Indian and Vichy French Forces in the Battle of Deir-ez-Zor, June 30-July 3, 1941
v.1.0 May 26, 2002

Ravi Rikhye

Source: Indian Armed Forces in World War II: Campaign in Western Asia [Historical Section, India and Pakistan, 1957]

The British-Indian Army fought five campaigns in the Western Theatre during World War II:

• North African Campaign
• East African Campaign
• Campaign in Western Asia
• Campaign in Italy
• Operations in Greece

The operations of this army in North and East Africa and in Italy are well known. The Campaign in Western Asia is obscure, mainly because actions were small-scale.

The British occupied Iran, Iraq, and Syria during the early years of World War II because they feared:

• German troops driving into the Caucuses would seek to capture oil production facilities in this region
• Turkey and Germany would create problems for Britain in Syria and Iraq
• Vichy French forces in Syria, increasingly coming under German influence, would work against British interests 

To prevent this, an enormous deployment consisting of 9^th and 10^th  Armies was stationed in the area.  Conflict with Vichy France in Syria was one result.

The battle of Deir ez Zor in Syria took place because Indian 10^th Division [Major-General William J. Slim] was ordered to move from Iraq up the Euphrates River to Aleppo in Syria, thus threatening Vichy French forces at Beirut.  Other columns were simultaneously tasked to take various other objectives.

The tasks given to 10^th Division, as listed in the Official History were:

• To advance from Abu Kemal (just west of the Iraq-Syria border) and seize Deir ez Zor
• To deal with any Vichy French forces encountered
• To defeat any irregular opposition in the area, such as the forces operating under the Palestine guerilla leader, Fawzi Qawukji
• To prepare for an advance to Aleppo
• To create among local tribes a friendly attitude for the Allied cause

The division’s 20^th Indian Infantry Brigade was left in Mosul, in northwest Iraq, facing Turkey.  The brigade would demonstrate with a force built around 2/8^th Gurkha Rifles to the north of the Euphrates to assist the advance of 21^st Indian Infantry Brigade Group, which was the striking force. 25^th Indian Infantry Brigade Group was to protect the line of communications between the objective and Baghdad. An independent battalion, 3/11^th Sikhs, under command to 10^th Division, was to protect the Kirkuk-Hafia pipeline.

Another force was to operate to the north of 20^th Indian Brigade; to the south, yet another force was already engaged in operations around Palmyra, which lay along the route of the pipeline from Iraq to Tripoli on the Mediterranean coast.

The terrain consisted of plains desert with little water and vast distances. For tacticians, the significance of the operation was that relatively small, fully motorized forces were sent over the long distances to attack enemy positions from multiple directions with wide outflanking moves. These were among the first motorized mobile operations conducted by the British Indian Army: long distances were being covered in the East and North African theatres, but large numbers of troops still walked as troops had done for millennia. The official historian notes the risks in such operations, but also emphasizes the rewards. Vichy forces were scattered through Syria, and though they had a considerable air superiority, were unable in the slightest to counter the Indians’ mobile offensive.  Of course, the official historian wrote from the comfortable aftermath of success.  Had these various columns and forces been cut up and destroyed – which could as easily have been the case – presumably he would have different things to say about the risks and rewards of mobile operations.

The operation was also of significance because it helped to further enhance the reputation of the 10^th Division’s GOC, the future Field Marshal William J. Slim. We will read more of him when we start on the British-Indian Army’s campaigns in the Eastern Theatre.

Indian forces were commanded by British officers, as was the norm at this time.  A few Indian officers had reached major’s rank, much more prevalent were Indian captains and lieutenants. Platoon commanders were invariably Indian Junior Commissioned Officers.

21^st Indian Infantry Brigade [Brig. Weld]

21^st Brigade Signal Section

 

-         4/13^th Frontier Force Rifles

-         2/4^th (Prince of Wales’ Own) Gurkha Rifles

-         2/10^th Gurkha Rifles

 

Under Command:

127^th Fighter Squadron, RAF

13^th Lancers

157^th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (a British regiment)

9^th Field Company (engineers)

29^th Field Ambulance

Detachment, 7^th Motor Ambulance Section

16^th (Mobile) Workshop Company

17^th, 21^st, and 25^th Indian Infantry Brigade Transport Companies

35^th General Purpose Transport Company

 

[The Under Command arises because almost all these troops were from division.  The orbat makes clear the manner in which almost the entire transport of the division was pooled to motorize 21^st Brigade.]

Vichy French Forces (as of June 19^th, 1941) Aleppo

One battalion Troupes Speciales (native troops)

4^th Battalion, Levant Infantry

4^th Squadron, North Syrian Cavalry

One 75mm battery

2^nd Group, Regiment Chasseurs d’Afrique (Metropolitan)

Dier-ez-Zor – Abu Kemal – Tell Abibab

One battalion Troupes Speciales

6^th Battalion, Levant Infantry

2^nd Light Desert Company

2^nd Light Mechanized Unit

2^nd Group, 2^nd Levant Metropolitan Artillery

Tell Kolcheck – Qamichliye

8^th Battalion, Levant Infantry

21^st, 23^rd, 25^th, 28^th Light Squadrons, Djejirah Cavalry

Note

Deir-Ez-Zor is an obscure place to almost everyone except the Armenians. They remember it as a way station on one of the main deportation routes in the 1915 expulsion and extermination of Armenians from Turkey.