Iraq: Orbat 2003
v.1.0 January 26, 2003
Kirill [Data]
Ravi Rikhye [Commentary]
This open source orbat is from Kirill’s www.waronline.org and from the Jaffee Center’s annual Middle East Military Balance 2001-2002. With the exception of units mobilized after the United States made clear its intent to attack, there will be no significant change in the information presented here and the situation in the winter of 2002/2003. We have more detailed orbats with material from sources that include not-open sources; these are available only on payment.
The following is solely the opinion of the editor, Ravi Rikhye, and does not presume to speak for anyone else associated with orbat.com.
In our opinion, relying on various sources, Iraq has at best just enough T-72, T-62, and T-55 tanks and BMP-1/2 IFVs to equip its ten armored and mechanized divisions with minimal reserves. More likely tank and mechanized units are seriously under strength in equipment. Aside from the question of how well this armor can stand up to US-British tanks and anti-tank weapons, we believe that even a few days of maneuvering prior to and during battle will severely deplete spare parts inventories built up through smuggled parts and cannibalized equipment. While divisions were also under strength in terms of personnel, by now we expect recalled reserves will have filled out formations. Readers are welcome to draw their own conclusions about the effectiveness of the standing forces and reservists, we believe it is significantly less than in 1991, despite the big reduction in overall size of the army.
The air force, with an estimated 60-70 effective combat aircraft, cannot be a factor in any future conflict. The Jaffee Center gives 200 effective aircraft from an inventory of 333, including 70 MiG-21/F-7 from an inventory of 130, we believe the Center has taken a worst-case estimate and it is much too high. Similarly we believe the Center’s estimate for 360 effective helicopters from a force of 460 is much too high – again, the Center is probably assuming a worst-case scenario.
The Iraq Navy is not to be considered a factor even in the most optimistic of circumstances.
While there is obviously room for quibbling on how many hours or how many days the Iraqi regular forces and Republican Guard can and will fight, no serious disagreement exists on the statement that the regulars will be quickly and efficiently dispatched at minimal loss to the invaders.
The real question is how much delay the Special Republican Guard can impose in a battle for Baghdad or whichever city President Hussein makes his final stand. We do not believe the SRG can hold out for more than a few days in the face of US-British bombing, and we do not believe the prospect of civilian casualties will deter the invaders; in the event of the casualties actually materializing we believe this still not impose more than some mild degree of caution on the air campaign. As for the pro-Government militias, we feel their rhetoric belongs in a comedy film rather than in a serious discussion about outcomes of an Iraq war.
We remind our readers of the rhetoric and the reality of the Taliban’s stand in Afghanistan. We were told that Afghanistan had never, in modern times, been successfully conquered and that these fiercely motivated fighters would battle till the death. A 3-cell B-52 strike at one end of the spectrum, and a single 2000-lb bomb through a house’s window at the other results in, we believe, a dramatic diminution in the will and the ability to fight. We would not like to make the mistake of judging the outcome of any last stand based on assumptions from yesterday’s wars.
Reading beneath the statements of American generals who, like all generals, prefer to be cautious and emphasize the difficulties – as they should if they are good soldiers – we believe there is no doubt that a military campaign would be won in a few days. There is little point to wasting time on this debate.
The real question, of course, is what happens after Mr. Hussein is killed. That will mark the start of the real war. The past few months in Afghanistan have shown the United States is getting better at nation building, but has a very long way to go. Of course, the stakes are much higher in Iraq so presumably Washington will be more focused. We believe the US is prepared to stay in Iraq for 10, 30, 50 or more years if necessary and predict in the long run it will succeed in it objectives. Undoubtedly, whoever, there will be plenty of excitement and many a crisis before the war can be said to be finally won.
Republican Guard units and their location
4 separate "Special Forces" brigades (14 battalions in all), guarding Saddam's palaces.
So called "Special Republican Guard" (according to JCSS 26,000 men; 5 brigades according to IISS).
Northern corps - Al-Rashadia
Southern corps - Al-Bafreia
Army units and their location
1st corps - Kirkuk
2nd corps - Deyala
3rd corps - Al-Naserria
4th corps - Al-Amara
5th corps - Mosul