The Sinews of War:

Economics, Production and Logistics during the Second World War

There's a saying that amateurs study strategy while professionals study logistics. This is certainly true of the historiography of World War 2 in which the economic underpinnings that supported the war effort have generally received short shrift. There are certainly notable exceptions, more so in recent years, but logistics and economics are topics far less 'sexy' than the Benghazi Stakes or the Battle of Guadalcanal. There are many reasons for this state of affairs, but suffice it to say that these subjects, crucial to the understanding of why the war was waged in the way it was, are definitely neglected. I aim to change some of that.

I've worked up some pieces on various topics that I've found of interest. You'll have to decide for yourself if the conventional wisdom is correct.

Battlefield and Strategic Logistics

German Ammunition Expenditure during the Polish Campaign
One of the minor myths about German actions after the conquest of Poland is that Hitler was dissuaded from attacking France in November by his generals who pleaded that the existing stocks of ammo needed to be replenished lest they be exhausted during the invasion of France which was bound to be expensive in blood and ammunition, implying that stocks had been largely expended during the Polish Campaign. This wasn't quite the case and methinks that the generals were exaggerating to dissuade Hitler from attacking. There were a number of good and sound reasons not to attack France in 1939, but low ammunition stocks wasn't one of them.

German Logistics and the Normandy Breakout

Italian Priorities in 1940-1941: Africa or Greece First?
It's often assumed that Italian support for the early stages war in North Africa was as much as it could muster at the time. This is not correct as the campaigns in Greece and Yugoslavia consumed much more than did that in North Africa. It's often forgotten that this campaign was waged at the same time as the initial battles in North Africa and that all supplies for the Greek front had to be delivered by sea to an area that possed virtually no infrastructure at all. For reasons of national and personal pride Mussolini placed the weight of the Italian effort on conquering Greece rather than Egypt. Italian resources were limited and thus neither campaign could be prosecuted to the fullest and Greece won out.

Weapons Production

Germany