US forces for Gulf II
v.1.6 March 16, 2003
Johann
Price & Ravi Rikhye
Acknowledgement: A substantial amount of the data on US forces has been obtained from Globalsecurity.org headed by Mr. John Pike.
Note by Ravi Rikhye On The Likely Course Of the War
Strategic Overview: Johann Price
Gulf II Buildup
The 101st Airmobile Division is finally moving from Ft. Campbell. Keeping in mind that it's likely that no one aside from a handful of high-ranking US and British officers knows the real plans, and that the plans are constantly evolving because of geo-political contingencies, the general assumption is that the 101st Division is crucial to any Iraq attack. The division will take a month to deploy and will require a minimum of two weeks for training. An offensive before mid-March seems unlikely.
The US DOD has begun a call-up of CRAF aircraft, indicating large numbers of personnel are about to be air-lifted into the theatre now that their heavy equipment is, or is coming, into place.
If the US decides on a primarily air option, backed up by small ground forces, and with reinforcing troops entering the theatre on a rolling basis, an offensive could be launched at any time. This is particularly true because a critical unit, the 49th TFW [F-117] has deployed to the theatre. Though some reports say that all need tactical fighter wings have not yet deployed, and though the five-carrier force designated for the theatre is still moving into position, US air forces have a 10X greater capacity for destroying targets than was the case in 1991, and the number of targets is much less. US air forces have the capability to enter action in 48 hours after taking off from the United States; accordingly, reinforcing air units could be in the theatre very rapidly.
One school of thought is that the US is dissembling with its leisurely buildup, and that it will launch a zero-warning attack to catch both Iraq and the world community off-guard. Barring this possibility, publicly at least the US seems inclined to soothe world opinion by giving the inspectors at least one more month, losing nothing because it needs that time to complete its buildup.
Indications are the US is planning on a 96-hour war with a maximum of six days. It will involve seizure of major oilfields by airborne assault, and a high-speed drive to Baghdad. Iraqi Army formations that do not resist will be bypassed and later disarmed; those that do will be destroyed from the air. US forces have no plans to engage in a street-by-street battle in Baghdad: we believe the rather open discussion about the US I MEF being prepared for battle inside Baghdad is disinformation. Similarly, we believe talk of the US exploring the use of nuclear weapons against the regime's deepest bunkers is also disinformation intended to persuade the Iraqi leadership that death is inevitable should they not surrender.
We recommend readers wanting more detail proceed to Mr. John Pike's Globalsecurity.org; the only difficulty with this first-rate source is too much detail for those needing an overall picture.
Strategic Overview: Johann Price
Modern western military strategy demands an attack upon the enemy’s centre of
gravity at the highest possible levels. In geographical terms Iraq’s centre of
gravity is area known in ancient times as Mesopotamia – the fertile land
between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers where the dominant Sunni minority is
concentrated. Within that area the Baghdad-Tikrit corridor will be the most
heavily contested. Tikrit is the home of Saddam Hussein’s clan and the only
place where he can draw on grass level support.
The field forces in these areas are a mixture of military Republican Guard,
counter-coup forces, secret police, and loyal but minimally trained militia.
Equipment includes tanks, artillery, light armoured vehicles, mortars and light
weapons. The regular army is kept on the periphery in the north and the south
(where they can react to rebellion but cant threaten Saddam), with more
republican guard divisions between them and the capital.
The need then is for highly mobile forces that can quickly cross obstacles like
rivers, marshlands and take on the enemy in built-up areas with sufficient
firepower. Behind them will be the heavier armored divisions that will engage,
block, isolate or destroy those units that could threaten Coalition units
moving to the centre. After the end of hostilities, they will play a role in
preventing any opportunistic separatist movements from taking advantage of the power
vacuum that Saddam and the Ba’athists will leave behind.
The other
critical centre of gravity is his stockpile of ballistic missiles, chemical and
biological weapons. Destroying these before Saddam has a chance to provoke
Israel (despite its new Arrow/Green Pine ABM system) or coalition forces will
be the initial priority and that will be a job for coalition Special Forces
working closely with aviation.
The air component will play a critical role as before in reducing the overall
battle effectiveness of Saddam’s forces before ground troops come in to
contact. As before key targets will be air defence, C3 (which in this case
includes the secret police), and transportation. Given the much weaker
international support for the war both strategic and tactical phases of the air
campaign will have to be shorter. The other critical effect of weaker regional
support is the effect on basing options. As in Afghanistan long range bombers
and naval aviation are going to play a much larger role in this w
Note on overall deployments
As of March 15, 2003
The buildup is said to be complete; with respect to fighter aircraft, we need to keep in mind the US may be retaining some of the 1000 inside the United States and will dispatch them only at the last minute because of overloaded bases. This is particularly true since the decision was made in the last few days to divert aircraft from Turkey or intended for Turkey to other Gulf countries.
It should be noted that this is not intended to be a comprehensive listing of
units. It is instead intended to give the reader a feel for the kind of forces
heading to the region, and why they’ve been picked. We will produce a more
detailed listing when we feel that such a document is both appropriate and
practical.
Ground Forces
Summary of major ground units in or ordered to theatre
Additionally, at least one battalion of the 10th Mountain Division and elements of the SETAF [the major combat unit of which is the 173rd Airborne Brigade] have been alerted for movement; it is not clear where these troops are going.
US National Guard mobilization is significant; details can be found in the article by Shawn Dudley. Some of the confusion on where exactly US units are headed is being caused by persistent rumors that the US has started a buildup aimed at North Korea and also is preparing to step up its role in Colombia. The 92nd Air Assault Brigade of the Puerto Rican's Guard has been mobilized as a complete unit; this is fueling the speculation about Colombia.
Other formations V Corps deploying are combat and
combat service support units:
130th Engineer
Brigade
205th Military Intelligence Brigade
22nd Signal Brigade
3rd Corps Support Command
Given the threat from both ballistic missiles and converted unmanned
aircraft equipped with biological and
chemical weapons air defense is of critical importance to the Coalition.
The following Patriot units are
deploying:
108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade
35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade
Air Forces
The following continental US based units are deploying to the
region:
1st Fighter Wing, [F-15C]
2nd Bomb Wing [B-52]
4th Fighter Wing, [F-15E]
20th Fighter Wing [F-16]
23rd Fighter Group [A-10, two squadrons]
28th Bomb Wing, [B-1B]
49th Fighter Wing [F-117]
57th Wing [Predator & HH-60G]
169th Fighter Wing
347th Rescue Wing [HC-130]
509th Bomb Wing [B-2]
Units identified in the theatre include:
Essentially, it appears that units of the 7th and 8th AEF stayed in the theatre and were reinforced with units of the 9 AEF, which normally would have replaced one of the previous two AEFs.
The new task-based organization of the US Air Force is extremely confusing [and therefore makes hiding real assets that much easier].
The RAF will be deploying Tornado GR4s, Jaguars, aerial tanking and
intelligence gathering aircraft in addition to those already in the region.
For naval aviation, please see naval component section
Naval Forces
The US naval deployment will be principally centered around carrier battle
groups. How many they will need depends on a number of political and military
factors – the cooperation of Gulf countries, the planning deadlines, the
anticipated length of high-intensity operations, etc.
The US currently has 3 carrier battle groups in the region:
CV 64
USS Constellation [CAW 2]
CVN 75
USS Harry S. Truman [CAW 3]
CVN 72 USS Abraham Lincoln [CAW 14]
CVN 73 USS George Washington
[CAW 17]
CV 63
USS Kitty Hawk [CAW 5]
Two additional carrier groups are preparing to either reinforce them, or
eventually replace them [CVN 71 USS Theodore Roosevelt [CAW 8] and CVN 68 USS
Nimitz [CAW 11]. While the US could deploy six carriers in the theatre, it is likely that number will be overkill.
Five carriers would appear quite enough.
[With the Japan-based Kitty Hawk enroute to the Gulf, the USS Carl Vinson, currently exercising near Hawaii, replacing it in the 7th Fleet on account of the Korea crisis. ]
The US Marines have, at this time, 18
rifle battalions either on shore, off shore, or en route to the theatre. The
controlling HQ is the I MEF, with elements of the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Marine
Divisions. [The 4th is the USMC reserve division, elements of which have been
activated.]
Identified combat units include: