Volume 8, Number 1

February 13, 2009

Swat, Pakistan North West Frontier Province

A letter from Hamid, forwarded by Major A.H. Amin (Retired)

Following is a piece sent to me by a former mid level intelligence official of Pakistan army with first hand information & experience about handling the issues discussed in the piece.  My comments are in italics.  The problem is complex and there are no easy answers or quick solutions.  I do not claim to be privy to any special information or have any solution. My perspective is based on my interaction with ordinary Pakistanis & Afghans especially Pushtuns and many Pakistan army officers and limited only to military aspect.  Military aspect is only 20 percent but an important one and the rest 80 percent is social.   This is just part of an ongoing dialogue because these events pose a serious threat to Pakistan's interests and specifically the future of Pushtuns.

 'Consider not only present but future discords …  If one waits until they are at hand, the medicine is no longer in time as the malady has become incurable.'        Machiavelli

In the spring of 1994 Mullah Omer started his Taliban movement with less than 50 Madarassa students and after the capture of Kandahar, the second largest city of Afghanistan, students, in thousands from Pakistani Madrassas rushed to join the new force and by December 1994 he had a force of 12000 talibs– a new phenomena had emerged in the Pashtun society, madrassa students and Mullahs were ruling the pashtuns with the barrel of gun.  In Pashtun society no clear role is defined for religious functionaries in the social system.  The Government officials posted in these areas and the Maliks/Khans are considered leaders, who get legitimacy from the state authority while religious functionaries are given a limited role dealing with some religious rituals.  (This is correct summary of traditional role of clerics and their rising power.) Religious leaders are not satisfied and content with this role, as they have always wanted a more prominent role in the decision making.  Throughout the history of Pashtuns major uprising were led by religious leaders like Pir Rosh an, Powinda Mullah, Faqir of Ipi, Sartor Mullah and many others. (This is only partly correct.  These examples are correct but they represent only a fraction of expeditions/uprisings in Pushtun territories in the last two hundred years.  In majority of cases especially in cases of Pushtun on Pushtun violence, leadership has been squarely in the hands of traditional leaders. In addition, each incidence was more local in nature and we can not put them in the same basket.  Faqir of Ipi fought against Pakistan as fiercely as he did against British.)  They had leadership as long as the war/jihad was on, but the moment the conflict was over, the leadership again reverted to the Maliks and Khans. The present talabinization is not just a movement for enforcement of Sharia,the mullahs want power, authority and a defined role in the decision making in the social system of Pashtun society (They have crashed into the party demanding their share and who would not if he had the gun and a firm belief that his hand was God's own hand doing God's work.)

Events and political happenings in Afghanistan have always had some impact on NWFP in general and FATA in particular.  Durand line divided many tribes, and out of the seven tribal agencies, 6 have divided tribes – with people of same tribe living on both sides of the Durand line.  They cross the border freely and in British time they had easement rights which enabled them to travel across the border without any documents. (This is correct but since increased centralization of Afghanistan & Pakistan in late 19^th and early 20^th century, the role of central governments gradually increased.  Tribal areas were never able to threaten the established order in both countries. Disintegration of Afghanistan in 1980s & 90s set in motion a dangerous phenomenon and we are now seeing the results of spreading of that process to contiguous areas. The most unfortunate part is that most Pakistanis are not aware of the involvement of their governments in Afghan affairs.  Everything was swept under the Jihad carpet and the phenomenon was never seriously studied even by those who were actively involved in it.  Most Pakistani never heard the narratives of others including Afghans.  Examples from my own personal experience may help to give some context;  I interviewed an ISI colonel who had worked for years dealing with southern Afghanistan.  His knowledge about his area of operation and the population simply shocked me.  He was simply handing money to Afghan proxies and thinking he was the master.  Those of us who grew up in Peshawar in 1980s knew very well that Afghan rebels were routinely executing school teachers.  When asked they replied that their mullahs have told them that they were teaching communism in schools.  So teachers became apostates and eligible for summary execution.  It started with female teachers and then expanded to males.  ISI directly supported bombings in Kabul University stating that as communism was taught there therefore 'educational institutions were a fair game'.  Exiled Afghan intellectuals and who held different views were assassinated in Pakistan by its proxies.  I'm not saying that Pakistan ordered their killings but its proxies which it could control were doing it on its soil so they share some responsibility.  When Khost was captured by rebels, it was designated conquered territory by clerics and therefore eligible for treatment as 'booty'.  In case of a school, there was dispute about what to do with benches and chairs.  A prompt fatwa solved the matter quickly when all furniture was chopped and distributed as 'booty' among the so called mujahids to be used as firewood.

Pakistanis are shocked now when it is happening in their own country but don't know that their government's direct support to elements doing these things more than two decades ago to someone else has something to do with it.  The purpose is not to denounce the whole policy or start blame game but facts need to be acknowledged to find a better course now. It is too fashionable in Pakistan to criticize America for all their ills and every civilian and uniformed scoundrel has walked free and has never been asked to answer for their acts of omission and commission which resulted in deaths of hundred of thousands of Afghans.)

Swat is neither a tribal area nor is it bordering Afghanistan, so the question arises, how come it has become a strong hold of extremist elements who have virtually taken over the area.  Being a fertile area it always attracted invaders.  Till the 10^th century most of the population were followers of Buddhism and were very peaceful and docile people.  In the 16^th century the Yousafzai tribe captured the valley.  The area was divided between various sub-tribes.  There was no central system of administration.  The tribes resolved their own disputes.  In each tribe a system of "Wesh" existed wherein residents of every village were shifted every 5-7 years to another village except for Syeds and Kasabgars.  The Gujjars and Kohistanis of Swat had no land ownership.  Except for few years of central rule, this tribal system continued till 1917, after which different tribes elected a central leader and Swat emerged as an independent state. In 1926, the British accepted the state of Swat and the ruler was coffered with the title of Waali-e-Swat.  He formed his own central administrative system with two types of courts functioning in the State. Courts headed by the religious scholars, known as Qazi Courts, and Judicial Courts, headed by the area Tehsildars.  The Qazi Courts dealt with cases of divorce, inheritance and some other minor cases involving sharia, while all other disputes were referred to the Tehsildar. The appellate forum was that of a Hakim, and a final appeal could be made to the Waali.  All this process took only one month. In those times the social problems were also not very complex so generally, the population was getting free and speedy justice. 

The Wali had a very effective administrative mechanism for the implementation of his laws known as "Riwajnamas" (Good summary of evolution of Swat but the question is whether it has any relevance to present scenario? We can learn some positive lessons but obviously can not turn the clock back.)

 Dir and Bajaur were annexed to Pakistan in 1960, while Swat was merged in Pakistan in 1969. In 1975, these former independent states were declared as Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). District Administration and Police were placed in these areas which were given status of districts. However, the judicial system was based on Jirgas and executive authority of the District Magistrates. In 1992, on a petition of lawyers, the PATA regulations were abolished by the courts. No alternative system was evolved and put in place to replace the previous system, so there was a judicial void which created unrest in the general public. (I'm glad that you pointed to an important event and you are the first person who understood the importance of this fact.  This is the dirty little known secret in Pakistan which even well informed people don't know.  Systems in place no matter how imperfect evolved over one hundred years and any ill thought action to overhaul them without serious home work is going to bring the whole edifice down.  If any one needs any proof, he should look at Swat which literally melted away in front of our eyes in less than two years. Those who are advocating abolishing FCR need some soul searching. No one is suggesting that existing systems are perfect but they worked pretty good in the past and are far better than anarchy. It is fashionable in newly independent countries to criticize colonial enterprises but I was surprised in my numerous interactions with Pushtuns that they have a great respect for British rulers.  Several of my friends from tribal areas consider British political officers far superior to any which independent Pakistan has produced.  Contributions of officers like George Rooskepple & Robert Warburton to Pushtun society are far superior to any Pakistani official.)

In November 1994, a general uprising took place in former Malakand Division on the call of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e- Mohammdi (TNSM).  Violence erupted during the movement and the mob took control of 6 Districts. New rules for traffic were introduced and all kinds of transport were forced to move on the right side of the road, left being un-Islamic. This resulted in numerous road accidents. Men were made to wear watches on right hand. A sitting MPA of the PPP, the then ruling party, was killed.  It took the law enforcement agencies more than a month to dislodge the militants and to regain control of these areas.  TNSM was formed by Sufi Mohammad in 1988.  He himself is a simple peaceful person who does not preach violence except for Jihad against the Non Muslims.  However, he does not have the leadership qualities and capabilities to control large movements. In the 1994 movement, besides the TNSM, car-lifters, timber mafia, kissans having disputes with Khans, loan defaulters, smugglers and many other anti-social elements penetrated, and took over control of the movement and resorted to violence.  As a result of this movement the provincial government was pressurized and a Nizam-e-Adal was introduced in the Malakand Division in December 1994.  The religious elements of TNSM established peaceful camps which continued till August 1995 for implementation of Nizam-e-Adal act.  Qazi Courts were established in 1995.  About 11 Qazis were directly enrolled and for remaining civil courts the Judges were named as Qazis.

In 2001 Sufi Mohammad crossed over to Afghanistan to fight against the American forces, along with thousands of volunteers who could not fire even a single bullet and were routed and they fled, in all directions, from Afghanistan.  Sufi Mohammad was arrested in Kurram and was awarded 7 years imprisonment.  (Lesson for GHQ from this incident is that let the nature takes its course.  Local population was furious against Sufi for taking young boys to slaughter and run back safe to Pakistan.  It would have been much better to force Sufi back to his territory and let some disgruntled local bump him and some other TSNM leaders off when emotions were high. Instead, he was put in the safe house in DI Khan.) The TNSM remained dormant for several years till Fazal Ullah became active in 2006-2007.       

Besides the TNSM factor, there are other actors in the prevailing Swat situation.  After the Tora Bora operations and operation Anaconda, conducted in March 2002 by the NATO forces in Shahi Kot,Paktiya,most of the foreigners crossed over to Pakistan and took shelter in almost all parts of Pakistan with Jihadi, Sectarian organization and other tribal, facilitating their movement and providing other administrative support to them.  A number of them went to Swat.   (This is another example of strategic myopia of GHQ.  They seriously under-estimated the extremist threat to Pakistan.  They only looked the whole changed strategic landscape through the prism of Afghanistan and no one can blame them.  After all it was only a handful of American Special Forces and CIA operatives who were operating at that time in Afghanistan.  Senior brass concluded that Americans were for a short stint and once gone, Afghanistan will again become their playground.  Even if that was the case, they should have looked at the extremist threat independent of American factor.  The decision at highest level was only to catch foreign fighters while Taliban were given a free pass.  This later proved to be a strategic blunder the price of which is being paid with the blood of Pakistanis;  both soldiers & civilians.  This is the reason that I'm of the view that Pakistani officers should stop reading novels of Nasim Hijazi and start reading some serious military strategy to broaden their horizon.  May be a little bit of Shakespeare will not do harm). On the onset of army operations in 2002, these foreigners kept on shifting their position. Another factor may also have contributed to the situation which is the conflict between the Kissans and the Khans. During Bhutto era, a kissan movement was started where the landless farmers took possession of lands which belonged to various big landlords. Matta Tehsil of Swat was the most affected area of this movement in Malakand Division.

In 2003 Gulbadin, Taliban and Al-Qaeda reached an agreement to fight the NATO jointly.  The apparent strategy adopted was:-

• To start guerrilla warfare against the NATO Forces and engage them in a long war causing attrition and prolonging the conflict to tire them out so that they are forced to leave Afghanistan-- a repeat of jihad against Russia.

• To create a Taliban state and system of Khilafat again in Afghanistan, as it existed before 9/11\

• To discredit the NATO Forces through effective propaganda campaign by proving the war on terror a crusade launched by infidels against Muslims and that American forces are killing innocent unarmed Pashtun civilians.

• To get the support of religious elements and middle class population of both Pakistan and Afghanistan through anti-US propaganda.

• To exploit the sentiments of ethnic Pashtuns through code of conduct of Pashtunwali to get shelter and support in those areas.

• To eliminate prominent elders/ Maliks, create terror by use of brutal force and to Talibanize the whole tribal area so that security forces cannot operate freely in the area.

• To paint both Karzai and Pakistani rulers as puppets of US. (This was the strategy of the adversary.  It will be more helpful if we review what was GHQ's strategy to face these challenges?)

• To develop a consensus of civil society, all political parties, media and all segments of society and educate the general public that Pakistan is facing a serious threat of Talibanization and if suitable steps are not taken, the country may land into anarchy. (The most serious impediment is the perception on part of Pushtuns that army is in cahoots with the militants.  GHQ has not been able to convince Pushtuns that it is not dividing militants into good ones and bad ones.  In my countless conversations with Pushtuns of different backgrounds, majority were of the view that if army wanted to eliminate militants, it could do it swiftly but it wanted to keep the option open for the use of 'good militants' in Afghanistan & Kashmir on some later date.  There has been numerous stories told and retold about how police arrested some militants or captured arms & ammunition but were told to let them go by military authorities. Some also argue that large scale camps can not operate without official knowledge.  They are not clear whether army is unable or unwilling to tackle the problem.)

• The proposal of Sufi Mohammad for establishment of Appellate Court may be accepted. Since the Adal act is already in place, the appellate court establishment is not a very serious issue. Some TNSM elements are likely to join sufi mohammad and fazalullah may be isolated to some extent.

• Targeted operations should be conducted by the law enforcement agencies against the real terrorists through accurate intelligence and avoiding collateral damages. Troops should remain stationed in these areas after flushing out the terrorists. All troubled areas should be secured in operations conducted in phases. (Mid and senior officers should start reading some serious counterinsurgency works.)
• The office of the DC/District Magistrate should be restored with inherent powers.
• Compensation should be paid for all the damages caused to public property.
• Special funds should be provided by the Federal Government for reconstruction of all damaged schools.
• An Army Garrison should be established in Swat of a Brigade size force. (May be a division size will be needed but more important than numbers is first molding the battle space in army's favor by firmly controlling areas and providing security to population.  Without that no one is Swat is going to support army for simple reason of lack of protection.  Once it is known that army will protect the population then the next step is setting up a robust local intelligence set up. In the absence of these two essential steps no amount of money will bear any fruit.  It is naïve to expect a huge reconstruction bonanza courtesy of foreign benefactors when people are being beheaded on daily basis. Although no two situations are same, but it will help Pakistan army a lot if they seriously study what happened in Sunni areas of Iraq.  A number of open source materials are available for those willing to learn.)
• Swat Scouts Headquarters be shifted from Warsak to Kanju.  It should be reorganized into 5 wings corps and FC Post be established in all suitable areas.
• Police strength should be augmented and Frontier Constabulary already stationed in the area should be suitably deployed.
• The local people who are against the present violence should be provided security. Make the locals rise against these terrorists. They will only rise if they feel and see on ground that the government is serious and committed in eliminating the Taliban.

(In short run, army will be needed to clear the areas.  The division of labor should be organized at tehsil level.  As soon as area is cleared, every attempt should be made to reconstruct the model of police and Frontier Constabulary as first layer closely supported by FC.  Army should be kept in reserve to come to rescue when needed. A more close coordination between police, constabulary, FC & army will be needed from lowest to highest level.  A battalion reserve for each tehsil backed by mobile combined rapid reaction teams will increase coordination & morale. Severely curtail use of air assets and artillery.  The dilemma for officers in charge of operations is that if they don't soften up opposition with artillery they increase risk to their own soldiers and if they use it then chances of collateral damage increase thus alienating local population.

Two crucial factors which have not been seriously evaluated as far as armed forces are concerned are ethnic & sectarian dimensions.  We need to seriously ponder what is the effect of ongoing extremist violence on Pushtun and Shia soldiers & officers and what are the remedies to prevent widening of existing fault lines?)  

 The Judicial system should be made more effective by taking suitable steps for provision of speedy and affordable justice.

'In a divided country, when any man thinks himself injured, he applies to the head of his faction, who is obliged to assist him in seeking vengeance if he is to keep up his own reputation and interests, instead of discouraging violence.'   Machiavelli

Volume 7, Number 3

July 29, 2008

A 1985 Study By The BDM Corporation

Forwarded by Mandeep Singh Bajwa

Note: for every mention of "soviet Union" in the paper, replace with "United States": you will then be reading a paper updated for 2008.

Plan To Change the Map of India-Pakistan & Afghanistan Region (or Dismemberment of Pakistan (1985) – proposed by BDM Corporation (Subsidiary of FORD), Intelligence Analysts), under the New World Order.

SCENARIO OF THE FUTURE

 A Soviet military presence in Afghanistan – thus positioned on the Pakistan border – would not be so disturbing if South Asia did not have a history of violent settlement of conflicts. The inherent belligerency between India and Pakistan has produced three wars in less than 40 years. The details of the disputes evolved from religious and territorial issues which have neither disappeared nor been diminished by an arms competition that has acquired a raison d’etre all its own.

India’s rise to the status of a regional superpower, a posture which now rivals that of its occupier, Britain, has consistently been at the expense of Pakistan. The In the initial confrontation between 1947-48, Pakistan did well to hold the high ground while the prize – the value of Kashmir –went to India. The 1965 war was as indecisive as it was costly to both. Despite lackluster showing by the Indian Army, what kudos the Pakistan earned in terms of that performance were lost in the rematch six years later when the Bangladesh revolt and Indian invasion resulted in a humiliating defeat in the West and the loss of East Pakistan.

            India’s test of a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974 did not soothe the regional rivalry. Its symbolic value for Indian prestige stimulated a crash program by Pakistan which in turn has caused New Delhi to take on a crusade against nuclear proliferation. Rather than become involved as a signatory to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, India has taken on the self-anointed role of regional enforcer. In the fall of 1984, there was growing evidence that the Indian military had developed preemptive options and was urging an attack on Pakistan’s developing nuclear facilities. In an address to an army commanders’ conference only weeks before her assassination, the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi complained that “Pakistan’s nuclear program has brought about a qualitative change in our security environment.”  Subsequent reports, both on the accelerated pace of Pakistan’s nuclear development and on heightened efforts to increase its survivability by constructing underground facilities probably means that an Indian preemptive option may not be infinitely applicable. In any case, the number, location, and protection of those facilities probably means that an Indian attack could neither be as small nor surgical  as the precedent of the Israeli strike against the lone Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.

But there is no shortage of excuses for war (like U.S. has demonstrated).. Earlier in 1984 the Indians were blaming Pakistan for fomenting revolt among the Sikhs--charges noticeably absent since Indira Gandhi’s death. Between July and October there occurred an escalating series of border clashes with Indian patrols penetrating 60-km across the uninhibited but disputed territory of the Siachin Glacier, high up the Himalayan Rim. Interestingly, it was during this same period that the cross-border raids by Kabul ground units reached their peak in frequency and magnitude.

  There has never been a paucity of conflict scenarios between India and Pakistan, but with Soviet offensive power ensconced in the Afghan regional pivot, new and more dangerous possibilities arise. Such scenarios are new in that they could involve a joint or at least a coordinated Indo-Soviet effort. They are more dangerous in the sense that combined Indo-Soviet capabilities permit them to contemplate aggressive military actions with not only a higher pay-off  than either could achieve alone, but also with substantially-reduced risk.

The Soviets and Indians manifest a growing interest in the violation of Pakistani air-space, which is shared consequence of engaging quite different targets. For the Soviets, the concentrated insurgent base camps just across the border (where air-strikes could  have a more significant effect than on dispersed and hard-t-acquire targets in Afghanistan) must look increasingly attractive as they become frustrated with their inability to close down the infiltration routes from the resistance sanctuaries into Afghanistan. Whatever the immediate military valu, the collateral effect of terror upon the civilian refugees would likely push these settlements further and further from the border—thus decreasing the proximity  of te mujahideen to a key source of their support. Given the high percentage of  rebel arms which are of Chinese origin, the Soviets may also feel compelled to interdict the most conspicuous route of supply – the Karakoram Highway linking China and Pakistan.

Attack from the air is a necessity for any attempt to take out Pakistan’s budding nuclear program. The problem for either India or Soviets in this regard is the active resistance of Pakistan’s air force. But in this scenario, the two countries have an incentive to act in concert. A carefully coordinated air offensive attacking simultaneously from two different directions would overwhelm Pakistan’s interceptors. With fighter strikes limiting the defenders sortie rate, the bombers of Soviet strategic aviation could inflict punishing blows against Pakistani AIRBASES. After this initial surge provided meaningful air-superiority, Indian and Soviet forces would have an uninterrupted ride for subsequent attacks and could concentrate against their respective targets. In such a campaign, India, and  the USSR could achieve via joint action that which neither could accomplish individually (at least with high confidence of success and acceptable loss).

THE INDO-SOVIET VICE

A far more ambitious and permanent solution to the joint irritant of Pakistan would be a combined Indo-Soviet invasion.. In its relatively brief history, West Pakistan has never been realistically threatened by abject dismemberment—until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is not evident that either the Soviet Union or India desires the disappearance of Pakistan. However, their past behavior (Soviet support for the Baluch uprising of the early 1970’s and the Indian invasion of Bangladesh) certainly does not rule this out as a possible, if unlikely, contingency. In the wake of a devastating air offensive, a simultaneous Indo-Soviet ground assault from opposite directions with converging axes would be unstoppable. An Indian attack out of the Punjab toward Islamabad (a’ la 1965) coupled with a Soviet drive out of the Khyber (utilizing absolute firepower superiority to suppress the opposing  infantry; air assault to enfilade defense strong points and seize key terrain; and attack helicopters to retard reinforcement and maneuver) would force the main body of the Pakistan army to fight back-to-back. Options facing the Pakistanis would be unacceptable—defend in place under the prospect of ever-tightening  encirclement , or withdraw south and abandon the capital and Kashmir. A second Indian offensive—a deep armored sweep across the Sind desert (a’ la 1971) that linked up on the Hinus River north of Karachi with a mirrored Soviet move through the lightly-defended Baluchi crest—would seal Pakistan’s fate.

Against India alone. Given current force deployment, the Pakistanis have a reasonable prospect of making a good account of themselves (accepting some territorial loss for a lot of Indian blood in a protracted series of  attrition battles).. The same is also true concerning the Soviets, given the terrain on the Afghan frontier and assuming substantial Pakistani redeployment prior to take on both simultaneously, with quantitative and qualitative inferiority on the ground and without adequate air protection, invites defeat within weeks if not days.

REAPING THE BENEFITS!

For the aggressors, the outcome would offer enormous strategic benefit. Using the Indus River as the primary partition of responsibility. Kabul could re-establish its historic claim to the northwest frontier and be confident that, however long its internal insurgency lasted, the “miscreants” possessed neither sanctuary nor source of supply. The Soviets could bring the “fruits of class struggle:” to a newly established People’s Republic of Baluchistan which would, of course, ask for protection in exchange for Soviet port access on the  Indian Ocean (Gawadar). India could complete its quest for the Kashmir and administer as an autonomous region whatever was left.

Other than short-lived economic sanctions and even briefer condemnation by irrelevant international bodies, the risk of outside interference to such a short, decisive campaign would come from only two significant antagonists – China and the U.S.

For China, her proximity to this potential battle zone does not translate into deployable power. Between Pakistan and the adjacent province of Sinkiang lies an enormous mountain range. With only a few infantry division in this province and an antique air force what China cannot provide prior to hostilities will not come. With the mountain passes closed by weather, the only militarily significant land route linking China and Pakistan is the Karakoram Highway. An 800-km road which took 20 years to build , its 99 bridges and 1,708 culverts make it one of the world’s most attractive targets for air interdiction.

For the US, strategic timing, not tactical geography, is the most critical limitation. With advanced warning, the US Air Force could redeploy enough US assets to correct the aerial imbalance, redress some point defense deficiencies, and establish a symbolic ground presence. But realistically, the warning time prior to hostilities is likely to be too short and the assets the US can deploy after the shooting starts is not whether the  Soviets and Indians would actually initiate such a campaign, nor how they would operationally implement it—but that it is a consequence of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan that this scenario is even available for conjecture. It is a contingency which did not exist five years ago.

The most likely scenario, however, is that the Soviets—by carefully orchestrating their military posture next door, tightening the political –strategic vice of the Indo-Soviet bloc, and periodically allowing the counterinsurgency war to spill over the border—will convey to the Pakistanis a heightened sense of the danger they are in. Given an overdose of threat perception, Pakistan might find it convenient to do the Soviets’ dirty work for them by closing down the frontier passes, keeping the refugees from creating a unified and effective infrastructure, and inhibiting the external flow of arms to the rebels.

Afghan armed  resistance may go on for decades. That notwithstanding, if the Soviets can militarily or politically seal off  sanctuaries in Pakistan, the intensity and effectiveness of the guerilla activity will fall to a level, the Soviet “pacification by terror” campaign can achieve its intended results over time.

THE AMERICAN OPTION

The motile challenges to US regional policy aggravated by Soviet action in Afghanistan offer contradictory dilemmas. Should the US provide the arms modernization necessary to backstop Pakistan’s self confidence in the face of growing blackmail while discouraging its proliferative ego trip for an Islamic bomb”? Should the US prepare contingency forces for a credible regional commitment without forward deployment; attempt to wean the Indians from the lure of Soviet largesse while resisting their hegemonic ambitions to “paper train” the Russians while their troops make a mess in Afghanistan?

But the most pressing policy issue is what the United States will do to help the Afghan people. David Isby, one of the most informed commentators on the Soviet War in Afghanistan describes the expectation of a mujahid after listening to President Reagan state his support for the jihad over Voice of America.

Being an educated man, and knowing what the Americans had done to aid people fighting communism in the past, he went outside to look upward for the black C-130s he thought would be arriving with what the Afghans needed to keep fighting. The black C-130s never arrived.

            The US faces not only a policy decision but moral choice. To proclaim a “crusade for freedom” and then offer nothing but rhetoric is not just hypocritical—it is contemptuous of every American value. It is time to put up or shut up. And there is no clearer litmus test than supporting the Afghan resistance with the one armament that every observer of the war has noted they need most—a man-portable surface-to-air missile. When the Soviet Union feels free to arm Marxists and terrorists all over the globe with its latest weaponry, and when the US has a massive stock of surplus Redeye missiles (which are being replaced with the new Stinger), why does the US continue the charade of dribbling third-party SA-7s to the Afghan Resistance?

            America can make the Soviet invasion extremely costly by aiming directly at the military assets, which most typifies the war—Soviet air power. An unwillingness to provide that minimal assistance will foreordain the success of the Soviet “time and terror” strategy. America’s future deterrent to Soviet aggression in the third world will be no more credible than in December 1979, and Afghanistan will not be a prologue but a precedent.

This article on page 103 shows two maps of Pakistan under the caption of “A Scenario of the Future?”

Top Map - Pakistan graphically depicting “Joint Indo-Soviet Air Offensive”

· Preemptive attacks on Pakistan’s major airbases

· Soviet bombing of refugee camps and air assault seizure of key passes.

· Indian Strikes on Pakistani nuclear facilities

· Soviet interdiction of Karakoram Highway

Bottom Map - Pakistan graphically depicting  “Ground Campaign for the Dismemberment of Pakistan”

· Creation of independent “Peoples Republic of Baluchistan” with USSR Naval Base and Force Deployment Treaty

· Absorption of northwest tribal territories into Afghanistan

· Absorption of West Kashmir into India

· Administration of Sind /Punjab autonomous zone by India.

References:

1. The above contains only relevant  partial article (only the last 4 out of 16 pages ) “Afghanistan’s Ordeal Puts a Region at Risk,” by James B. Curren and Phillip A, Karber, published in Armed Forces JOURNAL International, pp. 78-105, March 1985.

NOTE:

1. All these events happened during Reagan Administration, including the existence of folks called NEOCONS. I was witness to the work that GE received under a Military Contract called “Operation Desert Shield,” a huge contract awarded to several others as well (Raytheon, Westinghouse, Lockheed-Martin, and more). Simply replace the word “Soviets” with “American” and it brings you from 1980 era to events beginning of 21^st Century. 

2.    Just imagine who is occupying Afghanistan right now, and these thought came from two American Defense/Intelligence Analysts, working for BDM Corporation (a subsidiary of FORD) of MacLean, VA. Only juxtapose Soviets with the word American to relate what is going on in Afghanistan at presents and the direction of the blowing winds engulfing Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Iran. All these countries are surrounded by Military bases now possessed in

 a region called “Petrolistan.” Complete details are posted in a 30-page PDF File posted at www.environmentaldirectory.info (after logging select Houston to acquire this 30-page document with graphic maps showing most of the important U.S. Military bases in this region as part of the New World Order.

        According to University of California Professor, and president of Japan Policy Research Institute, (author of BLOWBACK and The Sorrows of Empire), U.S. now possesses more than 750 Bases around the globe to enforce the New World Order, as we have seen after September 11, 2001.

    3.  This quest would be incomplete without connecting the above information with a  Known World Oil Reserves Map published by British Petroleum (BP) that is posted on the web at to learn where McCain acquired the “110 –year” military occupation of Iraq:

     http://earthtrends.wri.org/maps_spatial/maps_fullscale.php?mapID=505&theme=6

4.       “The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals,” by Alfred E/ Eckes, Jr., University of Texas Press, Austin & Toronto, 1979. ISBN Box 0-292-78511-9. (pbk)

5.       “RESOURCE WARS- The New Landscape of Global Conflict,” by Michael T. Klare, Owl Books Henry Holt and Company, 2001. ISBN 08050-5576-2. (pbk)

6.       “OIL, POWER & EMPIRE: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda,” by Larry Everest, Common Courage Pres, Monroe, Maine 2004.  ISBN 1-56751-246-1.(pbk)

7.       “CONFESSIONS OF AN ECONOMIC HIT MAN,” by John Perkins, A Plume Book, published by Penguin Group, New York 2004. ISBN 0-452-28708-1. (pbk)

8.       “Forbidden TRUTH: U.S. - Taliban Secret Oil Diplomacy and the Failed Hunt for Bin Laden, “ by Jean-Charles Brisard & Guillaume Dasquie, and published by Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, New York 2002. ISBN 1-56025-414-9. (pbk).

9.       “The PENTAGON’S NEW MAP – War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century,” by Thomas P.M. Bennett, Berkeley Books, New York 2004. ISBN 0-425-20239-9. (pbk).

10.   “The ISLAMIC BOMB: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, “ by Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, NYT/Times Books, New York 1981. ISBN 0-8129-0978-X

11.   “ROGUE STATE: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower, by William Blum, published by Common Courage Press, Monroe, Maine 2005. ISBN 1-565751-374-3.

12.   "After Iraq: A report from the new Middle East - and a glimpse of its possible future," by Jeffrey Goldberg, pp cover and  68-79. published in "The ATLANTIC Magazine, January/February 2008. Cover had the map of New Middle East as envisaged by the Neocons and Zionocons.

.

Volume 7 Number 2

March 19, 2008

Hamid Hussain

Comments on Major A.H. Amin's analysis of US policy Pakistan/Afghanistan

Volume 7 Number 1

January 28, 2008

Major A.H. Amin (Pakistan Army, Retired)

Waziristan

Vol 6 Number 5

September 4, 2007

Chris Raggio

London's School Of Asian & Oriental Studies Report On US Strike against Iran

There is considerable international discussion that the confrontation between Iran and the international community over its nuclear programme may change in character into a major war between Iran and either US or Israel or both in conjunction with allies such as the United Kingdom.

This study uses open source analysis to outline what the military option might involve if it were picked up off the table and put into action. The study demonstrates that an attack can be massive and launched with surprise rather than merely a contingency plan needing months if not years of preparation.

The study considers the potential for US and allied war on Iran and the attitude of key states. The study concludes that the US has made military preparations to destroy Iran's WMD, nuclear energy, regime, armed forces, state apparatus and economic infrastructure within days if not hours of President George W. Bush
giving the order. The US is not publicizing the scale of these preparations to
deter Iran, tending to make confrontation more likely. The US retains the option
of avoiding war, but using its forces as part of an overall strategy of shaping
Iran's actions.

- Any attack is likely to be on a massive multi-front scale but avoiding a ground
invasion. Attacks focused on WMD facilities would leave Iran too many
retaliatory options, leave President Bush open to the charge of using too little
force and leave the regime intact.
- US bombers and long range missiles are ready today to destroy 10,000 targets
in Iran in a few hours.
- US ground, air and marine forces already in the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan
can devastate Iranian forces, the regime and the state at short notice.
- Some form of low level US and possibly UK military action as well as armed
popular resistance appear underway inside the Iranian provinces or ethnic
areas of the Azeri, Balujistan, Kurdistan and Khuzestan. Iran was unable to
prevent sabotage of its offshore-to-shore crude oil pipelines in 2005.
- Nuclear weapons are ready, but most unlikely, to be used by the US, the UK
and Israel. The human, political and environmental effects would be
devastating, while their military value is limited.
- Israel is determined to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons yet has the
conventional military capability only to wound Iran's WMD programmes.
- The attitude of the UK is uncertain, with the Brown government and public
opinion opposed psychologically to more war, yet, were Brown to support an
attack he would probably carry a vote in Parliament. The UK is adamant that
Iran must not acquire the bomb.
- Short and long term human, political and economic consequences of any war
require innovative approaches to prevent the crisis becoming war.

Conclusion

The study concludes that the US has made military preparations to destroy Iran's WMD, nuclear energy, regime, armed forces, state apparatus and economic infrastructure within days, if not hours, of President George Bush giving the order. This report is focused on the prospect of the possible attempted destruction of the Iranian regime and state by the United States and its allies. It neither examines the realities of Iran's nuclear programme, the negotiations between Iran and the international community nor does it examine in detail the human, political, economic and environmental consequences of such an attack.
Nevertheless a number of conclusions can be reached.

1. If the attack is "successful" and the US reasserts its global military dominance and reduces Iran to the status of an oil-rich failed state, then the risks to humanity in general and to the states of the Middle East are grave indeed. The two world wars of 1914-18 and 1939-1945, the creation of nuclear weapons, and the advent of global warming have created successive lessons that humanity and states cannot prosper or survive long unless they hold their security in common-sharing sovereignty and power to ensure both survival and prosperity. A "successful" US attack, without UN authorization, would return the world to the state that existed in the period before the war of 1914-18, but with nuclear weapons. The self-styled realists argue that this is an inevitable and manageable world, the naivety of imagining a nuclear armed world without nuclear war is utopian in the extreme. States and regimes in the region may consider that in the short-run they would benefit from the implosion of Iran and the eclipse of Shi'a power. However, the threat from within from disaffected elements outraged at further unabashed Western militarism is likely to threaten crowns and republics alike. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths have had no electoral cost to American and British leaders, the same number of Iranian deaths may have equally little impact in the West, but it is unimaginable that it would not cause far greater spurs to anger than already exist in the region. The impact of on Turkey of an autonomous Iranian and Iraqi territory of Kurdistan is hard to overestimate.

2. If the attack is pursued with the skill of the Iraq campaign then we face major and unpredictable escalation arising from the fallacy of attempting to make "the last move" on the political game board. Should Iranians rally to their
battered state regardless of their, then what has been seen in Iraq will merely become an overture to a larger regional war, and one where a blip in oil prices becomes a prolonged global recession. Regional instability that might follow "victory" will be magnified. The Shakespearean quote, "cry havoc and let loose the dogs of war" expresses the simple rule that wars, like fires are far easier to start than to contain or put out.

3. The potential for a major regional war over Iran should give greater impetus to all sides to avoid conflict and act on previously agreed objectives for security in the region as a whole. In this respect the UNSC (687, 1540) objective of establishing a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East should be given far greater political investment by all parties.

Vol 6 Number 4

August 6, 2007

Hamid Hussain

Wages of Extremism --- Past, Present and Future of Lal Masjid Phenomenon

[This article also appears in the Pakistan Defense Journal August 2007. Reprinted with author's permission.]

Recently, in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, security forces launched an operation codenamed ‘Silence’ to get rid of armed extremists holed up in Lal Masjid and its affiliated Madrassah (religious school).  This operation resulted in death of more than one hundred entrenched in the mosque as well as about ten security personnel.  The operation was watched closely by Pakistani and international audience.  Focus was mainly on the events surrounding the stand off between extremists led by two brothers; Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid.  There was no attempt to look at the crisis in the broader context.  It will be a folly to look at the issue only in terms of law and order.  The incident itself may be very local in nature but it has broader implications for the country and the region.  Rise of extremism in the region has many dimensions and its effects will also be multifaceted. 

The stand off at Lal Masjid came as a surprise to many Pakistanis.  With few exceptions, country has no culture of serious academic analysis of deep rooted social and security problems.  In the last few years, there has been rapid expansion of print and visual media outlets; however there has been very little effort to inculcate a culture of serious and responsible discussion about vital national security issues.  Just like most of their western counterparts, majority of private television stations are interested in sensational news with gory details. Even debates about important issues boil down to shouting matches between participants thus depriving the audience of any meaningful and constructive dialogue.  In the corridors of power, key decision makers simply stumble from one crisis to another and major focus is only on crisis management as it arises.  There is no institutional mechanism for serious study of newly emerging threats.  Military and intelligence hierarchy has not been able to reform itself to changing threats.  Culture of highly personalized decision making process, lack of input from different sources, strong inhibitory environment for dissenting voices and unaccountability generates an environment which is not conducive for a well informed decision making process.

Those who have even rudimentary knowledge of the events of the last two decades in the region are not surprised about the events like stand off at Lal Masjid.  This downward trend has a long history.  Pakistanis are not the only players in this drama and therefore all the blame cannot be placed at Pakistan’s doorsteps.  It is disingenuous on part of Washington to blame everyone while completely ignoring its own follies.  Americans need to remember that two decades ago, it was national security policy of U.S. government which was executed by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the killing fields of Afghanistan.   CIA provided training in sabotage, handling of explosive devices and urban warfare for yesterday’s holy warriors and today’s terrorists.  Special courses were run for target assassinations and how to make lethal bicycle, camel and car bombs. CIA also provided sophisticated communication equipment, delayed timing devices for plastic explosives, long range sniper rifles and high precision targeting devices for mortars.  The next generation of holy warriors is now not only using these skills against Pakistani security forces but has acquired new ones adding Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers to their arsenal. 

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the civil war in the wake of withdrawal of Soviet troops changed the dynamics of power in the region.  Non state actors gradually gained strength as the nation state of Afghanistan fragmented.  The ripples were felt from Pakistan stretching to Middle East and all the way across Atlantic to U.S.   A new breed of warriors emerged from the ashes of Afghanistan which is now shaking the very foundations of many nation states.  The seeds were sowed in 1980s when rules of warfare were completely overhauled to suit the need of that time.  All major players including Afghans, Pakistani military and intelligence personnel, U.S. Saudi Arabia and China conveniently ignored the brutality of their clients and proxies on the Afghan battlefield.  Everyone agreed with the principle of armed resistance against occupying forces but in executing the policy on ground the most brutal and inhumane tactics were employed.  Afghans indiscriminately killed civilians and indulged in activities such as skinning their adversaries alive and sodomizing prisoners.  Pakistani intelligence personnel approved and provided logistical support for sabotage operations even in educational institutions.  Arab countries let loose their own lunatics to descend on Afghanistan and contribute to the mayhem.  The label of communist was used liberally to eliminate school teachers, intellectuals and educated females.  The barbarity practiced on the land of Afghanistan also infected non-Afghans playing on that field.  The most bigoted and extremist fringe of Pakistani sectarian warriors which embarked on wholesale killing of Shia in Pakistan a decade later was schooled on the battlefields of Afghanistan.  Arab extremists flew back to their native lands to engage in barbaric acts in the name of Islam which have not even been catalogued properly let alone analyzed.  Indiscriminate killing of men, women and children in the most horrific way in Algeria was one gory example of this saga.  Careful look at the emergence of extremism and Pakistan’s role in it should be done not as an exercise of blame game but to understand the dangerous trend and finding ways to curb this trend.

Combination of general discontent, Islamist discourse, deteriorating economic and security situation and anger about some foreign policy issues are contributing to the brew of a dangerous cocktail.  Pockets of extremist militant groups are scattered throughout the country and they can create crisis situation at any time.  These groups are rapidly expanding their area of influence.  Their influence extends from the border hinterlands of North and South Waziristan to other border areas of Bajawar, Dir and Swat to small and large cities and now even the state’s capital is not immune from the rapidly escalating violence.  Several small groups are taking advantage of the situation and following the example set up by Lal Masjid.  In Swat Maulvi Fazlullah is threatening to send suicide bombers against Pakistani security forces.  In Mohmand tribal agency, a group of about 100 armed militants took control of a shrine and mosque.  Their leader offered talks with government and then threatened to unleash suicide bombers.  It looks like that everybody is obsessed with the death cult.  Extremists of all colors and shades are now popping everywhere.  The big landscape is a general trend of piety and observance of religious rituals by the majority of population.  Pakistani society has been a conservative society but in the last two decades religious symbols and rituals are visible in public arena.  The background theme is ‘revival’ and ‘return to puritan ways’ linked with the ‘end of the world’ and ‘arrival of Messiah’.  A number of orthodox clerics and their organizations as well as self taught neo-clerics and evangelists are propagating their views in their respective mosques, print and electronic media.  The very nature of this phenomenon is exclusive.  Each cleric is entrenched in his own mosque or institution with no interaction with others thus splintering general population into small groups.  The negative side of this phenomenon is entrenchment of sectarian identity.  Now a more younger and radical generation influenced by the ‘salafi’ (an ultra orthodox school of thought based on Hanbali school of juristic traditions which stresses on literal interpretation of scripture and discourages innovation) trend has taken a step forward towards ‘takfir’ (apostasy) and painting their version on the big landscape.  Their modus operandi is a mix of cult and gang culture making it very difficult to engage them in any meaningful way.  In areas ridden with violence, this younger leadership is pushing traditional peaceful clerics out of public arena and using coercive measures to purify the community.   Religion rather than advancing the concepts of equality, economic and social justice and egalitarianism has become a tool for the fragmentation of society.  

The most pressing question now for Pakistani state and society is how to tackle this phenomenon of extremism.  As far as Pakistan is concerned, this internal threat has now surpassed all external threats.  One is the immediate security aspect of the problem and the other is more long term holistic approach to forestall Iraqification of Pakistan.  It is now clear that threat from extremists can not be completely eliminated but measures can be taken to limit its damaging effects.  Pakistan is facing a grave crisis and there will be security, economic, political and social fallout from the extremism menace.  Outsiders can sympathize, warn or threaten Pakistan but at the end of the day it will be the decision of the Pakistani state and society to determine their own future.  Only Pakistanis will decide what kind of society they are willing to live in.  All critical decisions should be made in this context carefully balancing the benefits and risks.  A closer look at the emerging threat gives a glimpse of the future discourse in the context of Pakistan.  Extremist groups are very small in numbers and majority of Pakistanis of all ethnicities and religious denominations are moderate and are appalled at the violent cycle.  However, it is the action generated by extremist groups which send shock waves both internally and externally.  In Pushtun areas, the extremist ideology with its doctrine of apostasy was brought by Arab fighters.  This doctrine is the foundation stone of the legitimacy of killing fellow Muslims after they are declared apostates.  Two decades ago, during ‘external Jihad’ against the Soviets, no suicide bombings were carried out.  The tables are now turned and in ‘internal Jihad’, extremists have no qualms about using suicide bombings against all targets; civilian and military in Pakistan and Afghanistan.   The Pushtun element among the extremist groups based in tribal areas will continue to have some loose affiliation with their kin across the border in Afghanistan.  This will keep violence graph high enough on both sides of the border and will contribute to economic stagnation and dislocation.  In both countries, Pushtuns will come under increasing scrutiny.  Whether in Kabul or Islamabad, a poor Pushtun from the hinterlands will be viewed with suspicion further alienating a large number and aggravating ethnic frictions.  Nationalist Pushtuns may close ranks to provide the alternative stressing on ethnic identity and will try to negotiate with Pakistani state and international players.  Influence of extremists is making its way into the Hindko speaking belt of Hazara and Kohistan resulting in instability in that traditionally peaceful area.  In northern areas, where a large number of Shia and Ismaili community live, the nature of conflict invariably will be sectarian in nature.  In Punjab, a decade ago, extremist elements channeled their energy towards Indian held Kashmir.  Suicide bombings against Indian targets both civilian and military did not bother anyone in Pakistan for over a decade.  Now in ‘internal Jihad’, the same methodology is being used against Pakistani targets.  In Punjab, popular piety revolving around shrines and tombs will not be tolerated by puritans who consider such traditions as apostasy.  The rise of extremists will fan the sectarian fires and the wages of Jihad will be more bloodshed among Muslims.  A number of groups in Pakistan are not yet in the loop of religiously motivated violence and this include Baluch, Sindhi and Urdu speaking known as Muhajirs.  Rise of religious militancy and weakening of national bonds will only strengthen ethnic identity of these groups and they will use this identity while negotiating with the state or international players.  These groups will need armed wings to keep spoilers at bay and negotiate a better bargain from the state which is a recipe for a multidimensional internal conflict.

Pakistani state is facing a daunting challenge. On the security front, the approach needs to be diverse and innovative depending upon the situation.  The strategy needs to take into consideration local conditions.  Security operations in tribal areas have quite different dynamics compared to urban areas.  Support of local tribes both for negotiations and punitive measures is essential.  Hardcore extremist leadership both local and foreigner cannot be eliminated without tribal cooperation and timely intelligence.  In case of attacks of large groups of militants on settled towns such as recent attacks in Tank (a city bordering restive tribal agencies), show of force of combination of police and paramilitary soldiers backed by regular troops can neutralize the threat quickly and allay the fears of general population.  In case of suicide attacks by individuals, pouring large number of troops to the scene does not serve any meaningful purpose and wastes resources.  Quick response of police to maintain law and order and handle transfer of casualties at the scene will serve the purpose and may be a better and cost effective approach.  In fighting extremism, lot of things can be achieved quietly and more efficiently without too much of collateral damage.  More attention should be paid to the subtle approach and covert measures to neutralize the leadership of extremist groups.

In foreseeable future, it is clear that army will be used frequently for support of civilian law enforcement agencies.  Army should be used as a last resort and not as first option in case of a crisis.  Army’s General Head Quarter (GHQ) has to do some homework to analyze internal threat and how to handle it.  So far, everybody has been simply waiting for the crisis and when it occurs, bodies are simply thrown at it with the hope that something good will come out of it.  Regular troops are not trained to handle small groups of people entrenched in urban areas nor to manage a scene of a suicide bombing.  In addition, regular army troops have a long logistical tail and movement is usually slow and costly.  In view of these limitations, government has been using Special Services Group (SSG); the elite commando units of Pakistan army.  These are highly trained soldiers and can be effective in such situation.  However, they are a highly prized commodity and can not be replaced easily.  It takes a long time to select the best soldiers and officers and then train them in special tasks.  SSG has been stretched to its limits as they are involved in operations in Waziristan and Baluchistan.   A separate anti-terrorist battalion of SSG named Zarrar has been trained for special tasks and was used in ‘Operation Silence’.  The commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Haroon –ul-Islam, Captain Salman Butt and many soldiers gave the ultimate sacrifice in the operation.  Several others were injured.  These officers kept the tradition of Pakistan army by leading their men from the front.  The sad fact is that homegrown Jihadis were never able to lay their hands on Indian Special Forces but were able to kill a number of Pakistani elite soldiers without any moral qualms. 

A new special unit called Anti Terrorism Force (ATF) is being used in some internal security cases. Expansion and strengthening of this force with a mix of new police recruits and retired army soldiers and officers may decrease reliance on SSG.  There is a need of more coordination between civilian and military intelligence and security entities.  Use of army in internal security duties is always a tricky situation.  In case of use of religion by extremist groups makes the task more complicated.  Most of the rank and file of army is recruited from conservative districts of North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.) and Punjab.  The bulk of recruits are from rural areas, however soldiers are more educated nowadays.  They are not living in isolation and they are exposed to outside world and different opinions.  They are watching the same media and reading the same newspapers.  Confusion among general population affects soldiers and sympathy shown by a segment of population for extremists can have an impact on the morale of soldiers.  GHQ needs to look at the educational and psychological aspect of preparing soldiers for the unpleasant task of internal security duty.  In modern world, internal security operations can not be viewed in isolation.  Some covert operations are best done in total secrecy and information is shared only among a limited group.  However, in case of deployment of troops in troubled areas or Lal Masjid type operations, government has to take local community leaders, political parties and media into confidence.  Those involved in the decision making process of the operation have to do the homework to prepare their case and present it as a necessary measure to get consent of the majority of the society.  In the absence of that such operation though necessary to maintain law and order will not get the desired results.  Recently, federal government deployed paramilitary soldiers and regular troops in Swat but provincial government demanded removal of these troops.  Such chaotic decision making process will only bring grief and merely add more confusion to a very complicated and dangerous situation.  Prolonged deployment of soldiers under these trying circumstances for internal security duty can put enormous pressure on officers and soldiers and there is a clear danger that a number of them may refuse to perform such tasks.  Pakistan army is a disciplined force but fissiparous tendencies in the society will invariably seep into the army.  

No government can tackle the very difficult and complex problem of religious extremism with its attendant violence alone.  Civil society dialogue about the threat of extremism and effective measures to counter it is desperately needed to build a consensus.  Apathy among general population is not helping in this regard.  They have a simplistic and naive view of the whole saga.  They want government to be responsible for law and order and do not want gun totting militants in their neighborhoods.  However, when government decides to take action, they blame it for the crisis and want negotiation with extremists.  In case of Lal Masjid, general public opinion was in favor of action against militants entrenched in the mosque.  However, when action became messy, then public quickly back paddled and many even started to espouse the cause of those who had challenged the writ of the government.  Legitimacy crisis of government is coupled with the lack of trust.  A mix of denial, anger and frustration is severely hampering the efforts to understand a dangerous trend.  These basic issues need to be addressed above party politics and narrow interests.  It is up to Pakistanis to decide what kind of government they want but regardless of the shape and form of the government, the fundamental issues facing the nation need to be addressed. 

Majority of Pakistanis want to live a stable and peaceful life.  Economic and social problems take precedence over all other problems.  Most Pakistanis are connected to the outside world and get a variety of opinion from local and international sources.  However, as far as the issue of religious extremism is concerned, the attitude of a large number of Pakistanis is a mix of fear, anger, frustration and denial.  Even well informed Pakistanis are either unaware of the dynamics of violence generated by religious extremists which was linked to Pakistan’s national security agenda defined by Pakistani security establishment for over two decades or prefer to completely ignore the relevance of that phenomenon.   There are no quick and easy solutions to the complex security dimension in the context of religious extremism.  There is no easy pick on the table and Pakistani society has to make some tough decisions about benefits and risks of various approaches.  Current judicial system is unable to handle the rapidly rising menace of extremism and there is an urgent need for frank and informed debate about special antiterrorism court set up with adequate individual protections to try these cases.  Pakistan’s recent experience should be an eye opener.  Judges have been reluctant to sit on benches which try extremists.  No witness is willing to come forward to record the statement against the culprits for fear of his own life.  Even lawyers and judges have been assassinated, making normal judicial process unworkable.  Under such trying circumstances what kind of justice can be delivered is anybody’s guess.  Some mechanism needs to be worked out where terrorism cases are processed through judicial system giving reasonably fair trial to the accused. 

In the absence of a holistic approach, it is likely that crimes committed by extremists under religious banner will get a similar response.  On part of government, it will be very tempting to embark on extra-judicial killings.  The argument in favor of this approach will be that normal criminal and judicial principles do not apply to extremists and after appropriate intelligence these criminals should be put to sleep quietly without any fanfare.  On the other end of the spectrum, if state is unable to control law and order, then it is likely that some will take law in their own hands.  We may see emergence of small groups who may take the page from the book of religious extremists and start to assassinate leaders and rank and file of extremist groups.  It will be very tempting for the government to support such groups to avoid using large number of security forces.   Few months ago, in South Waziristan, a local group under the leadership of Mullah Nazir Ahmad killed large number of Uzbek militants.  Recently, some Afghan Taliban commanders and foreign militants crossing over from Afghanistan into Pakistan have been killed by unidentified gunmen in Baluchistan province.  There will be increase in such killings of rank and file and leaders of militant groups.  Those who decide to take arms against militants in tribal areas will link with Pakistani authorities and build relationship across the border with Afghan government and U.S. military and intelligence assets.  It is also inevitable that militant groups will fracture on issues of ideology, resources and operations.  These internecine battles will dramatically increase the scope of violence and further add to the complexity.  Recent example of arrest of suicide operators sent from Bajawar to Waziristan to assassinate Mullah Nazir Ahmad point towards this phenomenon.  The culprits are held by Nazir’s followers and being interrogated.   In earlier battles between local militants loyal to Mullah Nazir and Uzbeks, some local small armed bands sided with Nazir while others with Uzbeks.  However when the tide turned in favor of Nazir, many of them abandoned Uzbeks.  These small commanders are now in reconciliation process with Nazir.  In coming years, especially in tribal areas, the one who will carry the longest knife and fattest purse will turn the tide in his favor.  

A number of religio-political parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) and Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan (JUP) participate in political process of the country, contesting elections and serving in provincial and federal assemblies and cabinets.  They use these positions for political and economic gains.  It is likely that the clash between these religio-political parties and militant groups will follow the Afghanistan and Iraq patterns.  The gulf between orthodox clerics of various denominations and extremist militant fringe will widen.  The fight over control of disciples, mosques, madrassahs and economic resources will not be non-violent.  Recently, the house of leader of his own faction of JUI Maulana Fazlur Rahman in Dera Ismail Khan was attacked and enraged students of Lal Masjid threw out the JI delegation not allowing them even to pray in the mosque.  These are early signs of the coming conflict between orthodox clerics and neo-Taliban.  Religio-political parties will also see fragmentation of their own ranks where more radical elements will break ranks and link up with militant groups.  Second and third tier leadership of these parties will try to increase their influence by playing on both sides of the fence.  Recently, wanted militant Abdullah Mahsud was killed in the house of local JUI leader Shaikh Ayub Mandokhel in the city of Zhob in Baluchistan.  This event has led to internal blame game among the provincial leadership of JUI.  We may see more of this cycle of suspicion, accusation and blame in coming days.  Militant outfits are seething with anger against clerics who are benefiting from present arrangement.  If extremists decide to strike against religio-political parties then their first target will be Fazlur Rahman group of JUI followed by Barelvi outfit JUP.  

The most damaging long term effect from the incident was a sense of fear and helplessness among general population.  Pakistanis are now openly questioning the very viability of the state and the danger of anarchy, fragmentation and civil war is clear and present.  Rise of religious extremism has unnerved every Pakistani but the most damaging effect has been on minorities and Muslim sects who are not part of the majority.  This has severely weakened the national bond and smaller units of identity based on sect are on the rise.  Militants involved in sectarian conflict rotate through various Jihadi organizations to avoid capture.  If law and order situation is not controlled in a reasonable time period, it is inevitable that non-Muslims, Shia and other Sunni groups such as Barelvi school of thought will decide to arm themselves for self protection.  There is a real threat of emergence of these sect based militias and geographic shifts in communities all around the country.  In such an atmosphere, even a small incident can ignite large scale violence.   Kurram and Orakzai tribal agencies have seen such kind of sectarian violence.  If religiously motivated violence escalates, then other groups such as tribes and ethnic groups will also arm themselves and violence will become multi-faceted.  This is what exactly happened in Afghanistan about two decades ago and now happening in front of our eyes in Iraq. 

In the regional and international context, large scale violence in the heart of the country’s capital alarmed everyone interested in Pakistan.  So far, Washington’s interest in Pakistan’s border region has been limited to its relevance in the context of Afghanistan.  However, recent intelligence reports from U.S. raised the fear of possibility of attacks on U.S. soil from extremists entrenched along Pakistan-Afghanistan border and this has added another element to the dynamics of relations between Pakistan and U.S.  In efforts against non-state actors, despite differences it is the cooperation between countries which will counter the threat effectively.  Blaming each other causes more friction and less cooperation between security agencies thus allowing more room of maneuverability for the non-state actors.  Surely, many policies of U.S. have simply added fuel to the fire of extremism but Pakistan has no control over how others will act.  It needs to act to secure its national interests and every sane Pakistani agrees that ‘loose canons’ of any kind pursuing their own agendas at the expense of the country are a recipe for disaster.   It is clear that any direct action by U.S. on Pakistani soil will exacerbate the situation but if Washington concludes that extremists are gaining strength and their links with al-Qaeda are growing then Pakistan should prepare itself for direct overt or covert action by U.S. from its Afghanistan bases.  In action against non-state actors, best results are achieved by cooperation of states.  These battles will be won only by invisible forces and by actions which will never be publicized.  Traditional military tactics and beating of war drums will not curtail this trend.  If such crucial decisions become hostage to political rhetoric then nation states: big and small will pay a heavy price.  

The mosque incident may be just an aberration and may not have any long term negative effects but the message it sent to the outside world was shocking.  It affected Pakistan on both the security and economic front.  On security front, world is now paying close attention to the nuclear and missile arsenal of Pakistan in the context of internal conflict.  On economic front, many foreign entities cancelled projects and a number of foreign experts including citizens of Pakistan’s close ally China left the country.  This will have a negative impact on future direct and indirect investments in Pakistan.  Pakistanis were busy in the blame game and trying to get political mileage from a sad situation and nobody cared to send a reassuring signal to the outside world.  The result of this utter lack of responsible and mature attitude is that even Pakistan’s genuine friends are now worried about ‘loose nukes and long range missiles’ slipping out of Pakistan.  In the context of previous allegations of nuclear proliferation and rise of religious extremism with its attendant death cults, now even Pakistan’s friends are thinking about contingency plans of securing Pakistan’s ‘crown jewels’.  Whether right or wrong, the credibility of Pakistan as a nation state is very low on all international forums and sending a Lieutenant Colonel from Strategic Planning Division (the department of Pakistan army controlling nuclear and missile forces) to assure the world that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are in safe hands is simply not cutting the ice.   Pakistan may not care what others think or may consider their views biased but they have to do some soul searching.  They need to make decisions which they think are best for their country.  However, they should be prepared to face the consequences of their decisions.  No country can live in isolation and regional and international competition and conflicts impact on what choices one makes.

The violent incident in Islamabad mosque resulted in deaths of many including soldiers of Pakistani security forces.  Whatever is the ideology and motives of the people who have embarked on a violent ‘internal Jihad’, the irony is that no adversary could have done what they have achieved by shaking the very foundations of the state of Pakistan and setting the stage for a possible civil war.  It is prudent for Pakistanis to remember that the civil war of Afghanistan after the departure of Soviet troops was fought under the name of religion and Jihad.  All groups had the word ‘Islami’ in their titles and they killed and maimed their own so called brothers and sisters of religious fraternity in a methodical way without any moral ambiguity.  The blowback of Jihad for Pakistan has been a nightmare and now reached a stage where it is truly threatening the viability of the state itself.  Those who think that the threat is exaggerated; they only need to look at Afghanistan and Iraq and draw their own conclusions.  Internal conflicts don’t pop up overnight.  They evolve through various stages and internal and external factors impact on what direction a particular conflict takes.  Up to a certain stage, fault lines can be bridged but after crossing a certain threshold, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence can be very difficult if not impossible.  Pakistan’s own experience of separation of eastern wing in 1971 provides some insight into such painful scenarios.  The crisis and its immediate aftermath of a string of suicide bombings against security forces and ordinary citizens have raised some serious questions about the nature of internal conflict in the country.  There are some difficult times ahead for Pakistan and some tough choices need to be made.  Government, political parties, clerics, religious institutions, intelligentsia and civil society in general need to seriously look at core issues threatening the viability of the state.  Minimum consensus about how to tackle religious extremism in a holistic way is the need of the hour.  Pakistanis will need patience, tolerance and wisdom to come out of the current crisis with minimum damage to the society.

Vol 6 Number 3

June 11, 2007

Chris Raggio

Blitzer: If it came down to a preemptive US strike against Iran's nuclear facility, if necessary would you authorize as president the use of tactical nuclear weapons?

Hunter: I would authorize the use of tactical nuclear weapons if there was no other way to preempt those particular centrifuges.

Blitzer then turned to former New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who currently leads in opinion polls of prospective Republican primary voters.

Blitzer: What do you think, Mayor? Do you think if you were president of the United States and it came down to Iran having a nuclear bomb, which you say is unacceptable, you would authorize the use of tactical nuclear weapons?

Giuliani: Part of the premise of talking to Iran has to be that they have to know very clearly that it is unacceptable to the United States that they have nuclear power. I think it could be done with conventional weapons, but you can't rule out anything and you shouldn't take any option off the table.

Vol 6 Number 2

May 23, 2007

Letter from Chris Raggio

It seems that we narrowly avoided major conflict with Iran just three months ago.    There were multiple reasons but Admiral Fallon's refusal to request a 3rd aircraft carrier to facilitate offensive operations seems to be major sticking point. 

http://www.ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=37738

Bush could relieve him or force him to resign and appoint a more willing subordinate.   That would be very risky politically.   Also Fallon's not the only flag or general officer who has threatened to resign.   There's no precedent for it but they could resign on the grounds that the order was unconstitutional as Congress has not yet authorized use of force against Iran in accordance to the War Powers Doctrine.   Bush has tried to circumvent that legal and logical barrier by implicating Iran in the Iraqi war when he speaks of attacking neighboring "networks" and blaming Iran for EFPs.   I think the Pentagon wants a more explicit authorization in lieu of any overt aggression from Iran.  

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article1434540.ece


Cheney's threats delivered from the deck of the USS Stennis notwithstanding, there is no reason to believe the US will bomb Iran in the near future.    In my mind the only variable that could change this logic is Israel.   I know on orbat.com you identified Iran as the fulcrum nation in the Middle East but I still see Israel as the instigator or fomenter of any major conflict.   After the Winograd report was released polls have shown a resurgence in the popularity of Benjamin Netanyahu as he leads all candidates for PM.  And this polling was done before the Qassam strikes recently intensified.  According to a recent poll, 71 percent of Israelis would favor a US military attack on Iran if diplomacy fails to halt is nuclear activities. The Winograd report was focused on how to fight and win the next war. It didn't question whether or not it should have been fought at all.  Israel is spoiling for a new fight to reassert its dominance in the region.  

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/787766.html
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article1290331.ece

If Netanyahu became PM Israel would act unilaterally in the abscence of US support.   Iran would retaliate and the US would get involved at that point.  Nobody wants it to happen that way because Israel purportedly doesn't have the capability unless they use nuclear weapons.  Cheney would want the US attack first if he knew Israel was dead-set on it.   I don't know how they will overcome the obstacles in the Defense Department.  I don't think he can afford to have his commanders resign as he is going into war.  He would bear full responsibility for any adverse outcome after that.   Maybe he will replace these officers with more compliant ones now.  The White House could concoct a cover story like personal miscoduct or something like that.  That's one of the few things the White House does very well.  I don't know.  You may be right.   Iran will probably do something provocative this summer.   

Vol 6 Number 1

April 8, 2007

Feisal Khan

Orbat.com's Change Of Position On Iraq War

I am glad to see that you've come around to realizing the absolute folly of the Iraq War.  I was opposed to the Iraq War from the very beginning, not because of the usually wishy-washy liberal reasons ("illegal, no UN authorization, imperialism, etc") but because of what the late Molly Ivins (the woman who called Pres. Bush "shrub, because he is not half the bush his father was") said it was going to be, "a very easy war and the peace from Hell."

It should have been apparent to any one with at least half a brain, a category which excludes neo-Cons such as Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Co, that Iraq was a pressure cooker and Saddam was the lid.  With him removed, it exploded.  Like you, I am also in favor or military solutions since, properly executed, they can provide a lasting solution, unlike most of the ridiculous, interminable negotiations and cease-fires that always seem to be going on (e.g., Darfur, Sri Lanka, etc.).  The Peruvian insurgency was not ended by a negotiated cease-fire; neither was the Vietnam War.

However, it should be clear to any intelligent student of counter-insurgency warfare, the successful ones (i.e., where the government has scored a decisive 'win') involve very heavy civilian, more-or-less innocent, casualties inflicted by the government forces.  Since you are a student of military history, you should know that the E. Pakistan insurgency was essentially defeated months before the formal war started.  The cost in terms of civilian casualties was immense--NOT the 3 million that Indian propaganda claims but probably in the range of 150,000 - 200,000 plus civilian casualties.  This sort of counter-insurgency warfare is simply not possible for any Western force to carry out.  The Russian did it in Chechnya; the Americans cannot reduce Falluja to rubble the way the Russians did Grozny.  It should also be apparent that against a really determined opponent, the killing may have to continue for a generation or two, not a campaign or two.  If you cannot/will not use this kind of force and don't have the stomach for killing 50+ civilians in the hope that you might get a couple of insurgents, you should stay at home, unless you are willing to commit so many soldiers that you can garrison virtually the entire country side and slowly squeeze out the insurgents, in the process killing only a dozen or two civilians for every insurgents.  This is basically what the Indians are doing in Kashmir.

Since so many American officers have fancy advanced degrees from fancy American universities, one would think that this would have occurred to them.  But arrogance, stupidity and overwhelming wealth are a dangerous combination.  Just look at the current mess in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Gen. Shinseki tried to point out that if you are serious about occupying Iraq, you need to be talking about doubling-tripling the number committed and talking about years and not months.  Even he was too optimistic.

My objection to the Pax Americana is that it is run by idiots.  I came to this conclusion in the 1990s after reading 'Blackhawk Down.'  In the book, Bowden quotes a senior US Foreign Service officer as saying that the mistake the US made was that it believed that the Somali people wanted peace; what they wanted was their clan's victory.  One expects academics, politicians and young journalists to make these kind of stupid, naive mistakes; one expects more realism from jaded Foreign Service officers who have served in 'hot spots' the world over.  At this point I realized that the American empire is doomed

Vol 5. Number 13

August 15, 2006

K.G. Widmerpool

US-Israeli Coordination in the 2006 Lebanon War

According to an article by Seymour Hersh in this week's -New Yorker-,
the Israeli government had decided it was 'just a matter of time'
before it would have to deal with Hezbollah.  Thus:

 Israel had devised a plan for attacking Hezbollah —-
 and shared it with Bush Administration officials -—
 well before the July 12th kidnappings. "It's not that
 the Israelis had a trap that Hezbollah walked into,"
 he said, "but there was a strong feeling in the White
 House that sooner or later the Israelis were going to
 do it."

The White House realised that Hezbollah would have to be suppressed
before any major action could be taken against Iran.  An Israeli
offensive (comprising principally airstrikes and SOF a la Rumsfeld) was
also seen by the Americans as a trial run for Iran.  Consultation had
been taking place (unsurprisingly) between the US and Israeli Air
Forces, particularly as Iran loomed ever nearer, and the Israelis
appeared to have taken contemporary USAF (and Rumsfeld) doctrine as a
model, especially the ostensibly successful air campaign in Kosovo.

Of course, as the Kosovo war's SACEUR himself points out, Nato's air
campaign proved marginal, at best, in accomplishing Western war aims,
and it was ultimately the belated threat of Nato ground invasion that
ended the war -- and Nato had air assets far beyond what the IDF can
muster.  I would also mention that when Rumsfeld-style warfare has
proven somewhat effective (the initial campaign to overthrow the
Taleban), the airstrikes were conducted in conjunction with a
significant SOF and CIA presence on the ground, and of course native
allies in the form of the Northern Alliance.  In contrast Israel's
intelligence (even about Hezbollah capabilities and tactics) has been
distressingly inadequate, and of course Israel hasn't any overt allies
this time amongst the Lebanese population.

If the article is accurate (and I don't want to believe Israeli
strategists could be this silly), this would help explain why the IDF
concentrated on bombing and was so slow (and unprepared) to commit
substantial ground forces.  Indeed, no doubt unintentionally, the
Israeli offensive suffered many of the same flaws as Nato's Kosovo
campaign: unphotogenic destruction of civilian infrastructure,
collateral damage, extremely poor results against well concealed enemy
military assets, inability to protect allied civilians (Israeli or
Kosovar), and a self-crippling reluctance to commit real ground forces
and suffer casualties.

I find it hard to believe that, if the Israelis had been planning this
offensive for some time, there would have been no contingency plans to
mobilise substantial ground forces and reserves to go into Lebanon.  Of
course in Kosovo, Nato governments also somehow stumbled into a
shooting war without planning for serious fighting.

No doubt the press is going to seize upon this article as proof that
Bush and the Neocons somehow plotted this war.  Whilst it's clear to
everyone that the current conflict is a proxy war between the US and
Iran, I do want to point out that the Israeli sources quoted by the
article are quite clear that Washington did not somehow order the IDF
into Lebanon.  'The neocons in Washington may be happy, but Israel did
not need to be pushed, because Israel has been wanting to get rid of
Hezbollah.'

Finally I should add that Mr Hersh is well known for his Washington
connexions and fancies himself something of a Beltway player.  He
(probably knowingly) allows himself to be used by elements in the
government for their own purposes, and since 11 September his sources
have tended to paint a picture critical of those Administration figures
(especially Cheney and Rumsfeld) eager for preemptive war.  For the
past couple of years, his articles have strongly suggested that 1.) the
Administration is intent on striking Iraq but 2.) Cheney and Rumsfeld
have learnt nothing from Iraq and are planning an Air Force / SOF
campaign against Iranian capabilities that simply won't be able to do
the job.  Hersh's article about Israel's bungled offensive fits into
this larger scheme of criticism.

The Hersh article can be found at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060821fa_fact

Vol 5. Number 12

August 14, 2006

Todd Croft

August Military Briefing

Current Allied Operational Postures

US Naval Groups Deployed:

Currently the US has 3-carriers groups active...
USS Kitty Hawk CSG
       -Near Indonesia
USS Enterprise CSG
       -@ Singapore
       -Returning to CENTCOM-AOR
       -ETA Nov '06 return to US
USS Lincoln CSG
       -Pacific, finished RIMPAC
       -Returning to US

And 2-amphibious strike groups...
USS Iwo Jima ESG
       -Med off Lebanon,
       -Aiding evacuation & aid ops,
       -Originally tasked with CENTCOM ops
       -ETA Dec '06 return to US
USS Peleliu ESG
       -Pacific, returning to US

And 2-amphibious patrol groups...
USS Trenton (LPD+CG+DDG)
       -Med off Lebanon,
       -Aiding evacuation,
       -Originally tasked with CENTCOM ops
       -ETA October '06 return to US
USS Tortuga (LSD+DDG+FFG+ARS)
       -CARAT regional exercises


UK Naval Groups Deployed:
HMS Bulwark (LPD)
       -Med off Lebanon
       -Aiding evac & support ops
       -Will return home as soon as released


French Naval Groups Deployed:
FS Mistral (LHA)
       -Med off Lebanon
       -Aiding evac & support ops
       -This is a surge deployment, will return to France as
soon as released
FS Siroco (LSD)
       -Med off Lebanon
       -Aiding evac & support ops
       -This is a surge deployment, will return to France as
soon as released


Italian Naval Groups Deployed:
ITS San Giorgio (LSD)
       -Med off Lebanon
       -Aiding evac & support ops
       -This is a surge deployment, will return to Italy as
soon as released


Developing Naval Trends

US:
USS Eisenhower CSG
       -Ready to deploy
USS Stennis CSG
       -Pacific surge duty carrier
USS Roosevelt CSG
       -Atlantic surge duty carrier
       -DPIA maintenance in Oct '06
USS Washington CSG
       -DPIA maintenance in Sept '06
USS Boxer ESG
       -Training
       -ETA deployment in 2-months
USS BH Richard ESG
       -Finished RIMPAC, training
       -Pacific surge duty ESG?
       -ETA deployable in 4-months
USS Bataan ESG
       -Training
       -Atlantic surge duty ESG?
       -ETA deployable in 4-months

UK...
HMS Albion (LPD)
       -Deployable
HMS Ocean (LHA)
       -Deployable, but TB outbreak may scuttle any hopes
for future near-term ops

France...
Navy currently at <30% activity, very low, previous
period of maxed activity may have taken it's toll,
expect a fall workup / increase and winter deployment
of a major asset


Projections

The US made a good show-of-force in the spring /
summer, but is strategically weak in the near term,
naval-wise. No capital naval groups are currently
stationed in the Persian Gulf, or entire CENTCOM-AOR
(until Enterprise returns). Our Pacific fleet is maxed
and tired. 2-carriers will be going into maintenance
and will be indisposed of for 6-months to a year, and
2-carriers will be coming out of maintenance soon, but
won't be deployable for at least 6-months. Another
carrier is "broke", and it will cost an arm and a leg
to fix, and an LHA was found to also be "broke" and in
need of substantial repair.

That means for the next 4-8 months we will only be
able to deploy the standard 2-carriers, with the
potential to surge 2 more. That is a weak position. We
may be trying to make up for this condition by having
more ESGs ready to go if something happens.

That means we currently "can't" project a typical
offensive operation. For example, if we wanted to
strike Lebanon it would take our entire deployed
carrier fleet to carry it out (2-CSGs), and to strike
Syria or Iran we could only muster a MAX of 4-CSGs.
This is weak, and I anticipate no near term adventures
instigated by the US.

BUT, that doesn't mean nothing will happen. It just
means we probably won't instigate it. We have plenty
of surface combatants in the CENTCOM-AOR, and a large
patrol group in the Pacific, and it could respond well
to any threats.

The UK continues on it's standard routine, and is
expected to deploy the Albion soon, possibly to the
Persian Gulf. But I have no insider info on this.
Note, once the HMS Illustrious returns to port, they
will have no available carrier for an estimated
3-months minimum. This would as well dampen any
adventures for them.

The French are in a resting cycle, and could be able
to deploy more capital naval groups late fall or
winter. But, their carrier also recently returned to
port, and won't be available for 4-6 months, unless an
emergency developed, then they could be deployable
within 1-month.

Summary:
So, the projected trend is that the standard naval
patrols will continue (2-CSG, 2-ESG), and little else,
besides another amphibious patrol group may be
deployed to replace the USS Trenton in October (I'm
leaning towards the USS Cleveland, which has been
plenty active, but not attached to any battle groups).

If we initiate any action, we might not be able to
bring to bear any more than 4-CSGs until December.
This violates the Powell Doctrine concerning using
overwhelming force, but may be fine for the Rumsfeld
Doctrine of using just enough force, especially
considering the extensive basing options we have for
the air force right now.

Our allies are not going to do much, but could if they
needed to.

We might be talking tough with Iran, Syria, Hezbollah,
or North Korea, but don't be surprised if we don't do
much past sanctions and patrols.

Vol.5, Number 11

June 13, 2006

Bill Roggio

With the Canadians in Afghanistan

[With permission of the author.]

[While Mr. Roggio's piece is reportage rather than analysis, we thought readers might find it of interest. Mr. Roggio used to run the blog The Fourth Rail [www.billroggio.com] and has now joined forces with the Counterterrorism Foundation [http://counterterrorismblog.org].  

I've embedded with 7 Platoon, Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Regiment. This is a proud group of soldiers who bristle at the common perception in Canada that their primary mission is peacekeeping. "We're not peace keepers, we're soldiers," the soldiers freely told me during numerous casual conversations. Afghanistan is far from a peacekeeping operation. The Canadian soldiers are actively fighting the Taliban insurgency in Kandahar province.

Charlie Company is the battalion's maneuver company, which means they are the unit designated to engage Taliban formations as they appear, as well as provide manpower for other security tasks when needed. Their latest round of combat occurred during the last two weeks of May, when Charlie Company fought several hundred Taliban in Panjwai District. Well over two hundred Taliban are estimated to have been killed. Captain Nicola Goddard was killed during this engagement, and five soldiers were wounded during the four skirmishes in the Panjwai district. The soldiers expect to return to Panjwai, as this is a hub for Taliban activity in the region.

The company packs a lethal punch, with the LAV III as the main fighting vehicle, and augmented with the Nyala (RG-31) and G-Wagon. The troops rave about the LAV IIIs for the firepower, maneuverability and survivability. The LAV IIIs are ideally suited for the low intensity combat here in Afghanistan. Armed with a 25mm cannon which is stabilized and can be fired on the move, a 7.62 coax gun, an M240MG mounted on the turret, and a section (or squad) of infantry, the Canadians can bring superior firepower down on the Taliban.

Vol. 5, Number 10

May 10, 2006

Luke Graysmith

Al-Qaeda's Quest For An N-Device: Points To Think About

• Thermonuclear weapons (H-bombs) have a short shelf life, due to the
  12 year tritium half-life. Without the tritium, the yield is much lower.
  However, there is still a substantial yield because, after all, it uses
  a fission explosion to ignite the fusion reaction. The half-life of U235
  is 7*10^8 years. So what do you think will happen if a warhead is
  detonated that is 20-30 years old?
• Maybe nothing. The effect of the radioactivity on the trigger
  mechanism may be an issue; and 30-year old machines that have never been used do not necessarily just work...
• Nevertheless, the hardest part of developing a nuclear weapon  is
  getting the U235. This requires massive investment if you're starting
  from Uranium ore. But it probably doesn't take government levels of
  expenditure to buy an old warhead on the black market. And the u235 from
  that old core is quite potent.
• 6 Pakistani scientists are not going to enrich uranium any more than
  200 Iranian centrifuges. Nor will they solve from scratch the problems
  inherent in making an a-bomb. But could they reverse engineer an a-bomb,
  given a few models to play with?  Why not?
• 1kT is not as bad as 10MT. But it is bad enough. [Mr. Graysmith implies that even a minimal yield due to the device not working properly could cause great damage. Editor]
• Handling spent fuel rods stolen from a civilian reactor would be a problem. And it would be difficult to make that material go critical anyway. That is strictly a dirty bomb route.
• The way to go is to buy a few warheads. By definition they are self
  contained and easy to transport. Plus you can reverse engineer them, or
  even salvage them. Naturally, it would be harder to get a hold of a
  warhead than some junky fuel rods. But that just means it's more
  expensive.
• I find it very hard to believe that all nukes from the FSU are accounted
  for. This doesn't make for a strategic problem necessarily... but it
  could make for a very serious tactical problem.

Vol. 5, Number 9

April 23, 2006

Bill Roggio

Taleban Consolidate Power in Pakistan Tribal Zone

[Note: some Pakistani tribals have taken the name "Taliban", the same as  the Pakistan-created and trained Afghan militia. They deny Afghan insurgents are amongst them, but say if the Afghans were to ask for shelter they would provide it. As such their denials are pointless. It is difficult for outsiders to tell who are the Pakistani Taliban and who are the Afghan; its not clear the distinction has any significance, as they espouse identical values. Editor]

Yesterday's rocket attack on the U.S. Embassy and NATO's International Security Assistance Force compound in Kabul, Afghanistan highlights the increased level of violence throughout the country. Coalition and Afghan troop have seen a marked increase in suicide bombings, IED (roadside bombing) attacks and platoon and company-sized attacks from Taliban fighters over the past year. The Taliban's latest springtime offensive is now in full swing.

In the latest attempt to stem the violence, Coalition and Afghan troops launched Operation Mountain Lion in the Pech River Valley in Kunar Province, which borders Pakistan's Bajaur agency. Over forty Taliban were killed during the operation. The Pakistani Army reportedly has deployed paramilitary troops "along the border stretching from Dir Lower to Dir Upper and Chitral districts" to halt the flow of Taliban across the border during the operation. The Bajaur tribal agency hosts al-Qaeda and Taliban infiltration routes into Afghanistan. The agency is also the scene of air strikes in the village of Damadola, where U.S. Predator drones struck at a meeting of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. Ayman al-Zawahiri was thought to be in attendance but missed the dinner. Five senior commanders, including Abu Khabab al-Masri, the head of al-Qaeda WMD committee are believed to have been killed in the strike.

A segment of the violence can be attributed to Coalition and Afghan Army's push into previously uncharted territories within Kandahar, Urguzan, Kunar and Helmand Provinces. The Coalition and Afghan forces are now making contact with the enemy. The Taliban are attempting to fracture the Coalition, and believe they can run up the body count and force the Canadians to withdraw. "We think that when we kill enough Canadians, they will quit war and return home," said Taliban spokesman Qari Yuosaf Ahmedi. The narcotics trade is also a major source of conflict, as Robert Charles noted last January. The drug lords are finding common cause with the Taliban as the Coalition and Afghan government seek to eradicate the poppy crops.

But the increased violence and regeneration of the Taliban in Afghanistan cannot be viewed as a strictly Afghan problem. The Taliban is reconstituting in Pakistan's lawless North West Frontier Province. The Taliban have been massing in large formations and have essentially taken control of the North and South Waziristan agencies, while consolidating power in the Tank, Khyber and Peshawar agencies. The Pakistani Army is essentially confined to the two garrisons in Miranshah (North Waziristan) and Wana (South Waziristan). The Taliban has openly declared Shariah law in North and South Waziristan and usurped power from the local tribes. Two tribesmen have been beheaded, Zarqawi-style, for "working as US spies." Eight Pakistani paramilitary troops were killed and twenty-two wounded in an ambush near Miranshah, and eight 'miscreants' [Taliban/al-Qaeda] were killed in the ensuing firefight.

The Pakistani Army has been conducting air strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban camps, and has claimed the Taliban and al-Qaeda have taken heavy casualties. While these accounts are likely true, Pakistan has gone to great lengths to hide their own casualties. Pakistan's Daily Times indicates "Taliban forces have so far killed 150 pro-government tribal Maliks in the North and South Waziristan Agencies and are openly challenging the writ of the government by engaging a number of security forces personnel in the area." A source supposedly privy to a high level Cabinet meeting also indicates "the Talibnisation of Waziristan was damaging other parts of the NWFP and that the local Maliks and political administration had been limited to their houses and offices..."

The Taliban's sphere of influence has expanded to [the tribal agencies of] DI Khan [Dera Ismail Khan], Tank and the Khyber Agency, where clerks of the area have started to join them. There has been a sharp increase in attacks on heavily-defended military targets in these areas as well, according to Pakistani Interior Minister Aftab Khan Sherpao.

Steven Emerson aptly explained the status of Pakistan in the Global War on Terror, "[Pakistan] is both an ally and it's an "anti-ally," so to speak. It has been helpful. It's also been detrimental." The Taliban's consolidation of power in the tribal belt is a major detriment, and a problem the Musharraf government can no longer ignore.

April 19, 2006

A.H. Amin

Pakistan Army Promotions

April 18, 2006

Bill Roggio

Iraq Update

The political process remains a major front in the war in Iraq and the disparate political parties struggle to form a unity government. Omar at Iraq the Model fears the current political haggling and possible appointment of two Dawa Party candidates for Prime Minister would delay the formation even longer, as they are even less desirable than Jaafari. Omar warns of the deterioration of the security situation in Baghdad, and explains 'neighborhood watches' are forming at the neighborhood level. But it is the politicians who are now seen as the problem; "Baghdad's residents are managing their daily life with great difficulty and each delay in forming the government makes the situation even tenser and people more worried and people of course have different attitudes; there are always those who expect the worst to come and there are those who still have hope that this mess must reach an end, however they all agree that the situation now is bad by all standards and the accusation fingers mostly point at politicians who are being blamed for this exacerbating crisis."

The situation Omar describes is the prime reason that several weeks ago we recommended for an increased security presence in Baghdad. The politicians need breathing space as the insurgency and al-Qaeda continues to focus their efforts in Baghdad. Operation Scales of Justice is designed to alleviate some of the pressure in the city, but based on the reports from Iraqi bloggers and those in the media, the effects of this operation are marginal.

Today, the London Times reports the U.S. military is planning on a new liberation of Baghdad which would be carried out after the appointment of the new Iraqi government. This operation would provide "one of the few ways in which a fresh Iraqi government could bind the new national army and prove its mettle." The operation would be Iraqi-led, with U.S. forces serving in a supporting/advisory role, and the Marines' "three block war" and the targeting of the militias are the centerpieces of the campaign:

The sources said American and Iraqi troops would move from neighborhood to neighborhood, leaving behind Sweat teams - an acronym for - sewage, water, electricity and trash - to improve living conditions by upgrading clinics, schools, rubbish collection, water and electricity supplies.

Sunni insurgent strongholds are almost certain to be the first targets, although the Shia militias such as the Mahdi army of Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical cleric, and the Iranian-backed Badr Brigade would need to be contained.

While we speculate on the possible re-liberation of Baghdad, Iraqi, Coalition and insurgent operations continue to focus on the regions in and around Baghdad.

Five terrorists were killed, including a "wanted al Qaeda terrorist... whose name is currently being withheld, was involved in the planning and execution of improvised explosive device attacks and allegedly was associated with al Qaeda foreign fighter operations," and five detained after Coalition forces struck at a safe house in Yusifiyah. Three of those killed were wearing suicide vests, and further vests and bomb-making materials were discovered. Near Hawijah, two insurgents were killed while placing roadside bombs. The soldiers from the Iraqi Army's 2nd Battalion, 4th Brigade, 8th Iraqi Army Division recently led Operation Cobra Strike, which targeted a bomb-making cell in the area of Haswah and Iskandariyah. A forgery ring, which produced government IDs, was broken up in Samarra, and a massive oil smuggling operation was dismantled in the northern town of Rabiah. [Washington Post said 1200 trucks were impounded. Editor]

Late last week, the insurgency scored two successful attacks on the Iraqi police and the U.S. Marines. On Wednesday, an eight vehicle convoy of about one hundred police was ambushed on the way to Najaf. Over ten police were killed and dozens missing. Six insurgents were captured and one killed. Curiously, the insurgents passed on attacking a U.S. military convoy, just minutes before, indicating the insurgents has specific intelligence on this unit. The Iraqi police and Army are prime targets of the insurgency. The destination of the police - Najaf - also raises some red flags (more below).

In Anbar province, two Marines were killed and twenty-two wounded in unspecified 'combat operations'. The location of the fighting has yet to be disclosed, but the Marines killed and wounded belong to 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, which was last known to be operating in Fallujah. Asharq Alawsat reports "fierce fighting" between the Iraqi Army and insurgent forces. Another three Marines were reported to have been killed in a separate battle, and again the location of the Marines in Anbar is unspecified. The Marines appear to have been "cheating" closer towards Baghdad of late, and have been seen operating as close as Abu Ghraib. The recent DEBKA report (which must be read with the required helpings of salt) of Marine units being rushed to Najaf & Karbala does seem more interesting in that light. Najaf is a seat of power for the Shiites and Sistani, and the insurgency and Sadr would make a play in the city in any bid to seize power or disrupt the political process.

This article first appeared in Mr. Roggio's blog The Fourth Rail and is reprinted with permission.

April 17, 2006

Ravi Rikhye

Show Iran the Money

That is the argument made separately by William Arkin and Paul Danish: we have to make sure that Iran understands that the US has many military options against Iran and that it will not be deterred by Teheran’s threats of retaliation.

A recent statement by the chief of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps leaves unfortunate room for doubt that Teheran understands what it is up again. The chief said, with a “grin” that Iran has US forces in Iraq under “complete surveillance”, implying with no subtlety that Iran will retaliate against those forces should it be attacked.

The doubt arises because does the IIRC head actually believe what he is saying – which would be bad, or is he saying it for domestic consumption – which would be fine.  If he believes the former, he may believe his threat will deter the US. Which it will not, for the simple reason Iran is already doing its best to target US forces in Iraq. And in any case the stakes are too high for the US to worry about losing a few hundred soldiers to more suicide attacks and similar tactics. A single nuclear bomb would cause hundreds of thousands of Israeli or European casualties; ten could cause millions.

Danish’s solution to the “show me the money” problem in this high-stakes poker game is simple, easily executed, designed for maximum impact on Iran, and the one likely to have the severest global diplomatic repercussions for the US. Danish would explode, with two hours warning, a SLBM delivered warhead or warheads over an empty area of Iran to show the country America means business.

Before our readers react in horror, Danish’s point is precisely that the shot will show Teheran the US will stop at nothing, no matter what the world thinks, and no matter what the repercussions. Had a demonstration to Japan’s war leaders been possible in 1945, argues Danish, the need to actually incinerate Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been averted.

To us this assertion is the one we need to debate, not “what will the world think”. It has been argued that a demonstration would have changed nothing in 1945: the Japanese war leaders were not sufficiently impressed after the two A-bombings to sue for peace. They wanted to continue, because surrender was not the way of the samurai. They had no way of knowing America had only two bombs. For all they knew America had more, and if all Japan had to die for their code of honor, the war leaders weren’t going to shirk. This thesis says it was Japan’s emperor who overruled the warlords for the sake of his people.

Iran’s war leaders could shrug off the demonstration. Additionally, they could find comfort in the undeniable reality that the US will not N-bomb Iranian civilians, and thus not be deterred at all.

Arkin’s thesis is that instead of keeping contingency plans a secret, the US needs to clearly show Iran its cards, lest Iran think the US has only bad options.

The issue here is not that Iran’s was leaders don’t understand what the US military machine can do to them. After the US destroyed the Taliban armies with the loss of perhaps two Americans, at least one of whom was killed by friendly fire, even the Iranians cannot be foolish enough to believe their military forces can withstand American attack.

What the Iranians may well believe is that the US cannot tolerate $100/barrel oil and suicide attacks. Unlike Arkin, I believe the US should clearly explain to Iran that it can, and will, accept $100/barrel oil if push comes to shove. We have argued elsewhere that Iran cannot close the Strait of Hormuz; if we are wrong and it manages, it can keep the Strait closed only for weeks, not for months or years. One way of showing Iran the US does not care is to build up serious inventories in preparation for US: we have shown elsewhere the US can sustain even 1-2 years of loss of Gulf oil, which in any case will be partially and not totally lost, but the Iranians may not understand this.

But how can the US show Iran it doesn’t care if the latter does its worst in the matter of suicide attacks? How to convince Iran the US is not Spain, which was frightened out of Iraq by a handful of terrorist-inflicted deaths? Most people understand this: after all, the threat of more 9/11s has not deterred the US from anything. Indeed, the effect has been the opposite: it has energized the US in a way the US was not getting energized before 9/11.

Incidentally, suicide bombing is not just a matter of finding a volunteer. It requires training and organization. Western nations have been on alert for many years against such attacks. It is by no means clear the Iranians can push tens or hundreds of such bombers into the west when the feel like it. As for attacking US military targets in Iraq with suicide bombers, all we can say is "Good luck." Those may be hardest of all targets Iran can come up with. 

This is not so simple a proposition. The world has a history of underestimating America. Hitler did, and so did Mao. Ho Chi Minh and Giap took years to understand what they were up against. To give them credit, by 1972 they had learned, and they “tricked” the US with America’s full consent. They agreed to talks, the US withdrew, the Vietnamese came back for final victory in 1975 and few in America particularly cared. But the Vietnamese could have saved themselves untold trouble had they offered the same deal after Tet 1968. Saddam didn’t understand, and neither did Bin Laden. Zarqawi and Company may still be clueless – we say may because there is evidence he may have figured out he’s going to lose in Iraq.

The Soviet generals did understand: when they looked into the eyes of their American counterparts, they saw the same cold, ruthless determination that they believed was their prerogative. They understood the Americans were fanatics, ready to die for their “religion”. And they knew full well that they, the Soviets were not ready to die for theirs unless attacked first. But then the Soviet generals and war leaders were men who had first hand seen what Hitler’s cruel war had done to their country. Soviet generals understood that if they failed, they would be executed the same way as their men who ran away from the battlefield. They knew the meaning of all or nothing.

What have Iran’s revolutionary leaders suffered? Very little, and nothing since the Shah was overthrown. Making them understand the consequences of their actions may not be easy.

Vol. 5, Number 8

April 16, 2006

Ravi Rikhye

Resigning As A Way of Protest In The US Military: A Comment

In theory, if a general or admiral does not agree with the Secretary of Defense, he is free to resign. In practice, this is not so easily done.

The American military have a tradition of obeying orders and acting to carry them out whether they approve of them or not. There is no tradition of dissent, and this is not just in the military, but in most American organizations. If you’re not playing on the team, you get kicked off the team. This may lead to greater executive efficiency, but it is also the road to disaster because without constructive dissent there is no check on what the top person does. The head of a corporation is ultimately responsible to his shareholders – in theory at least. The head of the corporation called the Pentagon is responsible to no one but the President and this president values loyalty to himself, not efficiency, as the number attribute in his “employees”.

Add to this the military mentality. It’s a can do outlook: no matter how hopeless your chances for success, you throw yourself into your mission planning to win, or if you can’t win, go down trying. This mentality is absolutely critical for soldiers, it is a necessary virtue, not a vice. Add to the above the intense patriotism and respect for civil control American generals have, you have a system in which dissent is not just discouraged, the people who could dissent feel its disloyal and unpatriotic to do so.

Then there is money. We doubt figures exist on how many generals and admirals depend on their salaries. But these are men/women who have been earning civil service salaries since age 18. How much money can they have saved up? Successful corporate types get to put away considerably larger sums of money at each stage: bonuses and stock options supplement large salaries. It’s hard to resign when you need your salary to live on.

About the first factor, nothing can be done. Only generals and admirals can decide the question of how far loyalty should go. The German generals faced this dilemma repeatedly after the great victories of 1941 turned to defeats. Ultimately they decided they had to keep quiet. And of course, if Hitler needed a general, he wouldn’t let the officer resign. We should parenthetically note that under the Germanic tradition of “equality before the king”, the German generals had an astonishing right to talk back to the leader if they did not agree. The fights that Guderain, for example, had with Hitler leave us with mouths agape.

About the second factor, something can be done. Senior military officers – and senior bureaucrats – should be paid sufficiently that they can resign if the need arises.

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