Military options towards Iraq
Forwarded by Gerry Hol on May 10, 2002, this analysis by the IISS London is from its open section.
Which tactics and what force?
Washington has made clear its desire for 'regime
change' in Iraq, seeing Saddam Hussein's removal as
the way to reduce Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
threats from Iraq. US efforts to garner support for
military action have achieved little success to date,
with key Middle Eastern and European states urging
Washington to focus on the more immediate problem of
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The diplomatic
complexities surrounding US plans for action are
deepening.
Yet, in assessing tactics and levels of
force that the US would need to unseat Saddam,
relatively straightforward conclusions arise.
The US would have to plan an invasion resembling
Operation Desert Storm. While 500,000 troops might not
be needed again, half that number could be. US
casualties might be several times higher than the 400
sustained in 1990-91. Other options, such as using
limited force in conjunction with aid to the Iraqi
opposition, have appeal because they aim to repeat the
tactics used in unseating Afghanistan's Taliban. In
Iraq, however, such tactics would be unlikely to work.
Saddam's removal would have to involve decisive force.
The need for stability while a new Iraqi government
became established would mean deploying up to 200,000
US ground troops, backed by 700-1,000 aircraft, and
maintaining them in-theatre for some time.
Unsuitable Afghan model
The tactics used in Afghanistan would not work in
Iraq.
First, the disparity in power between government
and opposition forces is much greater than that
between the Taliban and Northern Alliance.
Second, the
terrain and tactics in Afghanistan favoured US
airpower working with the local opposition, whereas in
Iraq the US would have to plan for tactical
environments ranging from large-scale open manoeuvre
warfare to irregular urban warfare.
Third, Iraqi
forces have in the last ten
years learned to deploy and operate in a manner that
could mitigate the effects of bombardment.
In Afghanistan, Taliban forces and al-Qaeda fighters
numbered perhaps 50,000. They faced a Northern
Alliance about 15,000 strong, later assisted by
southern
Pashtun militias that made overall opposition forces
at least half the strength of the Taliban. In Iraq,
the armed forces include 425,000 active-duty troops.
Of that number, roughly 30,000 are Special Republican
Guard personnel and about 70,000 make up the
Republican Guard - these are better fighters than is
generally
appreciated. The other 325,000 are estimated at 50%
combat effectiveness. There are also 650,000
reservists of suspect capability and devotion, but
these should
not be dismissed entirely as a matter of prudence.
Iraqi forces retain large quantities of equipment,
although armoured combat capabilities are estimated at
less than half those in 1990.
Iraq's opposition
includes 15,000 Kurdish Democratic Party troops,
10,000
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan troops and 6,000 Shi'ite
troops. Kurds claim their strength could double in
time of conflict. This would make for a total of
30-100,000
opposition personnel. However, most Iraqi opposition
forces lack mobility, anti-aircraft and anti-tank
weapons. This could be rectified by the US, which
could
also provide the technical means to operate in
conjunction with US aircraft.
Yet, the question of how
the mostly Kurdish opposition would infiltrate in
strength into central Iraq would remain. If a few
thousand Kurds straggled into Saddam's strongholds and
then faced tens of thousands of elite forces, the fate
of those Kurds (and any accompanying US forces) would
be bloody. Even if all the Kurds and other opposition
fighters took up position, the resulting force ratio
would be at least 4:1 in Saddam's favour.
The tactics of Iraq's army must also be considered.
Facing a challenge from the Kurdish-based opposition
and US airpower, its wisest course would be to hunker
down in cities, distribute and hide its forces, and
fight from those places. It cannot be assumed that the
Iraqi army would deploy armour in the open desert (as
in 1990-91), firing from static positions and
presenting an immobile target for airpower (as the
Taliban did). Many Iraqi weapons and command and
control (C2) centres will be placed near apartments,
hospitals, schools, and mosques.
Proponents of fighting Saddam, emboldened by the
success of Operation Enduring Freedom, argue that US
capabilities have improved enormously since Desert
Storm, and are confident of rapid success, regardless
of where the US fights Iraqi
forces. They note that over 50% of ordnance dropped in
Afghanistan has been precision-guided, whereas the
proportion was less than 10% in Desert Storm. This
is correct, but not particularly persuasive. Desert
Storm hardly lacked for precision-strike weaponry:
nearly 20,000 'smart' bombs were used, in contrast to
about 12,000 in Enduring Freedom to date.
Yet, several
attempts to kill Saddam failed. In ensuing years,
moreover, precision weapons were relatively
ineffectual in depriving Iraq of WMD, much of which
was hidden from intelligence analysts.
Airpower proponents often forget the experience of
Kosovo, where more than one-third of NATO's ordnance
was 'smart', yet confirmed kills on Serbian forces in
the forests and towns of Kosovo were very few. The US
is largely still fighting with the weapons and tactics
used in Kosovo.
Meanwhile, weapons such as the Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM), so effective against entrenched
Taliban forces, would generally be ineffective against
Iraqi armour inside Iraqi cities, as they typically
miss their targets by 10-15 metres. In urban settings,
such inaccuracy would cause unacceptable collateral
damage.
Armoured targets would also often survive strikes.
Laser-guided bombs could be more effective in good
weather and against exposed armour, but require
forward
target-designators. If US aircraft tried to spot
targets on their own, they would have to fly low over
Iraqi cities, risking losses from Iraqi anti-aircraft
artillery and shoulder-launched surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs). When coalition aircraft flew low in
the first three days of Desert Storm, 27 aircraft were
damaged or destroyed (one-third of losses).
The invasion option
The presence of sizeable US ground forces would make
a decisive contribution to military success. Iraqi
units might move against Saddam if they saw a massive
army advancing towards them - many commanders are
loyal to Saddam only out of fear for their lives.
However, mass Iraqi defections cannot be assumed, and
other factors warrant consideration.
First, despite
degradation, Iraqi forces have an urban warfare
capability and it can be assumed that if US forces
assembled over a period of months, cities would be
'prepared' for urban combat. Much heavy equipment is
in poor repair, but the weapons needed for urban
combat - shoulder-launched
SAMs, anti-tank weapons, automatic weapons,
rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, explosives and
mines - are in ample supply.
Second, the Republican
Guard and Special Republican Guard are more loyal to
Saddam than conscripts. It would be extremely
imprudent to assume that 100,000 hard-core fighters
would not
oppose US-led coalition forces inside Iraq's cities.
Washington would have to at least attain parity. More
than 100,000 US troops would thus be required, while
an
invasion and occupation force of 200,000 would be
ideal.
Third, recent experience in urban combat points
to the likelihood of one US loss for every 5-20
opposition losses. If Iraq were prepared to endure
20,000 casualties, the US could also suffer thousands
(with roughly 20% fatalities). The risks in assuming
easy victory only to be proved wrong would be quite
high.
The Iraqi targets of greatest interest to US forces
would include C2 and leadership targets, what remains
of the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme and other WMD
capabilities. If these could be neutralised, the war
could potentially be won quickly, since toppling
Saddam and depriving Iraq of WMD is of more importance
to the US than completely destroying Iraq's military.
However, it has to be assumed that C2 targets could
survive attacks; that the US would not quickly learn
the whereabouts of WMD targets; and that Saddam could
evade capture or remain within a protective cordon
formed by elite troops. Under these circumstances, one
has to
assume that the US would have to destroy or force the
surrender of the bulk of
Iraq's armed forces, and particularly the Republican
Guard and Special Republican Guard.
In choosing forces, the US would have to use several
hundred combat aircraft to attack strategic targets
and provide close air support for US and any other
coalition ground troops. In terms of ground forces,
some heavy armour would be needed, but a mix of armour
and infantry would be critical.
Since there is no
dedicated division or corps of urban combat troops in
the US military, the US ground force might include:
two heavy armoured or mechanised infantry divisions;
the 101st Air Assault Division (possibly also
earmarked for seizing forward operating bases); the
10th Mountain Division; several thousand Rangers and
special operations forces; and one or two Marine
divisions.
A ground invasion would be difficult to prepare.
Deploying 200,000 troops to the Gulf would take time,
especially since Saudi bases and facilities might not
be available. If only Kuwait allowed access to its
facilities for staging, building up 200,000 US troops
would take 2-3 months and forces would be more limited
in terms of their breakout manoeuvre warfare. More
airfields would also have to be built and a number of
carrier air groups would have to be deployed. A total
preparation period of 4-6 months might be needed.
WMD wildcard
Despite these caveats, it is possible to be confident
that a US-led invasion force would achieve victory.
Yet, US planners will have to keep in mind possible
use of whatever WMD capability Saddam has retained or
developed since UN weapons inspectors were ejected in
1998. Based on past experiences with chemical weapons,
current US casualty estimates would have to be
increased by at least 50%.
Also of concern would be
possible WMD-use against Israel, Kuwait, the Kurds or
Western targets. Iraq may possess 30 SCUDs and
shorter-range missiles, while aircraft and human
agents might also deliver weaponry. SCUDs carrying
conventional warheads would not be major threat, with
average casualties of 1-5 per missile expected. Those
carrying biological weapons would probably fail to
dispense agent properly, given the crudeness of the
delivery mechanism but SCUDs carrying chemicals would
be expected to kill dozens per warhead, depending on
levels of protection, wind conditions and advance
warning. Aircraft carrying chemical or biological
weapons would, however, be much more dangerous.
Fortunately, neighbouring states are unlikely to be
vulnerable given the cover afforded by the US air
force, but Iraqi Kurds and Shi'ites might be at risk.
These dangers are real but probably not excessive.
Calibrating the conflict
Overthrowing Saddam would require preparations for a
ground invasion followed by an occupation of Iraq. It
is difficult to imagine any US administration which
contains Secretary of State Colin Powell not planning
for the use of overwhelming force. Simple prudence
also argues for such an approach. If such plans are
made,
and deployments initiated, there is a possibility that
the Iraqi army might crumble before it had to be
fought. But this cannot be relied on. Hoping for an
easier victory, or experimenting with an Afghan model
of warfare first, would probably result in large
causalities among the Iraqi opposition and a stalemate
that would damage US relations with the Middle East,
without shaking Saddam's hold on power.