v. 3.0 April 8, 2003
Alex Raditch
Every detail in this analysis has been found on publicly available sources, with the author’s own interpolation to fill in some of the gaps.
The British Army puts much emphasis on delegation of responsibility and initiative down to the very lowest of ranks. Even privates are expected to use their heads - it is hoped wisely! One very positive consequence of this is that formations of a ‘small’ nature can be readily moved from one command structure to another with little loss of fighting potential. The Officer Commanding (OC) a squadron or company can easily adapt to an instant chain of command (CoC) change with little difficulty. One example of this was the temporary detachment last week of a tank squadron from the Royal Scots Dragoons Battle Group (RSDG BG), part of 7 Armd Bde, and placed under command of 3 Commando Brigade (3 Cdo Bde) in support of 40 Commando (40 Cdo) on the al-Faw peninsular.
As the operational situation changes from day-to-day, rather than attempt to locate individual units the focus is on an overall orbat/TOE for British ground forces in Iraq/Kuwait. The below reflects the original plan when British units crossed into Iraq. Corrections/additions are welcome.
The regular British Army is ‘overstretched’. With a nominal establishment of approximately 108,000, it has currently approximately 102,000 ‘trained’ soldiers, 5% below manning. It has currently on ‘operations’ just under 60% of it’s entire manpower, this is unsustainable for any length of time (this figure includes those allocated to ‘Op FRESCO’), and is the reason why military and government officials have already stated categorically that there will be no more additional troops sent over and above the current amount. Worryingly, it is only able to operate at this level with the inclusion of large numbers of reserve soldiers, some of whom are included, as individuals, in the ‘fighting’ elements.
No peacetime unit can deploy operationally 100% of its nominal formation. In order to ‘make up the numbers’ individuals and elements from other units have temporarily strengthened named units in Iraq. We ask readers not flood Orbat.com with information such as: “My friend from the Grenadier Guards (1 GG) is in Iraq, why haven’t you mentioned that unit?” The answer is simple; elements of 1 GG are operating within the Black Watch (1 BW) formation, as the peacetime 1 BW battalion is under strength. On a more permanent basis, 1st Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment (1 R IRISH) has a Gurkha reinforcement company within its unit structure, yet you will never see mention of these 120+ troops in any orbat or deployment list!
Wire diagram: 1 (UK) Armoured Division upwards
Wire diagram: 1 (UK) Armoured Division downward
This orbat depicts only ‘fighting’ elements. That is not to say that the ‘support’ elements are not important. In this campaign, due to the nature of the Iraqi resistance graphically highlighted in an-Nasariyah, the rear support elements are in just as much danger as the combat troops. However, because of time constraints, these elements must be omitted. Therefore the orbat contains only units from the following arms: armour, infantry, artillery, combat engineer and aviation.
1 (UK) Armoured Division
Major General Robin Brims
28 Regiment Royal Engineers (28 RE) Lt Col Callum Skeet
23 (Amph) sqn RE
45 (Fld) sqn RE
29 (Armd) sqn, 35 Regt RE
70 Gurkha (Fld) sqn, 36 Regt RE
and elements from:
Duke of Wellingtons Regiment (1 DWR) supplemental infantry
5 (STA) Regiment Royal Artillery (5 RA) UAV reconnaissance
33 (EOD) Regiment Royal Engineers (33 RE) ordinance disposal
A Sqn, QDG light armoured reconnaissance
59 Indy (Cdo) sqn RE assault engineers
131 Indy (Cdo) sqn RE (V) support engineers (reserve)
9 (Cdo) Assault Squadron RM river and canal patrol / transport
539 (Cdo) Assault Squadron RM river and canal patrol / transport
40 Cdo RM (Combat Group) Lt Col Gordon Messenger
HQ and support coy
A coy
B coy
C coy
D coy
8 (Alma) Cdo bty, 29 (Cdo) RA 6 x 105mm Light Gun
HQ and support coy
J coy
K coy
L coy
M coy
79 (Kirkee) Cdo bty, 29 (Cdo) RA 6 x 105mm Light Gun
29 (Cdo) Regt RA
23 (Cdo) HQ bty RA (Gibraltar)
7 (Cdo) bty RA (Sphinx) 6 x 105mm Light Gun
148 (Cdo) Fwd Ob bty RA (Meiktila)
845 (Cdo) sqn RM Sea King helicopters
847 (Cdo) sqn RM Lynx and Gazelle helicopters
In January 2003, Naval Task Group 03 left the UK on a ‘routine’ sailing. Few were under any illusions that this was headed for operations in the Gulf, as its configuration was far from standard (HMS Ark Royal in pure helicopter role with Chinooks of 18 Sqn RAF in place of Sea Harrier etc.). On reaching the Gulf, Naval Task Group 03’s land component consisted of: HQ 3 Cdo Bde RM, 40 Cdo RM, 8 (Alma) Cdo bty RA, 148 (Meiktila) Cdo Fwd Ob bty RA and other support elements. Sea landing to be carried out by 9 and 539 Assault Squadron RM, and air transportation and support by 845 and 847 Cdo Squadrons RM (and other RN / RAF / USMC helicopters).
In theatre, 3 Cdo Bde has been strengthened by 42 Cdo flown in from the UK as well as the remaining elements of 29 (Cdo) Regt RA, a (light armoured) reconnaissance squadron from the Queen’s Dragoon Guards (QDG) and the USMC 15th MEU.
For US readers, Naval Task Group 03 is similar and equivalent to a USMC MEU.
40 Cdo is an independently mobile force as it is equipped with its Haaglund BV206 and Viking all terrain vehicles and other support equipment, 42 Cdo requires helicopter airlift (or road transportation from other units).
As the conflict has progressed, various elements have been attached and detached. The most noteable being the 15th MEU, but also a tank squadron of the RSDG has/is operating in support of 40 Cdo and the assault on the southern suburbs of an-Basrah. The various artillery batteries have been allocated as and when required in support of the ground troops.
7th Armoured Brigade
Brigadier Graham Binns
C Sqn, QDG light armoured reconnaissance
M (HQ) bty, 3 RHA
2 (HQ) sqn, 32 (Armd) Regt RE
HQ sqn, RSDG 2 x Challenger 2 / 8 x Scimitar
A sqn, RSDG 14 x Challenger 2
B sqn, RSDG 14 x Challenger 2
C sqn, RSDG 14 x Challenger 2
1 coy, IG 14 x Warrior
2 coy, IG 14 x Warrior
C bty, 3 RHA 8 x 155mm SP AS-90
26 (Armd) sqn, 32 (Armd) Regt RE
Nero (HQ) sqn, 2 RTR 2 x Challenger 2 / 8 x Scimitar
Cyclops sqn, 2 RTR 14 x Challenger 2
Egypt sqn, 2 RTR 14 x Challenger 2
Falcon sqn, 2 RTR 14 x Challenger 2
? coy, 2 LI 14 x Warrior
? coy, 2 LI 14 x Warrior
? bty, 3 RHA (26 RA) 8 x 155mm SP AS-90
25 (Armd) sqn, 38 (CS) Regt RE
HQ coy, 1 BW 1 x Warrior
A coy, 1 BW 14 x Warrior
B coy, 1 BW 14 x Warrior
C coy, 1 BW 14 x Warrior
Fire Sup coy, 1 BW 4 x Warrior, 8 Sabre and various FV432
1 sqn, QRL 14 x Challenger 2
J bty, 3 RHA 8 x 155mm SP AS-90
31 (Armd) sqn, 32 (Armd) Regt RE
HQ coy, 1 RRF 1 x Warrior
W coy, 1 RRF 14 x Warrior
Y coy, 1 RRF 14 x Warrior
Z coy, 1 RRF 14 x Warrior
Fire Sup coy, 1 RRF 4 x Warrior, 8 Sabre and various FV432
1 sqn, QRL 14 x Challenger 2
D bty, 3 RHA 8 x 155mm SP AS-90
39 (Armd) sqn, 32 (Armd) Regt RE
This orbat gives a total of 116 Challenger MBTs, 150 Warrior IFVs, 32 AS-90 SP guns as well as numerous Scimitar, Swingfire, Spartan, Sabre and other recce and support vehicles, a significant armoured force configured for manoeuvre warfare in open country. However, this force has become the main element surrounding al-Basrah and tasked with securing the two major urban areas of the south, az-Zubayr and al-Basrah.
Looking again at the orbat of 7th Armd Bde, there are a number of interesting points to be made. During peacetime, 3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery (3 RHA) consists of three batteries each with 6 guns. Operationally they are to be enlarged by reservists to four batteries each with 8 guns. However, the deployment to Iraq saw 3 RHA combine with 26 Regiment Royal Artillery (26 RA) to form the artillery support. In fact, there are more members of 26 RA in Iraq than 3 RHA, yet it is the 3 RHA nameplates on the units involved. In the orbat above, 1 battery has been allocated to each BG as is appropriate. Once manoeuvre warfare was halted and 7th Armd Bde adopted a static position west of al-Basrah. All four batteries were grouped under 3 RHA RHQ command, and deployed when and where necessary. One battery was then deployed to the southern outskirts of an-Nasariyah to assist the USMC Task Force Tarawa. Once the situation in an-Nasariyah had eased, this battery joined the 16th Air Assault Brigade in assisting 1 PARA in their operations north of the ar-Ramaylah oilfields.
C Squadron, Queens Dragoon Guards (QDG) has generally been operating north of an-Basrah protecting the brigade’s northern flank. However, this requirement has diminished as 1 PARA and D Squadron, Household Cavalry Regiment (HCR) have extended their control in this area and subdued the remaining elements of the Iraqi 41st Armoured Brigade.
16th Air Assault Brigade
Brigadier ‘Jacko’ Page
D Sqn, HCR light armoured reconnaissance
HQ and support coy, 1 PARA
A coy, 1 PARA
B coy, 1 PARA
C coy, 1 PARA
D coy, 1 PARA
G (Para) bty, 7 RHA 6 x 105mm Light Gun
HQ and support coy, 3 PARA
A coy, 3 PARA
B coy, 3 PARA
C coy, 3 PARA
D coy, 3 PARA
I (Para) bty, 7 RHA 6 x 105mm Light Gun
HQ and support coy, 1 R IRISH
A coy, 1 R IRISH
B coy, 1 R IRISH
C coy, 1 R IRISH
D coy, Gurkha reinforcement coy
F (Para) bty, 7 RHA 6 x 105mm Light Gun
7 (Para) Regt RHA Lt Col Duncan Francis
H (Para) HQ bty, 7 RHA
12 HQ sqn RE
9 (Para) sqn RE
51 (Fld) sqn, 38 Regt RE
61 (Fld) sqn, 36 Regt RE
Elements from 662 Sqn AAC Lynx and Gazelle recce and anti-tank helicopters
Elements from 663 Sqn AAC Lynx and Gazelle recce and anti-tank helicopters
16 AA Bde’s main task has been to secure the important oilfields in southern Iraq. Initially relying on helicopter insertion to numerous widespread locations, sufficient light vehicles (i.e. Land Rovers) have now arrived in theatre to give them some independent mobility.
As discussed earlier, 3 PARA has been redesignated to 7 Armd Bde in the last couple of days for the an-Basrah operation.
1 PARA has been heavily involved with D sqn, HCR in securing the northern flank to the UK position, by aggressively seeking out and destroying the remnants of the Iraqi 41st Armoured Division. The lightly armed 16 AA Bde are (with support) taking on, and defeating, Iraqi armoured units, thanks to Milan and Swingfire.
1 R IRISH initially performed a dual function, oilfield security and POW handling. Latterly it has dispatched at least one company to Umm Qasr to replace elements of 42 Cdo in operation at an-Basrah.
The three 105mm Light Gun field batteries of 7 RHA were initially allocated one to each combat group, but now come under central RHQ command. At least two batteries allocated to the ‘northern front’ in support of 1 PARA. These have been joined by a battery of AS-90 155mm guns, which have leant considerable weight to 1 PARA in ‘controlling’ the ground north of ar-Rumaylah.
23 RE is a new formation, which in the UK under peacetime conditions has still yet to properly form. Both 51 and 61 Fld Sqns RE are attached from the units indicated above, however, in time this will be permanently under the command of 23 Engineer Regiment and 16 Air Assault Brigade.
3 AAC has formed a composite squadron of reconnaissance Gazelle and anti-tank Lynx helicopters. Due to the compact nature of the area under UK control, these forces, in conjunction with the Commando Helicopter Force, as well as elements of the RAF/RN Joint Helicopter Force have come under the command of 1 (UK) Armd Div, and thus support any of the units as and when necessary within the division.