Aircraft Division Industry Report

1. In September 1944 the US Strategic Bombing Survey was organized under Presidential directive to conduct a survey of the effects of strategic bombing in hastening the German defeat. The Amercian public is well aware that no small part of the cost of the European war can be charged to the Allied aerial offensive against strategic industrial installations. To them an accounting must be given.

2. Strategic bombing is a highly scientific process. It is aimed at the systematic destruction of those resources which will most weaken the enemy by denying him the materials or weapons he needs to prosecute the war. Targets are selected only after a careful balancing of their significance to the enemy economy against the capabilities of the attacking force. To be successful, any strategic attack must cost the enemy many more man-hours lost than are expended in the attack.

3. During the war it was impossible to asses the real significance of this type of warfare. A limited amount of information on physical damage to industrial plants could be obtained from aerial photorgraphs. Ground intelligence from agents inside Germany made an important contribution and some German prisoners of war also told what they knew. It was impossible, however, to know with certainty whether or not the effects of air activity against the Reich justified the effort expended. The final accounting could only be made only after a careful on-the-spot investigation of the targets that had borne the brunt of the attack.

4. This report deals with the specialized but highly important part of the total strategic bombing effort - the attacks on the German aircraft and V-weapons industries. The destruction of this group of industries was considered of vital importance in support of the Allied air effort against Festung Europa. A number of key points in the industrial pattern were selected as objects of attacks. In this report an attempt is made to assess objectively the merits of the choice. It analyzes the German aircraft industry as it was before bombing and as it reacted to our attacks. Chapter One presents the summary and conclusions of the entire investigations. One of the most important effects of strategic bombing, plant dispersal, has been given special treatment in Chapter Two. Throughout the report, wherever the available data have permitted, comparisons are drawn between American and German production methods.

5. The report is based on field team investigation of a selected list of key targets in Germany, on interrogations of important German aircraft officials taken into custody after the collapse, and on analysis of government records of aircraft programs and production found hidden in caves, cellars and attics throughout Germany.

6. Reference should be made to Exhibit VII for detailed information on the history of the Aircraft Division, the persons who engaged in this study and the documents available to supplement this report.

7. The report was prepared under the editorial leadership of Colonel Carl H. Norcross, formerly managing editor of Aviation Magazine. The group responsible for the perparation and the analysis of the German aircraft industry included: W. G. Friedrich, head of the Aeronautical Engineering Dept., North Carolina State College; N.W. Gilbert, Professor of Business Economics, California Institute of Technology; Jerome Lederer, Chief Engineer and Assistant Manager, Aero Insurance Underwriters; C.W. Miller, formerly Director, Planning and Airframe Supply, British Air Commission, Washington, D.C.; Myron A. Tracy, Acting Director, Aircraft Resources Control Office, Aircraft Production Board, Washington, D.C.; and Stephen Zand, Director, Vese Memorial Aero Lab., Sperry Gyroscope Company.

1. This report deals with the effects of strategic bombing on the German aircraft industry.

2. Strategic bombing bears the same relationship to tactical bombing as does the cow to the pail of milk. To deny immediate aid and comfort to the enemy, tactical considerations dictate upsetting the bucket. To insure eventual starvation, the strategic move is to kill the cow (with apologies to Mr Franklin D'Olier).

3. It is not always a simple matter to distinguish between strategic and tactical effort. For example, the heavy attacks against the German airframe assembly plants early in 1944 failed as a strategic effort because they produced only a mild indisposition in the great industrial "cow" that fed the Luftwaffe. "Bossy" refused to stay dead, and eventually succeeded in refilling the pail again and again. But in a tactical sense the results were tremendously important. Hundreds of aircraft that might otherwise have opposed Allied landings in Normandy were left battered and twisted in the smoking ruins of Marienburg, Augsburg, Wiener Neustadt and Dessau. They were not available at the time the enemy needed them most.

4. Neither is it a simple matter to differentiate between the results of direct attack against strategic targets and indirect effects of attack against other segments of the enemy economy. Clearly, if all means of surface transport are wrecked to the point where deliveries of raw materials to factories for the manufacture of finished products become impossible it is of little consequence where the factories themselves are destroyed or remain intact. So, also, if a complete electrical power failure could be brought about by bombing, what happens to plants that are dependent upon power to produce is only a question of academic interest.

5. To cut off the flow of usuable aircraft to Hitler's fighting squadrons, the Combined Bomber Offensive applied every known form of attack. The Royal Air Force bombed cities and industrial areas by night to disrupt and demoralize labor and destroy such factories as might be located in the target area. The US Army Air Forces bombed airfields and factories by day to destroy as many finished aircraft as possible and to cripple further production. At the same time, rail centers, bridges and marshalling yards were under constant attack by both air forces and tons of bombs rained down on oil refineries, synthetic fuel plants and fuel dumps. In the end the total weight was too much. Germany's industrial machine could not endure such punishment and finally collapsed.

6. How much each form of attack contributed to the end result is impossible to determine. Counting up the totals, however, and contrasting their potential capacity with actual accomplishment, it appears from this study that some 18,000 aircraft of all types were denied the German Air Force in the period of intensive attack between July 1943 and December 1944. (Reported production for the same period totalled 53,000 aircraft.)

7. Of the estimated production loss, roughly 78 percent or 14,000 aircraft were fighters. (Total reported fighter production for the period, 45,800.) Whether or not the German Air Force could have used all these additional aircraft effectively (because of shortages of fuel or of pilots), it is obvious that the attacks against the German aircraft industry paid dividends. By keeping such a number of defensive fighters out of the air at times when the air war was critical, the job of wrecking Germany's manufacturing industries, her transportation system and her cities, was rendered that much easier and the war was probably shortened by some months.

8. The question is still open, however, as to how many of those accomplishments resulted from the direct attacks against the aircraft industry. The records which are presented in detail in this report point up the tremendous recuperative powers of Germany's aircraft production. Paradoxically, aircraft production, appears, at first glance, to have been stimulated rather than retarded by the attacks. It must be remembered, however, that the great upswing in production that took place in the spring of 1944 had been planned and provided for during the six to nine month's period preceeding. How much higher the production curve would have risen had the attacks not been made is only a matter for conjecture. It was not until the fall of 1944, after the aircraft industry per se had ceased to be a primary target for the Combined Bomber Offensive, that production began to lag. Airframes, engines and parts were being manufactured in increasing numbers in the vast network of dispersed and concealed factories, but it was only after transportation was disrupted and supplies of fuel dwindled that deliveries of finished aircraft to the GAF finally approached the vanishing point.

9. The quantitive study of the results of the strategic bombing of the German aircraft industry occupies the bulk of this report. Figure 1, which is not to be considered as a statistical presentation, is a composite picture of the trends of capacity, planning and production during the war years. The curves have all been "faired" and any quantitive vertical scale has been deliberately omitted. The relationship of the various elements of the chart, however, is in close agreement with the facts as disclosed in the detailed study that follows. (A more complete discussion of the meaning of the chart appears on the facing page.)

10. If strategic bombing did nothing but force the dispersal of the aircraft industry it would have paid its cost. The disruption to production occasioned by the physical movement of goods and machinery, the resulting loss of efficiency due to the dilution of management, the increasing load on an already overtaxed system of transportation were all factors in the final result. In the end, dispersal defeated itself, because once transportation systems failed, it became impossible to keep final assembly points fed with the necessary components parts and subassemblies to produce finished aircraft.

11. It was largely after that system failed that dispersal went into reverse. It was finally recognized that re-concentration of plants was necessary for efficient and economical operation. Concentrating plants above ground was obviously impossible. The only answer was to go underground. This decision came too late to be effective in the German war programs, but the cost of the effort added tremendously to the strain on the national economy. The millions of man-hours that were drained away from the available total to prepare such huge underground workings as those at Nordhausen and Neckar-Els may be credited directly to the account of strategic bombing.

12. Prior to the end of 1944 there is little evidence that lack of engines or of necessary equipment or of basic materials led to any critical shortages of finished aircraft. Even the widely publicized attacks against the ball bearing industry, which were supposed to pinch off a vital accessory to the building of aircraft and aircraft engines, failed to produce even as a temporary setback. The costly raid on Schweinfurt did cut heavily into ball bearing production. The stock bins and pipelines to airframe and aircraft engine plants, however, were so well filled, redesign of equipment to eliminate ball bearings progressed so rapidly, and the increased output of unbombed bearing plants was so great that the situation never became critical to the point of denying finished aircraft to the GAF.

13. It now appears that the most vulnerable points in the aircraft production pattern were not given the attention they deserved by target selection people or by operational groups. Apart from purely tactical considerations, attacks against the industry would have been more effective in the end if they had been made further back in the manufacturing process rather than against final aircraft assembly points. Hindsight indicates that the aero-engine manufacturing plants were far more vulnerable than our intelligence might have been dealt with more profitably. For example, if shops housing fuselage assembly jigs could have been eliminated, if forge shops making crankshafts could have been put out of business, and if the manufacture of propellor blades could have been disrupted, the effects on final production would have been immediate and persistent. It was recognized only late in the

war that certain foundries, which made certain highly complicated and specialized castings for jet engines, were the "Achilles heel" of the jet fighter complex. By taking out but a few such key shops, the production of the fighters on which Germany was depending to break up our long-range bombing attacks might have been seriously hampered.

14. Failure of British and American intelligence to disclose such vital targets was responsible in a larger measure for our failuer to attack them. Through 1943, intelligence regarding German aircraft industry was reasonably good. After the industry dispersed, however, the quality of our intelligence deteriorated. We not only did not know the locations of many important units in the dispersal pattern, but we seriously underestimated the production capabilities and recuperability of the German industry. A high degree of optimism was injected into the estimates of production as a result of faulty interpretation of air-cover photographs and of reliance upon intelligence from unreliable sources. We underestimated almost by one-half the total aircraft production for 1944. Official estimated predicted a total of 22,440 aircraft. The records show, however, that 39,807 machines were delivered to the German Air Force during that same period.

15. Physical damage studies point to the fact that machine tools and heavy manufacturing equipment of all kinds are very difficult to destroy or damage beyond repair by bombing attacks. Buildings housing such equipment may be burned down and destroyed but, after clearing away the wreckage, it has been found, more often than not, that heavy equipment, when buried under tons of debris may be salvaged and put back into operation in a relatively short time and with comparatively little difficulty. Electrical equipment associated with heavy tools suffers most severely. A good fire in the vicinity of such equipment will destroy motors, control equipment and so forth. It has been generally observed, therefore, that incendiary attacks against airframe and aircraft engine parts are more effective than the equivalent amount of HE on the target.

16. There appears to have been some decline in the quality of German aircraft as a result of strategic bombing coupled with resultant dispersal. Certain items, possibly of superficial importance were neglected as the pressure to produce went up. There is little doubt that operations under dispersed and disrupted conditions presented unusual difficulties, but, throughout, inspection standards appear to have been generally well maintained. Greater-than-average losses in performance or losses of aircraft due to mechanical or other failures were undoubtedly experienced, but in the overall were relatively unimportant. One high ranking US Air Force officer has gone so far as to state that, except for their long range capabilities, we could have traded fighter aircraft with the Luftwaffe and still have beaten them in individual aerial combat. Our greatest advantage lay in the skill

of our fighter pilots and not in any decisive technical superiority of equipment.

17. Looking at the picture as a whole, at the beginning of the war and as long as the initiative was theirs, German industrial planning was good. During the late 1930s, the aircraft industry had been built up to a point consistent with supposed military requirements. Early successes against untrained and under-equipped air forces, coupled with the fact that the losses in these early campaigns were far less than expected, developed a degree of overconfidence and resulted in pushing aircraft requirements well down the list of wartime priorities. Not until 1944, after the overall military situation had been reversed, were aircraft, particularly single-engine fighters, put back at the top of the priority schedule. By that time, however, a certain degree of desperation was in evidence, which eventually led to the deterioration of the aircraft industry and the GAF.

18. Hitler frequently interfered with the aircraft planning program because of his belief in the effectiveness of "secret" or "wonder weapons". Although no great percentage of the V-1 or the V-2 production was directly subtracted directly from the aircraft industry, Hitler's insistence on such weapons interfered seriously at times with material and labor supplies to the aircraft industry and caused dissension and disputes with respect to the relative importance of the two classes of weapons on the priority schedule.

19. All evidence concerning the later phase of the war points to a considerable amount of internal dissension, lack of coordination, and reliance on emergency measures to achieve results. One indication of this condition constantly comes to light during interrogation of topside personnel. Every one of them engaged in a considerable amount of "buck passing" and was obviously making an effort to justify his own position and to prove that what happened to the German Air Force was not his particular fault.

20. During the period from 1941 to 1945, the relative position of German avaition planning and Allied aviation planning reversed itself. In the beginning, the planning for Germany's air effort was consistent and coordinated, while Great Britain and America were fumbling their way toward a plan and a program. From late 1943, however, German production planning became increasingly confused and muddled as Allied effort took shape and gained strength.

21. Strategic bombing of the German aircraft industry caused a direct and indirect loss of production amounting to appoximately 18,000 airplanes between July 1943 and December 1944.

22. The best estimate that can be made distributes this loss of

production about evenly between direct losses caused by destruction of airframe plants, and indirect losses caused by dispersal and by inefficient operation under dispersal conditions.

23. If the German aircraft industry had not been dispersed, it is probable that an equal or even larger production loss would have been suffered.

24. The great rise in the number of airplanes turned out during the first half of 1944 was not so impressive when measured in terms of weight of airframe produced. In the end (1944) the overall efficiency of the German aircraft industry was less than 50 percent of that attained in the United States.

25. The German aircraft industry had at least a 100 percent excess capacity of plant and equipment before the Combined Bomber Offensive. This is indicated clearly by the fact that single-shift operation of most facilities was normal procedure prior to 1944.

26. The pardoxical increase in the rate of production following the heaviest attacks is explained by the fact that earlier planning programs were then on the point of producing maximum results. All pipelines were full and flowing. Also, because of the urgency of the situation, extraordinary expediting of shortages was carried out under the authority of the Speer Ministry, and political terrorism was occasionaly resorted to through the Gestapo to increase output.

27. More attention should have been given earlier in the period of the Combined Bomber Offensive to attacks against aero-engine plants.

28. The quality of German aircraft tended to decline during 1944 because of the difficulties which attended dispersal operations, and because the inspection system began to operate less efficiently under high pressure. The extent of the decline in quality cannot be measured. It probably resulted in only a slight loss of performance for individual aircraft.

29. The alibis used by many German officials and industrialists blaming their failure to produce on a multiplicity of models, excessive progam and engineering changes, can be discounted. Their situation in this regard was no more difficult than that which pertained in the United States.

30. The basic error made by Germany was probably Hitler's failure to increase the aircraft program at the time the Allies began the Combined Bomber Offensive. It is known that accurate information as to the plans and programs for building of aircraft in the United States was available to him, but he and Goering

dismissed the figures as false and impossible, and thereby underestimated their eventual requirements to meet Allied attack.

31. The decision to abandon offensive action by long-range bombers against Allied industry and shipping, and to rely on the defensive capabilities of fighter aircraft proved also to be a strategic error of the first order.

The chart gives a picture story of what happened to the German aircraft industry from the beginning of the war through to the final defeat. It is not a statistical presentation. It is intended to give a qualitative picture of the trends of capacity versus production, particularly during the period of expansion and attack.

Until early 1943 less than half the available capacity was utilized. The industry was coasting along on a one-shift per day basis. The big push for expansion started in 1943 when the High Command realized the potentialities of the Allied air attack. The realization came too late. The weight of attack that was delivered late in 1943 and early in 1944 set back production plans by many months and denied the German Air Force some thousands of aircraft at a time when it needed them most.

By the end of 1944 disintegration of the entire economy had set in. Transportation was disorganized to the point that essential materials could not be delivered to the manufacturer, nor could finished products be taken away. Airframe assembly plants, though relatively invulnerable to direct attack because of dispersal and underground installations, could not get deliveries of engines, accessories, or subassemblies. Centralized planning broke down completely. Production of aircraft fell precipitously to a point far below the normal requirements of the GAF. By war's end the manufacture of aircraft was at a standstill.

1. Prewar Background

a. In 1933 when Hitler came to power there were a number of small aircraft companies in Germany which had had some experience with aircraft design and production. The Treaty of Versailles had forbidden the construction of military aircraft. Only sport and transport airplanes, and a considerable number of gliders, could be built. The companies which constituted the airframe section of the industry at that time were Arado, Dornier, Erla, Fieseler, Focke-Wulf, Heinkel, Junkers, Klemm, Messerschmitt and Rohrbach. The plant and equipment of most of these concerns were very small. Their capital investment was comparitively insignificant.

b. The accession of Hitler marked the beginning of the expansion of the aircraft industry which built the Luftwaffe. Goering, appointed Air Minister by Hitler, ordered the immediate increase in production of existing airplanes, and initiated the development of new military types. The purpose of the first action was to provide the companies with manufacturing experience, and to have something to fly to impress the German people. The second action involved two basic steps: 1) design and development, and 2) the expansion of the manufacturing capacity.

c. The design and development of high performance military aircraft was undertaken by leading aeronautical engineers along lines laid down by the Air Ministry (Reichsluftfahrt Ministerium). The Messerschmitt Me 109 and Me 110, the Junkers Ju 52 and Ju 87 and the Heinkel He 111 were the principal successful model which resulted. These planes were combat tested in the Spanish Civil War.

d. The expansion of the industry was accomplished 1) by extension of existing aircraft plants, 2) by bringing concerns engaged in other industries into aircraft manufacturing by converting some of their plants, and 3) by constructing new plants. The principal concerns from other industries which took on the manufacture of aircraft before the war, were as follows:

e. Funds for the expansion were provided principally by the Air Ministry directly or through bank credits guaranteed by the Air Ministry. The arrangements were liberal enough so that by close cooperation between the government and the aircraft companies it was possible to repay loans quickly and thus build up the ownership of the expanded facilities. The Air Ministry owned Junkers and Arado, and the Saxony State Bank controlled Erla. The management of those concerns, however, carried on operations with little interference from the government. Allgemeine Elektrizitat Gesellschaft controlled Focke-Wulf, Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke controlled ATG, and Krupp controlled Weser.

f. From the first, the keynote of the organization of the German aircraft industry was "rationalization". Competition was discarded as a matter of policy. Patents and designs were pooled. Only a few of the more competent goups were encouraged to carry on engineering development. Several companies were regarded as satellite or "shadow-plants" for concerns with strong design organizations, such as Junkers and Messerschmitt. Henschel entered the aircraft industry of its own accord in 1933 and made a substantial investment of its own funds. At first it was not welcomed by the Air Ministry and it was refused contracts. Shortly, however, this attitude was reversed. Henschel developed several new designs, but its principal contribution was the production of airplanes designed by other companies.

g. The new combat designs were put into line production in the expanded aircraft facilities and a substantial output resulted. The actual yearly production of combat and non-combat types from 1933 through 1944 is shown in Figure VI-1. The types of aircraft that were being built in 1939 as Germany entered the war are shown in Table VI-1, Chapter VI.

2. The Aircraft Complexes

a. A distinctive feature of the organization of the German aircraft industry was the system of complexes, which was an extension of the rationalization principal adopted so generally by the Hitler regime. The original was the Junkers complex. It's purpose was to control manufacturing operations carried on in "shadow-plants" and in the plants of subcontractors. Junkers maintained rigid control over engineering design, provided at least the basic tools, administreed inspection, and took care of materials and facilities requirements. In addition Junkers controlled the manufacturing methods, operations sequences and machining methods employed by subcontractors and licensees. Messerschmitt and Focke-Wulf eventually built up similiar complexes.

b. This system was reorganized in 1942. The idea of the complex was applied to any manufacturer who held a direct contract from the Air Ministry for the production of an airplane model under license

from the designer. The Speer Ministry recommended at that time that Special Committees be established for each principal design concern, to coordinate the several complexes engaged in production of a particular model. The committees were resident in the main office of the design company. They were manned by people from industry but were responsible to the Main Committee for Airframes (Figure III-2). When the Fighter Staff (Jagerstab) was formed in February 1944, the Special and Main Committees were made responsible to it in the Speer Ministry (Ministry of Armaments and War Production).

c. The complexes and Special Committees constituted centralized organizational groups which could draw upon expert technical staffs to handle engineering, tooling, material expediting and other emergencies arising out of bombings. In addition, they were able to arrange interchanges of materials and components among the several manufacturers of the same articles and products. For example, when Focke-Wulf's sole source for empennage assemblies at Posen was bombed out in May 1944, the Special Committee for FW-190s could divert enough identical assemblies from the reserves of licensee complexes, Arado and Fieseler, to supply Focke-Wulf assembly operations while Posen was being set up in dispersed locations.

3. Location of the Industry

a. The aircraft industry in 1939 was scattered over most parts of central Germany. There was no concentration of production in a single region. The principal plants lay along an approximately north-south axis from Bremen to Munich. The new plants built between 1934 and 1939, furthermore, were built in the open country, well outside of the towns and cities.

b. The industry was thus originally well protected against bombing attacks. During the war two other steps were taken to improve the situation: 1) removal eastward to get out of range of heavy bombers based on Britain, and 2) dispersal to scattered locations which offered less concentrated bombing targets, a point which will be treated at greater length later. The location of the German aircraft industry at the beginning of the war, and again in 1944, is shown in Figure II-1 and II-2.

4. Changes in the Industry During the War

a. Except for the eventual dislocation of the aircraft industry brought about by strategic bombing, there were no important changes during the war. In 1940-41, the Air Ministry built a large plant at Wiener Neustadt, Austria, to produce Me 109 airplanes. This plant, operated by the Wiener Neustadter Flugzeug AG, was owned by the Air Ministry. Several other plants were built during the war.

Several new ones were established in Czechoslovakia. Others were set up to balance the operations of individual companies, but there was no need for a general expansion of plant capacity.

b. The prewar concept of multiple integrated production operations, eventually was abandoned. Sometimes the manufacture of subassemblies was separated by several hundred miles, and the parts brought together at two or more widely separated places for final assembly. This shift was necessitated by bombing. The organization of the operations of the Erla Maschinewerk as of the last months of the war provide an example of the changed situation. The Erla operations are shown in Figure II-3.

c. The companies which constituted the German aircraft industry in October 1944, are given in Table II-1. The total number of workers employed by each, and the estimated floor space utilized are listed to provide a rough measure of size. The floor area figure became very difficult to appraise after general dispersal had been undertaken in 1944.

N.R. Not Reported: On the assumption that the proportion of persons employed by subcontractors for the plants in this category is roughly the same as for the plants reporting this item, it is estimated that a total of 425,000 persons were employed in German airframe industry during October 1944.

5. Types of Factory Buildings

a. The aircraft industry was exceedingly well housed as a result of the expansion of facilities between 1934 and 1941. Most of the buildings were of steel frame. Some were of hangar type with wide clearances. Others were the monitor-style type with overhead cranes and monorail systems. Saw-tooth roofs were also widely used. There were no blackout type buildings.

b. The prinicipal of local dispersal was applied to the layout of new aircraft plants. As a precaution against bombing the Air Ministry restricted the total ground area covered by individual buildings, except in rare cases, to about 75,000 sq ft. This meant that the usual plant consisted of several buildings distributed over an area of 30 or 40 acres. An example of such a plant is given in Figure II-5, which shows the arrangement of the buildings which made up the Heinkel plant at Oranienburg. Even before the war this plant was equipped with an elaborate system of underground bomb shelters (See "Hitler Wasn't Bluffing", Saturday Evening Post, 19 February 1939).

c. When manufacturing operations were dispersed it was necessary to make use of a miscellany of structures such as converted textile plants and car barns. Many of the new buildings built during the war, including the great Ostmark engine plants, had wooden roofs. Metal shelves and storage bins were not available, thus increasing fire hazard.

d. The plant structures utilized by the aircraft industry

varied widely in this vulnerability to bombing attacks. The most easily wrecked were the mill type buildings, where brick walls and wooden posts carried the roof. These were easily destroyed by 500-lb bombs and by incendiaries. Many of the early shops of the pre-Hitler industry, and some of the buildings into which operations were dispersed were of this type. Steel structures were less vulnerable. Five hundred pound HE bombs would blow off sections of the roof, dig craters in the floor, and damage equipment within a few yards, but unless there was a direct hit on a girder or column, the building usually did not collapse. Blast effect was reduced by leaving windows open during alerts and by installation of blast walls. Sections of blown-off roofs showed plainly in photo reconnaissance cover, but could be replaced in a matter of a few days. Steel buildings were vulnerable to incendiary bombs if they contained combustible material in which extensive fires could be started.

6. Types of Machine Equipment

a. The airframe industry did not make extensive use of machine equipment. In this regard it is conspicuously different from aircraft engines and accessory manufacture, which will be considered later. The principal machine equipment was used for fabrication of parts: hydraulic presses, stretchers, punch presses, power brakes, metal shapers, shears, routers, and a varied assortment, but not a large number of machine tools for machining forgings and castings. German practice corresponded rather closely with American practice. The capacity of the largest German presses was far greater than that of America. There was not a large excess capacity of these heavy presses. Some were operated in multiple shifts long before the airframe plants as a whole.

b. This equipment was not highly vulnerable to bombing attacks. The large items were too large to be damaged by anything except a direct hit, but their electrical control equipment was highly vulnerable. The smaller pieces of machine equipment could be protected by blast walls. They were vulnerable to a considerable degree to incendiary bombs. Even the most massive equipment is destroyed by fires.

7. Types of Assembly Jigs

a. The manufacture of airframes on a line production basis requires elaborate assembly tooling. Jigs and holding fixtures are necessary to insure that the many structural parts, ribs, longerons, stiffeners, and skin, are put together accurately in the desired aerodynamic form. German practice as to such equipment was well advanced. The production of the principal German planes, especially the FW 190 and the Me 109, by several licensees would have most difficult, and interchangability of parts would not have been possible,

if the assembly tooling problem had not been solved.

b. Two basic types of assembly tooling were used by aircraft manufacturers: The Dornier system which minimized the use of assembly jigs, and the Aircraft Manufacturers' Association "standard" system. The latter system, used by all but Dornier, was operated as follows: Sets of production jigs were made from a master jig. Each plant or licensee was provided with a set of production jigs and also a master jig with which to keep the production jigs in adjustment. The complex also maintained a master control jig to which the several master jigs were sent regularly to be checked for accuracy. This system is similiar to the American practice where several plants made the same airplane. Molding fixtures frequently were of the rotating type, which permitted maximum convenience as to accessibility of work.

c. The dispersal system made heavy demands on the tooling control system. As transport became difficult, it was not always possible to circulate the master tools readily. If a plant was damaged by bombs, delays resulted from the inability to replace and prove substitute jigs. The principal use of assembly tooling was in connection with the production of wings, ailerons, flaps, tail surfaces, and fuselage sections. These units were well suited to dispersal, so raids on the final assembly plants seldom hit the tooling used to make subassemblies. For example, a plant at Frankenburg, 40 miles from Kassel, which made FW 190 wing panels, was not bombed at all.

d. German assembly tooling was almost entirely of the universal type. The frames were made of heavy steel members which were bolted together, and the check points on the jig which determined the shape of the part to be built were bolted to the frame. This type could be adjusted withing limits to premit fairly wide changes in design. Universal jigs of this type were not so vulnerable to bomb damage as special purpose jigs because injured sections could be replaced by bolting in new sections. They were not set permanently in the floor, so that they could readily be moved to new locations.

e. German techniques were generally line production similiar to American techniques, with the notable difference that operations were broken up among several buildings in the same location or dispersed over a wide area. Not only was it common to have fabrication, sub-assembly and final assembly in separate buildings, but also to carry on each type of operation in at least two places. In 1944, when dispersal was carried out energetically, the multiplicity of establishments performing the same production operation was carried still further. Line production of this type was not closely articulated, as in most American aircraft plants, so that any one unit or assortment of units could be destroyed by bombing without stopping the flow of production. But production efficiency, of course, suffered.

f. The segments of the breakdown of the airframe structure into subassembly segments roughly paralleled the American practice. The smaller size of most German airplanes noted as a limiting factor in this regard, but a point of maximum advantage was reached which was well suited to the isolation of production in scattered plants. This high degree of segmentation of production was adopted by German manufacturers before the war, when the Me 109, 110, Ju 87 and He 111 first were put into line production in newly constructed plants, but it was carried still further after 1942 when the declining quality of the working force made necessary a still further simplification of work.

g. The use of mechanized assembly lines and mobile jigs was common but not universal in German plants. Such installations were vulnerable to bombing, but since the usual practice was to have two or more installations in separate plants for each assembly or subassembly, another line could be operated double shift until the damage to the first could be repaired. Moving belts, with the work along them carefully planned at definite stations, were a part of German practice, but they have little bearing on the matter of vulnerability to strategic bombing.

8. Capacity of Plant and Equipment

a. The aircraft plants built by Germany in the years immediately preceding and in the first two years of the war had a capacity, on a single-shift basis, adequate to supply the aircraft requested by the General Staff. This fact had a very important bearing on strategic bombing. Theoretically half of the plant capacity could have been destroyed and the other half, by working, two shifts, could have produced just as many planes as before. There was no problem of a major expansion of aircraft manufacturing capacity during the war, therefore, as there was in the United States. In 1943 and 1944 strategic bombing made necessary the provision of alternate plant capacity in dispersed locations, but it is probable that the plant and equipment which Germany possessed in 1941, if undisturbed, could have produced the quantity of aircraft turned out in the peak months of the war. (Figure I-1).

b. Not only was plant capacity exceedingly large at the beginning of the war, but production tooling had been built for a scale of operations much greater than that actually carried on in 1938 and 1939. German manufacturers had made an intensive study of aircraft tooling during the thirties, and had evolved techniques of "series" or line production for the industry averaged 700 airplanes a month, only one shift of 40 hours a week was worked. Holidays were observed, and most models stood high on the learning curve. These facts as to the capacity and advanced conceptions of German aircraft factories had been noted by visited and had been reported in magazine articles in the United States

and Great Britain long before the war.

c. Plant capacity apparently was at no time a limit on aircraft production. For at least the first three years of the war there was a substantial excess of capacity. Until 1943-44 the General Staff of the Air Forces was content with programs which constituted a light load on the industry. The existence of excess capacity and the practice of having several plants manufacture the same model with production tooling controlled by master tools, increased the difficulty of the strategic bombing attacks against the industry.

9. Use of Aircraft Plants in Foreign Countries

a. During the war Germany incorporated the aircraft industry of captured countries in her total program. After the surrender of Italy, the Air Ministry tried to integrate the Italian aircraft industry with the German. By 1943 almost all training planes and a large number of transports were being manufacturered in France, Holland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The models made were entirely of German design. The list of principal plants outside Germany engaged in the production of completed aircraft is given in Table II-2. This table shows the yearly output of each model for each plant for the period 1941-1944. In addition to completed planes, a considerable number of subassemblies were made outside Germany, but never more than a small precentage of the total.

b. The Vichy government of France declared itself unwilling to produce aircraft for direct military purposes. This position did not conflict seriously with German plans, however, since there were advantages in having the tactically important types produced in Germany and Austria. As the Allied armies advanced in France, Holland and Hungary, machines and tool were brought back into Germany.

10. Extent of Bomb Damage to Aircraft Plants

a. The damage to aircraft plants was much greater than to aircraft productionl. There is not statistical measure of the extent of factory floor space destroyed or damageed over a specific period of time. In a later chapter an estimate is given of the loss of aircraft production which can be attributed directly indirectly to the Combined Bomber Offensive. The damage to individual aircraft plants is covered in detailed in the reports of the field teams of the Aircraft Division of the US Strategic Bombing Survey.

b. An overall estimate of damage to aircraft plants was made by Saur, formerly Chief of the Fighter Staff. He said that up to 1 March 1944, 75 percent of the factories producing airframes and engaged in main assembly work had been damaged. The extent of the damage ranged up to 75 percent on buildings and 30 percent on machines and tool

installations. At a meeting in the Air Ministry in February, 1944 Dr Tank, General Director of Focke-Wulf, stated that Allied attacks had made necessary the expenditure by his company of an estimated 3,000,000 man-hours on the construction of jigs and other production tooling.

c. When the war ended most of the principal buildings of Germany's prewar industry had been destroyed or damaged. Production was being carried on, however, in sections of buildings that could still be occupied, in dispersed locations all over Germany, and, increasingly, in underground forest and bunker-type facilities.

11. Strategic Bombing Forces Industry Dispersal

a. The Combined Bomber Offensive was as effective in forcing the dispersal of the German airframe, engine and accessory industries as it was in the direct damage of factories. It may well be that more aircraft were lost out of production because of dispersal than because of direct bombing.

b. The principal of local dispersal has already been referred to. The arrangement of the buildings at the Heinkel plant at Oranienburg as shown in Figure II-5 is typical. There was a great difference, however, between the planned dispersal the Air Ministry ordered before the war and the frantic scattering of production operations all over Germany undertaken so energetically in 1944. Examination of the maps (Figures II-1 and II-2), which show the location of the principal airframe plants in 1944, indicates only in part the extent of the effort to avoid strategic bombing. It was not practical to show the many small plants involved on small scale maps.

c. The first important airplane factory to be dispersed was the Focke-Wulf plant in Bremen. The British bombing of Bremen during 1940 and 1941 convinced Dr Kurt Tank, president of Focke-Wulf, that he should move his manufacturing facilities eastward, beyond the range of British-based bombers, and that production operations should be broken up among several plants in different cities. He selected Marienburg, Posen, Cottbus, and Sorau, which were east and southeast of Berlin.

d. The Air Ministry prepared a study of the problem of dispersing the entire aircraft industry which was completed in 1942. Nothing official, however, was done than to put the plan into operation. The defensive character of the proposal did not appeal to the High Command, and industrialists opposed dispersal as inefficient and costly. In April 1942, however, as a result of a British attack, the Air Ministry had ordered aircraft concerns to disperse their material stores into neighboring towns.

c. Early in the war, Messerschmitt believed that his principal plants at Augsburg and Regensburg were beyond the range of British-based bombers. It was not until 1943 that he realized his error. It was then that the German people became fully disillusioned as to Goering's promise that "No enemy bombs shall ever fall on the Reich".

12. The Decision to Disperse

a. The official general order to disperse the aircraft industry was not issued until February 1944. Previously, however, a good many individual dispersals of critical war industries, such as ball bearings, had been ordered. The official decision undoubtedly was delayed too long. Beginning in August 1942, American bombers based in the United Kingdom had demonstrated their ability to do precision bombing against continental targets, but it was not until January 1943, that such raids were made on Germany itself. The impression was widely held in Germany that American bombers would not dare to penetrate the Fatherland.

b. Beginning in July 1943, after the decision at Casablanca to conduct the Combined Bomber Offensive against German industry, the Eighth AF began its long campaign of heavy attacks on selected targets within Germany. The Messerschmitt plant at Regensburg was heavily hit. In November, when the Fifteenth AF based in Italy hit the Wiener Neustadt plant near Vienna, Germany no longer could have been in doubt as to the ability of Allied bombers to reach her vital war industries. A detailed analysis of bombing attacks made by the Eighth and Fifteenth AFs against aircraft targets is given in Chapter V. A diagramatic idea of the dispersal of the plant facilities engaged in the production of the Me 109 airplane is given in Figure II-6.

c. The climax to the suprise given the German High Command came in February 1944, when for several successive days large bomber formations attacked targets deep in Germany, with fighter escort all the way. There was no longer any doubt as to what German industry must do in order to maintain the flow of its war materials.

13. The Dispersal Pattern

April and August 1944.

b. Manufacturers had to find their own plants to which to disperse. They were guided by the original Air Ministry plan and were given what assistance was possible. The extreme urgency attached to the aircraft production prgram after February 1944, however, made it relatively easy to find and arrange for plant space.

c. The dispersed plants were normally operated as branches, not as subcontractors. The real difficulty arose in tooling up the new facility and in building up a working force. It was common practice for the Air Ministry or the Main Committee to order workers of a plant being dispersed to go to the new locations. This was done whether they were German or foreign workers. Because the original working force was used in the dispersal, loss of production on that account was reduced to a minimum.

d. The actual transfer of operations from one location to a number of other locations, itself was a threat to production. In most cases, however, it was possible by operating multiple shifts, to build up a cushion of parts or subassemblies before moving. In a few cases an excess of machines or tooling was available which could be set up in the new locations without disturbing production operations in the plants to be dispersed. Normally, however, dispersal caused a temporary setback to production. The Junkers company had stated that it expended approximately RM 50,000,000 in dispersing its operations, and that the removal of engine manufacturing operations to the tunnels at Nordhausen set back production by three months.

14. Difficulties Resulting From Dispersion

a. Industrialists and government officials were fully aware that costs would rise as production units were broken up and scattered. It is not clear, however, whether it was realised in advance that the situation would become intolerable, and that centralized operations underground or in huge concrete bunkers would be the ultimate step. The principal difficulties encountered as the result of the energetic dispersal of the aircraft industry were as follows:

(1) Transportation: The dispersal of industry to avoid bombs ran head on into the fact that transportation upon which dispersed operations depended was itself highly vulnerable to bombing. Furthermore, some locations to which operations were moved were not adequately served with transportation. The actual process of dispersing main factories constituted a heavy burden on transportation facilities. The network of transport on which the Augsburg assembly

plant of Messerschmitt is shown in Figure II-7.

(2) Management: Dispersal made necessary a tremendous dilution of supervisory and technical talent. On top of the heavy manpower demands that were being made by the army, the shortage of persons capable of running the dispersed plants was acute.

(3) More Indirect Workers Required: Dr Frydag estimated that 20 percent additional workers, including those engaged in transportation, materials handling, inspection, production control and expediting were required because of dispersal.

(4) Engineering and Program Changes: These matters were difficult enough to handle when production was concentrated. When the number of production sites was multiplied as a result of as drastic a dispersal program as that directed by Saur, it became practically impossible to make engineering and program changes efficiently. Dr Heinkel stated that he was convinced that Saur carried dispersion much too far.

(5) Scale of Operations: Dispersed operations reduced the size of plants and shortened the production runs that otherwise would have been possible. Milch made a particular point of this as explaining in large part the low efficiency of the German aircraft industry.

(6) Bottleneck as to Tooling: The bombing of aircraft plants placed a heavy load on tool and jig builders. The additional load which resulted from having to tool up a large number of small branch plants resulted in a critical bottleneck which explains in part the failure of aircraft production to increase according to schedule during the second half of 1944. Efforts were made, without success, to return tool and jig workers from the armed forces to meet the emergency.

15. Underground Plants

a. In August 1943, after the RAF attack upon the V-weapon research station at Peenemunde, the Special Committee for the V-weapon project was instructed, probably by Hitler, to set up operations in an underground location. This decision also followed closely after the successful daylight attack upon Regensburg. It preceeded the general dispersal order of February 1944. Hitler apparently was ready to gamble that bombing attacks would not be too serious a factor against German

war industrial capacity, but he evidently wanted to be sure that the development and production of his secret weapons were safe from bombing attacks.

b. At the same time that the general dispersion corder was issued, a governmental agency was established to locate existing underground sites and to prepare them for industrial use. Mine galleries, railway tunnels, salt mines, and fortifications were surveyed and many eventually utilized. Industrialists had regarded such facilities as undesireable for manufacturing operations, but the frequency of air raid alerts and attacks resulted in so much loss of time that underground facilities, by comparison, were a welcome alternative. The government paid the cost of going underground.

16. Underground Plant Problems

a. Few of the German underground plants afforded what might be regarded as good working space and conditions. Some were entered through vertical shafts where elevators constituted a limiting factor both in handling workers and materials. Others were entered through horizontal tunnels, but the danger of a cave-in was usually so great that only relatively narrow working spaces could be afforded.

b. Ventilation, heating, lighting and sanitation usually presented special problems. The underground facilities in most cases were not located satisfactorily as to labor supply, so that barracks had to be built nearby and workers moved in.

c. Bussing, a licensee of Daimler-Benz, moved a part of its aircraft engine manufacturing operations into a salt mine. Because of difficulty with ventilation the humidity became so high that serious corrosion of the precision machine tools resulted. Some of the machines, furthermore, were damaged while they were being moved into the mine. The elevator shaft was not large enough to handle the larger units, with the result that some machines had be extensively dismantled. Few of the interior of the underground facilities were lined with concrete, so that dust conditions, seepage of water, and breaking off of overhead rock frequently resulted in unsatisfactory and unsafe conditions.

d. The Junkers underground plant at Tarthun, near Magdeburg, occupied about 200,000 sq ft in a salt mine. Subassembly and some final assembly operations were conducted on the Ju 88, and FW 190, and He 162. Approximately 2,400 wokers were employed. The management of the plant had no complaint as to the working space. The moisture absorption qualities of the pure salt walls of the corridors and adeqacy of the ventilation system, resulted in satisfactory working conditions. A serious difficulty was the limited capacity of the elevator. Shifts of workers had to be continually on the move in order to go up and down

to the 1600 ft level. This factor undoubtedly interfered with production efficiency.

17. Priority of War Production Moved Underground

a. V-weapons, especially the V-2, were the first moved underground. the tunnels into which they were moved, operated by the Mittelwerke Company, are described in some detail in Chapter IX.

b. Jet aircraft, especially the jet engine of the Me 262, were next to be moved underground. Aircraft engines for fighter aircraft followed. The Junkers company moved the production of its jet engine, the TL.004, and its latest conventional engine, the Jumo 213 into the north end of the set of tunnels at Nordhausen, the rest of which were occupied by the Mittelwerke. The Junkers operations were called the Nordwerke.

c. Daimler-Benz moved part of its principal plant at Genshagen, south of Berlin, into a gypsum mine near Heidelburg, called the Goldfischewerke (see below), Skoda, in Czechoslovakia, a licensee of Daimler-Benz, moved part of its engine production into a granite quarry at Kobanya, near Budapest. In June 1944 Bayerische Motoren Werke undertook to move into a railroad tunnel at Markirch, near Strassbourg. By September the move had been completed, but before significant production could be stated, Allied armies forced the abandonment of the project, and production tooling and machines were returned to dispersal locations in the vicinity of the principal plant at Munich.

d. Fighter aircraft, especially the jet Me 262, were next to be moved underground, Messerschmitt planned to produce this airplane entirely underground in converted mines at Kahla and Kammsdorf, near Weimar. All tools had been installed and production was scheduled to begin in March 1945. A monthly rate of 1000 was to be reached by the end of the year. This establishment was the largest underground production complex in Germany. It had scarcely started when the war ended.

e. In addition to the great Kahla plant, Messerschmitt had a number of small underground plants. Junkers made a few components in a small salt mine at Stassfurt, and Ago, a licensee of Focke-Wulf, operated a small underground plants near Aschersleben. Henschel built Ju 88 subassemblies in an unfinished subway tunnel 2200 ft long in the outskirts of Berlin.

18. The "Goldfisch" Plant

It was planned to produce such parts as crankshafts, cylinder heads and connecting rods for the main Daimler-Benz plant at Genshagen, which was to assemble the complete engines. The move to the gypsum mine on the Neckar was ordered in the spring of 1944.

b. About 500,000 sq ft of the mine could be utilized satisfactorily. A working force of 7000 was planned, and 2500 machine tools were to be moved in. The entrance to the works was bout 100 ft up a hillside. It could be reached only by a primitive road.

c. The preparation of the plant was the responsibility of the Special Committee which had been set up in the SS organization to move critical war industries underground. It was necessary to level off ground surfaces and install ventilation, electricity and sanitation equipment. An underground source of electrical power was planned but not built. The plant used the power system which supplied the local community. A separate water supply system was planned. A pumping station on the Neckar River was started, but not completed.

d. Transportation facilities had to be provided. The nearest depot for loading and unloading railway cars was at Neckar-Els. A spur later was built to a point halfway between the river level and the entrance to the tunnel from which point goods could be carried up by elevator into the plant. The elevator was not completed until the beginning of 1945. Storage sheds were planned but not completed. The original entrance to the tunnel proved inadequate to handle the flow of workers and materials, and a second one had to be built.

e. The working force was housed in nearby towns. Barracks at the underground location were planned, but not completed. The underground kitchen to supply workers with hot meals was not completed until January 1945.

f. Special problems arose in the actual operation of the plant. The power supply was not adequate, and there were frequent interruptions when the local electric plants were damaged by bombing. Working conditions became unbearable because of high humidity over a long period of time. The dampness was detrimental to machine tools. It was necessary to use unheated air for ventilation, frequently leaving tunnel entrances open. The drafts were most uncomfortable and resulted in much sickness among the workers. In one tunnel the loosening of overhanging rock caused loss of life and damage to machines. Under such conditions it was almost impossible to carry on precision work on aircraft engine parts.

g. The air attacks during the winter of 1944-45 led to interruptions in the supplies of raw materials and parts because of tranportation. It was difficult to maintain efficient relations with the assembly plant at Genshagen. The low-level air attacks in the spring of

1945 on local rail and road transportation finally made work entirely impossible. The heavy bomber attack on 23 March 1945, directed against the railway bridge near the plant damaged the power cables, the main water plant and the access road, as well as the railway. A number of bombs fell on the hill above the mine excavations and a few rocks were disloged in the tunnels, but no serious internal damage was done.

h. Daimler-Benz officials in charge of the plant summarized their experience with the underground plant as follows: "More and more it became clear that even a subterranean plant cannot function during air attacks in a satisfactory way unless it had at least its own power and water supplies, forge and foundry. It should also carry on its own assembly operations. There should be underground means for transporting both workers and materials. Unless these conditions are complied with, working underground is a hopeless undertaking, as proven by the experience in the spring of 1945.

19. Forest Factories

a. One of the most interesting and effective dispersal methods developed by the Germans was to hide plants in forests. Such plants were necessarily small but they were quite large enough for the production of subassemblies for fighter aircraft. They were constructed principally of wood, hence they were cheap and could be erected quickly. In many ways forest factories were Germany's most successful form of dispersal. Only a few were built, however, and they were available only in the last months of the war.

b. Messerschmitt used the forest plant idea extensively. Such buildings played an important part in the production of the Me 262 jet fighter. Messerschmitt had had a considerable amount of experience with the common types of dispersal and with the operation of underground plants. It concluded that factories hidden in the woods near its plant at Augsburg offered the best possibilities for a quick solution to the problem of evading Allied bomber attacks. More than a dozen such installations were built near Leipheim, Kuno, Horgau, Schwabisch Hall, Gauting and other places. A diagram of the Kuno plant is given in Figure II-8.

c. The plant at Horgau, about seven miles west of Augsburg, on the Autobahn, is typical of the forest factories built by Messerschmitt. It assembled wing panels, nose and tail sections for the Me 262. A nearby forest plant attended to final assembly, and the Autobahn was used for flight tests. The Horgau plant had 21 separate wooden buildings, including seven barracks in which workers lived. The total floor space was approximately 25,000 sq ft. The wing assembly was 300 ft long and 50 ft wide. The roofs were painted green, and as the tops of the trees met overhead the locations could not be detected from the air.

Access roads to the Autobahn were easily hidden. The Horgau plant employed 845 workers on a two-shift basis.

20. Comparison Forest vs Underground Plants

a. The Messerchmitt company made a comparison of forest and underground installations principally as to construction details. The following table, compiled by company officials at the request of the Bombing Survey, shows the significant comparative data:

* Still unfinished

b. The Research Institute Herman Goering, at Voldenrode, near Brunswick, planned much of the scientific development of Germany and carried out certain projects. Its buildings, which included libraries, administrative offices, wind tunnels, engine laboratories, living quarters and an armament development center, were located in the forest which surrounded the airport. The institute was not bombed at any time during the war.

c. The success of forest factories is demonstrated by the fact that the exact location of none of them was discovered. The use of the Autobahn as a runway was detected by photo interpreters, and Allied

fighters destroyed a large number of Me 262 airplanes half hidden along the highway, but the places of production in the forests were not attacked.

21. Bunker Plants

a. The highest development of the idea of a structure in which manufacturing operations could be conducted free of enemy bombing attacks was the bunker-type plant. This structure was an adaption of the submarine pen protected by slabs of reinforced concrete. Difficulties with dispersed operations and with underground plants had convinced the High Command that production eventually must be centralized in large measure in above-ground structures that would withstand the heaviest known bombing attacks. At the end of the war two bunker-type structures each of about 1,000,000 sq ft, were about 50 percent completed (at Kauffering and Muhldorf/Inn) and three more projected. Shortage of steel and cement in the last months of the war delayed the program.

b. These bunker-type plants were designed as great dome-shaped structures about 80 ft high containing from three to four stories. The thickness of the top and sides of the dome was to be between 20 and 30 ft. The curved surfaces were intended to deflect bombs and to minimize blast effects.

22. Conclusions

a. The dispersal of the aircraft industry was successful from one point of view. Targets were scattered and so difficult for intelligence to locate, that it became almost impossible to reduce Germany's capacity to produce aircraft by direct attack.

b. Dispersal eventually defeated its own purpose because it was entirely dependent on transport. Rail, water and highway transport were all vulnerable to bombing and, especially, to tactical operations as the front advanced.

c. Dispersal, because of the difficulties it presented, led to reconcentration. When the war ended Germany was making desperate efforts to centralize critical war industries underground and in bunker structures.

d. Perhaps the greatest tribute that could be paid to the effectiveness of Allied bombing was the herculean effort made by Germany's war industries to escape it. The aircraft industry was blasted out of its well planned plants in established industrial centers and forced to disperse to hundreds of makeshift factories all over Germany. It burrowed under the ground, fled to wooden sheds in the forests, and finally, at the end of the war, was in the process of covering itself with mountains of reinforced concrete.

Chapter III
Government Controls and Programs

1. With the accession of Hitler to power the aircraft industry became a tool in his hands with which to attain the objective of National Socialism. The development of aircraft types, the expansion of production capacity, the provision of capital investment and the placement of orders for aircraft production depended upon the government. The organization formed for this purpose, the official programs for aircraft production given the industry, the coordination of the aircraft program with the rest of the German war production effort are the subject of the present chapter. These matters must be understood in order to appraise the effect of strategic bombing on the production of aircraft.

2. Organization of the Air Ministry

a. Hitler appointed Goering Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Forces and also Air Minister. The jurisdiction of the Air Minister extended to production of civilian aircraft as well as military, and to the operations of the Lufthansa commercial airlines. In his capacity as Air Minister, Goering appointed a Director of Aircraft Procurement (General Luftzeugmeister) who was charged with the procurement of aircraft for the German Air Force. General Udet occupied this position until his death by suicide in November, 1941. Field Marshall Milch, who had been serving as State Secretary of the Air Ministry, took over Udet's office.

b. The overall organization of the Air Ministry as it existed throughout most of the war is given in Figure III-1, which also shows the Ministry's relationship to the General Staff of the German Air Force, to Speer, to Goering in his several capacities, and to Hitler.

c. Milch served as director of Aircraft Procurement until the Air Ministry became formally associated with the Speer Ministry for Armament and Munitions in February 1944 and was finally dissolved a few months later. Milch had requested that the initial association be arranged. He had enjoyed the friendliest relationships with Speer. The overwhelming problems with which the Air Ministry was confronted in the winter of 1943-1944 as a result of heavy bombing of aircraft targets, the general dispersal order, and the desparate need for increased fighter production, could only, Milch believed, by getting the direct action on materials, machine tools, manpower, and construction which Speer was able to supply.

d. The transfer of the Air Ministry and its subsequent dissolution have been interpreted as an admission of its weakness. It was manned by Air Force officers, some of whom, at least according to Speer

and others, were not well qualified for their positions. The general in charge of production in the Technical Office, for example, was a reserve officer who had been a judge. He knew little about industrial production. Few of the responsible officers in key positions in the Air Ministry, both reserve officers and professional army officers, proved to be effective. Milch, himself, was reasonably competent. He knew enough about engineering and production in relation to aircraft to defend the industry against unreasonable requests by the General Staff of the German Air Force, but he failed to be an effective leader of the Air Ministry in handling critically important engineering and production matters.

e. The point of friction which caused Milch to go to Speer for help dealt principally with the supplies of raw materials required for the aircraft program. Milch, under interrogation, put the situation as follows: "During the winter of 1943-1944 the supplies allocated to the Air Ministry were reduced more and more. The Speer Ministry was mainly concerned with supplies for the Army, as that was its responsibility. Thereupon I started weekly conferences between members of my staff and members of Minister Speer's staff to correct the situation. Speer wanted to be helpful, but his assistants took a different view. After a two - three month trial, I saw that these conferences were doing no good. I spoke to Speer, who was ill at the time, and suggested that we start along new lines since the production of fighters must be increased. Speer realized the difficulty of the situation, and agreed to the situation. As a result the Fighter Staff was formed." It was in this way that the Air Ministry first became identified with the Speer Ministry.

f. Milch was the first chief of the Fighter Staff, but Saur, at Milch's suggestion was made deupty chief. Saur had previously been in charge of the Technical Office of the Speer Ministry, in which capacity he had jurisdiction over the allocation of war materials. He had just made a successful record by increasing the production of tanks. Saur had caused Milch considerable difficulty because of inadequate allocations of steel forgings to the aircraft program. Milch and Speer knew that Saur enjoyed the personal favor of Hitler and that he was in daily touch with him.

g. Milch did not expect that he would be displaced by Saur. Within a few days after the Fighter Staff was set up, however, Saur was made its chief. The production functions of the Air Ministry were carried on energetically by the Fighter Staff, and in June 1944 the Air Ministry as such was dissolved. The Speer Ministry assumed full responsibility for the aircraft program. The technical functions of the former Air Ministry were transferred to the Chief of Air Armaments in the office of the High Command for Air, which had been set up late in 1943, and the procurement functions were absorbed by the Speer Ministry.

h. The Fighter Staff continued until 1 August 1944 when it became an Armament Staff (Rüstungstab) with jurisdiction over other principal war equipment in addition to aircraft. Saur served as its head until the end of the war.

3. Organization for Program Planning

a. At the beginning of the war Udet carried on direct negotiations with aircraft manufacturers as to production plans. When Milch took Udet's place later in 1941, however, he set up an organization in the Air Ministry whose sole task was to plan the aircraft program. This group was part of the Technical Office, not the Planning Office. The latter group was concerned with the planning of materials, facilities, and manpower required by the aircraft program.

b. The planning work on aircraft programs by the Air Ministry was carried on with the advice and assistance of the Main Committees for airframes, engines and accessories. (See "Relationship between Air Ministry and Aircraft Industry" below.) These committees were inspired by by Speer when he became Minister of Armaments and Munitions in 1942, and were outgrowths of the Industry Advisory Council which Milch and Udet had formed in May 1941. The Main Committees were made up of leading people from industry. Throughout the war they represented a definite industry point of view. Before the Air Ministry went over to the Speer Ministry the Main Committee was responsible to the Air Ministry. Subsequently they came under the Speer Ministry. When the Air Ministry was dissolved in May 1944, its planning functions were transferred to the Main Committee.

c. The procedure for program planning, while it was undertaken by the Air Ministry, was as follows: 1) The General Staff of the Air Force originated the requirements by type, approximate numbers and delivery schedules. 2) The Air Ministry received the request from the General Staff and the planning group in the Procurement Division undertook the preparation of studies aimed at the fulfillment of the requirements. 3) The planning group consulted the Main Committees for airframes, engines and accessories, and the divisions of the Speer Ministry which had jurisdiction over materials, machine tools, and other matters which were basic to the proposed aircraft plan. 4) The planning group sent its completed study to the General Staff of the Air Force. If accepted it became an official plan; if not, a new study was made. Goering personally approved each official program, presumably after consultation with Hitler. After the Air Ministry was transferred to the Speer Ministry, the procedure remained substantially the same. The planning group was transferred to the Main Committee for Aircraft (established in the late fall of 1943) which had become part of the Speer Ministry.

d. Several aspects of the planning function are not revealed

in the following description. The Air Ministry was under considerable pressure from the Air Forces General Staff to find ways to include in the program airplanes and modifications of existing airplane types which met the individual whimsy of famous fighter pilots. Some of these erratic requests could be traced to aircraft manufacturers who wished to secure the adoption of an improved design or a new technical idea.

e. The personality of Goering does not show through the description of planning procedure that has been given. He was always ambitious for his Luftwaffe, but he would not oppose Hitler on any point. There are strong indications that Goering did not really understand engineering and production matters in relation to aircraft procurement, and that he was often impatient with such details.

4. Master Planning of the Aircraft Program

a. A distinction is made in the present discussion between formal series of offical programs issued to aircraft manufacturers, and the broad thinking that was behind them. In this latter light there appear to have been three stages: 1) The prewar program, from 1933-1939, when the plan for the establishment of the aircraft industry was conceived, executed, and sufficient airplanes were produced to fight the war through its first successful stages; 2) The period 1940-1943, when the dominant attitude toward the aircraft program appears to have been one of neglect; 3) The frantic effort beginning in 1944 to get fighters with which to save the homeland.

b. The nominal responsibility for initiating the requirements of the Luftwaffe lay with the General Staff of the German Air Forces. Actually Hitler and Goering were the dominating personalities in the picture. The General Staff officers owed their appointments to Goering. They included a number of young officers who had met with great success in combat, but who were not qualified necessarily to originate the procurement of aircraft which involved complex industrial production and technical design considerations. Since the average tour of duty was three months there was no opportunity to learn through experience.

c. In addition to the general failure to do anything to increase the aircraft program, a conflict existed throughout the war among high officials as to the relative desireability of bombers and fighters. Hitler and Goering favored bombers because such airplanes could carry the offensive to the enemy. Other high-ranking Air Force officers were insistent that the only answer to the Combined Bomber Offensive was fighters. Fighters were defensive weapons and Hitler was opposed to that type of thinking. When Allied bombs were raining down on Germany in the winter and spring of 1943-1944, Hitler personally ordered a cut in the fighter program in order to make material available for a small four-engined bomber program and the conversion of the

Me 262 to a fighter bomber.

d. In justice to the Air Ministry, it should be noted that it was not responsible for the weakness of the master planning of the aircraft program on Air Force General Staff and higher levels. The Air Ministry was an administrative agency. Milch repeatedly tried to arouse interest in expansion of aircraft programs. Under interrogation he stated that Goering on one such occassion told him point blank that he and not Milch was running the German Air Force. Since the General Staff would not raise its conception of requirements, and material and other things were difficult to get from the Speer Ministry for programs which had been adopted, it is a little wonder that the Air Ministry had a poor reputation.

e. In a partial explanation of the neglect of Germany of adquate planning of the aircraft program during the first years of the war, two points may be mentioned. 1) There is considerable evidence that Hitler regarded the war in the west as over in October 1940. The Air Ministry made a study based on the assumption that the war was over (a chart to that effect was found in the documents of the Air Ministry) calling for the building up of aircraft production for another war in 1947. 2) In October 1941 with the Wehrmacht at the gates of Leningrad and Moscow, Hitler concluded that the war in the east had been won. The Russian campaign became one largely between ground forcers, and Hitler turned his principal attention to tanks and other mechanized ground equipment.

f. The background of thinking in 1942 as to aircraft requirements is reflected in the following statement by Milch. Under interrogation he recited a conversation that had taken place among Goering, General Jeschonnek (Chief of the General Staff, German Air Force), and himself. It is paraphrased as follows:

Milch: Herr Reichsmarschall, I have now studied the matter. Your total demand is for 360 fighters a month. I don't understand. If you were to say 3600 fighters then I would have to say that against America and England combined, 3600 are too few, you must produce more. But to demand 360 fighters --!

Goering (to Jeschonnek): What do you think about it?

Jeschonnek: I do not know what I should do with more than 360 fighters.

g. Germany had declared war on the United States in December 1941, and the following month Winston Churchill stated that soon American bombers would be operating from British bases. With American tacticians favoring the use of heavy bombers it would have seemed obvious for the German Air Force to start preparations for the defense of

the homeland by building up a mighty fighter force. But the declaration of war on the United States apparently did not cause a ripple of attention in the direction of increased aircraft requirements for the German Air Force. The Air Ministry and certain designers of heavy bombers were unable to get the support of the General Staff for the development and production of heavy bombers with which to supplement German submarines in the war against Allied shipping.

5. Relationship Between Air Ministry and Aircraft Industry

a. The formation of the Industry Council by General Udet in May 1941 has already been mentioned. This group, made up of principal members of the aircraft, engine and accessories industries, served in an advisory capacity to the Air Ministry. The Director of Aircraft Procurement served as chairman. Milch continued this Council. In March 1942 however, when Speer succeeded Todt as Minister of Armament and Munitions the Industry Council was reconstituted into three Main Committees, one each for airframes, engines and accessories. The council continued in nominal existence but the Main Committees were active throughout the war. Speer established similiar committees for each major war industry. The organization of the Main Committee for Aircraft as it existed in 1944 is shown in Figure III-2.

b. The function of these committees in the aircraft industry was to advise the Director of Aircraft Procurement and the Air Ministry on production matters. They served also as a buffer against unreasonable requests from the General Staff, in cases where Milch, because of his military position, was unable to take a firm stand. Because they represented the industry point of view, Speer referred to them as "parliaments."

c. In addition to the main committees, there were Special Committees for each of the principal aircraft companies, with offices at the head office of the company, and Special Rings for each of the industries which supplied the aircraft industry. Under the Industry council there had been 104 Special Committes and Rings. When the Main Committees were formed, however, Speer took 52 of the Special Rings into his organization because they served other important war industries as well as aircraft. This was the beginning of the dependence of the Air Ministry for the flow of vital materials and items of equipment.

d. The Special Committees were especially important in the cases of the principal complexes, such as Junkers, Messerschmitt and Focke-Wulf. They funnelled the requirements of the parts of the complex as to materials, facilities and workers. They also coordinated engineering and tooling matters.

e. In the fall of 1943 the Main Committee for Airframes at Speer's request was made the Main Committee for Aircraft. It centralized

the requirements and functions of the entire industry. Dr. Frydag was director of the Main Committee for Airframes and later, Aircraft, throughout its life. He appears to have been accepted both by the ministry and the industry in general. He was a strong moderating influence (along with Dr. Werner and Dr. Heyne, directors, respectively of the Main Committees for Engines and for Accessories) on the purely military demands made by the Air Force General Staff, and he was of major help to the Air Ministry, which was weak with respect to production matters.

f. The Main Committees were important in an advisory capacity between the industry and the Air Ministry and the Speer Ministry, but the direct relationship of leading individual aircraft manufacturers with leading persons in government, Hitler, Goering, and members of the General Staff especially continued to be an important factor throughout the war. All too often, from the point of view of the Air Ministry, manufacurers dealt directly with Goering and Hitler. There were instances where some industry leaders were in bad favor with Luftwaffe officials, and instances where others were in such good standing that they received special favors. The fact that Dr. Frydag, who, while Chairman of the Main Committee for Aircraft, was also serving as director of both Heinkel and Henschel, created a situation which was open to the criticism of other aircraft company directors. Dr. Frydag appears to have enjoyed the confidence of his associates quite generally, however, because of his recognized ability and pleasing personality, although friction developed between him and Messerschmitt during the winter of 1944-45, over the Me 262 and He 162 jet airplanes.

g. Any appraisal of the particular attitudes of individual aircraft manufacturers toward Luftwaffe and Air Ministry officials, depends largely on statements that border on gossip. The following observations hav been gained from interrogations:

(1) a. Professor Messerschmitt expressed himself as highly critical of Goering and Milch for failing to provide the workers, materials and machine tools required by the expanded programs given the industry in August and October 1943. He complained also of the fact that the German Air Force suffered from deficient leadership. One of his principal complaints was that young pilots who had distinguished themselves in combat had been placed in positions of great responsibility. These men were largely incompetent at least insofar as production problems were concerned. Front-line men had been considered only as mechanics. He also criticized Goering and Milch for failing to see the need to construct a fleet of long-range bombers to supplement submarine warfare in the Atlantic. This

failure was part of the general failure to determine which of the 35 types of aircraft in production should be curtailed in order to make a place for four-engine bombers. Messerschmitt's poor opinion of the Air Ministry caused him to suggest to Saur in 1943 that the Speer Ministry take it over.

(2) b. Dr. Tank of Focke-Wulf became critical of the Air Mininstry in 1940, when, after the Battle of Britain he tried to direct attention to the need for a high-altitude fighter. He was told to forget the matter, that the war was being won on the ground. Tank confirmed Messerschmitt's statements as to Goering's General Staff. He referred to General Molders as having no capacity for the job, to Gen. Storp as incapable, and to Gen. Peltz as a dud. Gen. Galland, he said was excellent and the only exception. Dr. Tank criticized Gen. Pasewalt, head of the Technical Office in the Air Ministry, for suggesting that the four-engine bomber, He 177, be made a dive-bomber. Dr. Tank complained that when the Air Ministry was turned over to the Speer Mininstry and Saur was made director of the Fighter Staff, no thought was given to anything but numbers.

6. Production Planning Prior to September 1942

a. The successive official aircraft programs do not fall into clear-cut groupings. For present purposes, those dated between the beginning of 1939 and the middle of 1942 will be considered first. During this period there were 14 separate plans no including minor revisions.

b. It was characteristic of this period that the sights of the aircraft program were kept low. The aircraft industry was allowed to operate at substantially less than capacity, even on a single-shift basis. Actual production of the leading combat types (fighters and bombers) followed closely and sometimes exceeded figures in the official plan (Figure III-3 and Exhibit I.) Program totals tended to exceed actual production because they included hoped-for production of new types especially the Me 210 and the He 177.

c. The average monthly production of combat types of aircraft during the period 1939-June 1942 was as follows:

These figures reflect the limited scope of the German aircraft program during the first three years of the war. They are the leading combat types only (Me 109, 110, 210, Ju 87, 88, He 111, He 177, and Do 217), and are not to be confused with total aircraft production which included trainers and other types.

d. Throughout this period, Milch and Udet tried to increase the aircraft program, but the General Staff of the Air Force did not support them. In 1941, they put forward two expansion programs, the Elch and Goering Plans, but neither was approved. Both plans provided for new construction of factories and the Goering Plan projected an approximate doubling of production by the end of 1943. Goering was always ambitious to incerase the scope of the operations under his command, but he appears to have been a weak salesman of such projects to Hitler. It is noteworthy that he seldom took Milch with him to see Hitler in spite of the fact that Milch understood the necessity of advanced planning in the case of aircraft. There is a possibility that Milch might have gotten further with Hitler than did Goering.

e. A modest expansion program did come out of Milch's and Udet's efforts in 1941, however, and the Air Ministry undertook the the erection of several large plants, principally in Austria and in Czechoslovakia. They included plants at Wiener Neustadt, Vienna (Ostmark), Brno and Steyr. The General Staff of the Luftwaffe authorized no significant overall increases in aircraft schedules in connection with this expansion.

f. The Air Ministry failed also in the development of new types of aircraft during the first years of the war. Germany began the war with the Me 109, 110, Ju 87, [Do 17] and He 111, all of which were in substantial production. Volume deliveries of the Ju 88 were just beginning in 1939. The FW 190 was added shortly thereafter. These models and improvements of them remained the backbone of the Luftwaffe of the Luftwaffe throughout the war. In 1944, the He 177 design difficulties finally were solved and it was getting into volume production just before it was cancelled to conserve fuel and to divert productive effort to fighters. In 1944 the Me 262 also came into production, but it had sufficient operational experience to provide a convincing test of its merits.

g. Dr. Frydag stated that the Air Ministry had a reputation for meddling in problems of design, and that usually the results were unsatisfactory. It is difficult to authenticate this comment. There appears to be no doubt that the technical staff of the great airframe and engine companies were far more competent than the engineers in the Technical Office of the Air Ministry, and that the function of the

ministry was to indicate the direction of desired new developments and improvements, not to meddle in working out the assignment. The manufacturing companies were prohibited from carrying on experimental and development work not specifically directed by the Air Ministry.

h. The weakness of the leadership of the Air Ministry on production matters is illustrated vividly by the experience of the Henschel plant at Schoenefeld. In 1940-41 that plant was engaged in the production of Ju 88 airplanes. The Air Ministry authorized it to change to the Hs 129. When production tooling was about 50 percent completed the project was cancelled. The company was then directed to tool up for the production of the Ju 188. This was 100 percent completed, but before production started the project was cancelled in order to make a place for production of Me 410s at a rate of 400 per month. This was only 80 percent tooled up at heavy cost when the project was cancelled and Henschel was directed to produce the Ju 388. Altogether some 300,000 to 400,000 man-hours had been expended on tooling for this project when the bomber program was cancelled, and the company ended the war making wings for the Ju 88 as a night-fighter.

7. Programs Subsequent to September 1942

a. Nine separate programs were set up between September 1942 and the end of the war. They are shown in chart form in Figure III-3. The data for these charts are given in Exhibit II. Actual production curves are shown on these same charts. The comparison of the successive official schedules with what actually was produced throws light on the hopes and desires of those responsible for planning the aircraft program.

b. A summary table which brings out the principal features of these plans is given in Table III-1. It shows a comparison of the successive plans as to single-engine fighters, twin-engine fighters, bombers, and total airplanes, as of six-month intervals, 1941-45. Actual production as of those check points is given for convience in making further comparisons.

c. The first three plans reflect the decision to do nothing about expanding the aircraft production program. The peak conception of needs for single-engine fighters was 465 a month, bombers 683 a month, and all models 1732 a month. These programs included several new designs, such as the Me 210 and He 177, which were still in the stage of development, so the General Staff of the Air Force had no assurance that it would get production. In such cases it is usual to keep other models in the program as insurance.

d. The next two plans, those dated 21 Sep 1942 and 15 April 1943, show the first indications of increased schedules as to aircraft requirements. The increase was almost entirely in fighter types, but the rate of increase was much less than that of which the industry was capable.

e. The two plans which followed, dated 8 Aug and 1 Oct 1943, made possible the build-up in production in 1944. Single-engine fighter requirement were raised to 4150 a month, and twin-engine fighters to 1740 a month. The rate of increase was a realistic maximum. Bombers were kept in the program at existing production rates.

f. The plan dated 1 Dec 1943, is of special interest because it reduced the program for both types of fighters drastically in order to make way for the He 177, a four-engine bomber. Supplies of materials were not adquate for both. This was done at the personal direction of Hitler. Instead of a peak rate of 4150 single-engine fighters, a peak of 2933 was substituted, and twin-engine fighters were reduced correspondingly. This plan did not make material changes in the short-run interval. The earlier plans, because of the flow-tine factor, controlled the flow of materials into the productive process which resulted in the rise in output during the first half of 1944.

g. The next three plans, date 15 July, 15 September, and 15 December 1944, might be called "fantasy" programs. They reflect an atmosphere of desperation. Fighter requirements were restored to levels even higher than before Hitler had cut them. Bombers, except for the defensive night fighter types, were cut out. The rate of climb prescribed for the immediate months (Exhibit I for monthly figures) in each of these plans was far too steep to be realistic. Great hope was placed at that time on the new Heinkel jet airplane, the He 162, called the "Volksjager". Design work began 23 Sept 1944, the first flight was made 4 Dec 1944, line production was undertaken immediately, and by March 1945, 100 airplanes had been built. Dr. Frydag who directed this effort, claimes that this is a record. It was a small airplane with a single BMW-003 jet unit mounted above the fuselage. It was abandoned two months later because of technical difficulties and the ending of the war.

h. The last plan, dated 16 Mar 1945, was as realistic as it could be under the rapidly disintegrating condition of Germany's industrial economy. With Allied armies crossing her borders at several points, all programs were cut drastically. The end was in sight.

8. Standardization of Airplane Models

a. The multiplicity of airplane models has been cited as factor explaining in part the troubles of the German aircraft industry. There is no question that a large number of models was in each successive official program, at least up to the last threee, but it is equally significant that the overwhelming proportion of German aircraft production was in a relatively small number of models. In this last respect

Germany probably was in a better position than the United States, where a considerable number of second and third line models were in substantial production. The amount of production effort absorbed by the large number of models which comprised the bulk of the German list, cannot have been large.

b. There were several conspicuous examples of indecision as to whether a particular model was to be included in the program or not, but this reflected confusion in planning rather than an undesireable number of available models. The failure to develop new and successful models except for the Me 262 in spite of many attempts, was an experience shared by the United States.

c. Germany's success with the improvement of existing models was also similiar to United States experience. The use of the same basic model for several purposes introduced a complicating factor in final assembly installations and equipment. Leading pilots were accustomed to go to aircraft plants and specify individual arrangement of such things as seats, instruments and controls. The Air Ministry was foreced finally to issue a specific rule against this practice.

d. An important step to reduce the number of models in production was taken in the summer of 1944. The emergency emphasis given the fighter program by the formation of the Fighter Staff in February 1944 resulted in the pushing of bombers into a poor second place. In July this situation was formalized by striking out bombers as a group from the official Air Ministry program. Saur claimed that in February 1944 there were 45 models in the aircraft program. By June he said that he had cancelled 25, and by September 11 more, with the result that only nine models were left. This was a drastic reduction, indeed, but the actual records do not support Saur's claim. The elimination of bombers from the last three programs, beginning with 226/2 dated 15 September 1944 certainly resulted in a reduction of the number of models. In August 1944 Dr. Frydag ordered the immediate transfer of 20,000 production workers from bomber plants to places where fighters were being produced.

e. It is not strictly accurate to count the Me 109 and the FW 190 as single models. There were alphabetical sub-type designations, numerical series for each sub-type, minor variations as to equipment and structure for each numerical series, and a further numberical series designation for each modified veriation. These subdivisions were the result of design improvements and of different tactical requirements, the Me 109, for example, was used for training, reconnaissance, high and medium level fighting, and other special purposes.

f. In the case of the Me 109, nearly all those built in 1943-44 were of the G series. Only 754 of the K series were built. There were six numerical subdivisions of the Me 109G (2, 4, 5, 6, 10, and

14) built in the period, and three equipment and two minor structural modifications of the Me 109G-6. During 1944 the number of sub-types of the Me 109 and the FW 190 increased from five to ten and four to eight respectively. In spite of this large assortment, because of dispersal it was usual to have each plant concentrate on one sub-type.

9. Coordination With the Overall War Effort

a. This subject comes under the divisions of the Bombing Survey which treat the broader aspects of the German war effort. Only brief consideration will be given it here.

b. The outstanding incident was the necessity for the Air Ministry to come to the Speer Ministry in February 1944 to get sufficient power to meet the tremendous obstacles with which it was confronted. This action reflects unfavorably on the previous effectiveness of the Air Ministry. Although Speer and Milch were friends, there was friction between their respective organizations and time was lost because of red tape in clearing important matters having to do with materials, tools, manpower, and bomb damage repair.

c. The priority position of the aircraft industry is an important factor in the coordination of the total German war production effort. There does not appear to have been any formal listing of priority positions. The statements of responsible officials are not in agreement. Dr. Frydag has stated that aircraft always were in first or second priority position. Directors of aircraft manufacturing concerns which had to compete with other industries for materials, insist that aircraft were often in fifth, sixth or seventh position.

1. A highly efficient intelligence organization is a clear prequesite for strategic bombing. Before German war industry could be bombed out, it was necessary to develop a clear idea of the location and nature of important targets. In the light of the knowledge which was developed as to targets, the specific bombing missions of the Combined Bomber Offensive were planned, and the tactics to be used were evolved.

2. Organization for Target Intelligence

a. The Eighth Air Force began operations against Germany approximately two years after Great Britain had started its attacks. It was natural and desireable that the American organization for air intelligence hsould work closely with the established RAF organization, and to benefit from its longer experience. This was done. Officers of the USAAF and the British Air Ministry engaged in joint intelligence activities throughout the Combined Bomber Offensive.

b. The central joint organization for target selection was the so-called "Jockey" committee. It was formed in the summer of 1943 at the beginning of the offensive, and was charged with the duty of continuously studying German industry and operations, and with recommending weekly target priorities to the Chief of the Air Staff. The Committee was composed jointly of British Air Ministry specialists, and Intelligence Section officers of the Eight AF and VIII Bomber Command. It was in charge of target selection during the period of the war in which the main objective was the defeat of the German Air Force. In September 1944 the Jockey Committee was merged into an enlarged organization, the Combined Strategic Targets Committee, in order to cover more effectively several major target priority systems.

c. The Jockey Committee had nothing to do with the grand strategy of the Combined Bomber Offensive which had been decided at Casablance, in January 1943. The basic policy of the great air offensive was to be "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system... to a point where... capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened." Within the general directive there were changes of emphasis, from the aircraft industry to synthetic oil and to transportation, for example, according to the decisions of the Allied Command. Even among aircraft targets there were shifts from one point of emphasis to another.

3. Sources of Target Information

a. Basic information concerning the German aircraft industry

had been gathered by the usual intelligence organizations of the United States and British governments. Detailed information was available on most of the prewar industry, which served as a good point of departure for photographic reconnaissance, prisoner of war interrogations, espionage, and other information gathering activities. During the war the technique of photographic interpretation became very highly developed. Information was secured both as to the nature of industrial production and as to bomb damage assessment.

b. As a general matter, the t