Kargil and Skardu

Incomplete and Provisional Draft

v.5.1 Last Updated February 1, 2004

The Plans: Background

• India develops 3 strategic plans for 2010, labeled Green, White, and Orange; each plan has several variants. The plans range from the most ambitious – Green Mod 1, calling for the reintegration of Pakistan with India and recovery of territory lost to China in 1959-62, to the most modest, Orange Mod 5. This calls only for the recovery of Skardu; once Skardu is taken Pakistan will lose all territory to the east including the Siachin.
• Because of political considerations, in May 2010 the Indian armed forces are given the go-ahead only for the least ambitious plan, Orange Mod 5. India will initiate action in the Siachin and, blaming the incident on Pakistan, will use it as an excuse to attack Skardu. In this distant, high-mountain wasteland, where at the best of times both sides are on hair-trigger response times, and where there are neither civilians nor journalists to say otherwise, India is confident it can get away with blaming Pakistan as having started the fighting.

Political Inhibition Against a First Strike

• All 3 strategic plans have been formulated with the assumption that India will strike first, seizing and maintaining the strategic initiative. This is necessary to shorten the war and reduce its costs, material and human. The Military Planner was assured by the Cabinet in 2003 that the military will have a free hand once the Go order is given.
• As the time for war approaches, however, nervous politicals in the Cabinet, National Security Council, and Foreign Ministry insist that India cannot initiate a war. In 2010, the cost of being labeled an aggressor in is considered too high.
• The military is told India will attack first only against Skardu. Any other offensive can open only if Pakistan escalates the war. This new instruction forces the military, at the last minute, to assume a defensive posture in all seven major subtheatres of operations: North Kashmir, West Kashmir, Jammu-Pathankot, Punjab, North Rajasthan, South Rajasthan-Gujarat, Makran Coast.
• It creates a further problem: once on the strategic defensive, all the bold plans must be held in abeyance. For example, the North Kashmir plan requires simultaneous, minimum warning assaults against Gilgit, Minimarg, and Skardu, putting Indian forces behind Pakistan’s defenses at the very start of war, and thus shortening the time required to seize this geographically difficult area. With the initiative now essentially conceded to Pakistan, if Pakistan refuses to oblige India by escalating, a huge spanner will be thrown into India’s plans.

North Kashmir

• North Kashmir’s four main sectors, from the Indian side of the border are Siachin, Skardu-Kargil, Gurais-Minimarg-Skardu, and Minimarg-Astor-Gilgit. Pakistan has, in the last 15 years, improved roads from Astor to India’s Kupwara sector in the NW of North Kashmir to facilitate support to infiltrators. The aim is also to counter a potential offensive threat posed by India: India has been improving infrastructure in this previously remote region to support CI operations, but those same roads and helipads can be used to mount brigade sized operations against Astor.
• Minimarg is vital because it is on the western flank route to Skardu, so a two-front attack can be put in, from here and from Kargil-Marol. Minimarg is also on the road to Astor, from where the Gilgit-Skardu road is easily accessed.
• The interdependence of the sectors makes a unified offensive essential. For example, to attack Skardu just from the Kargil side creates a situation in which a skillful defender can hold his own for weeks, if not months.

Deployments – India

Peace Dispositions

India’s peacetime deployments in North Kashmir are:

• HQ XIV Corps Leh

- 3^rd Division Leh [now 3 brigades]

- 8^th Division Nimu [rotates one brigade every 4 months to plains]

- 6^th Division Bareilly [Corps reserve]

- 102^nd (I) Brigade Thoise [Siachin]

- Ladakh Scouts seven battalions

• Arrayed for Orange Mod 5, India plans to use its XIV Corps [3, 6, 8 Divisions] against Skardu. To safeguard against the possibility that China takes the opportunity to threaten India in Eastern Ladakh, India quietly replaces 3^rd Division with 57^th Division from the east. To permit GOC XIV Corps to focus exclusively on his offensive, 57^th Division is temporarily out under direct command of Northern Command.
• Snapshot

The other Indian corps are deployed as follows:

§ IV Corps – [Army HQ Reserve]

§ XXXIII Corps – Northeast border, insurance against China

§ XIII Corps – Gilgit offensive

§ XV Corps – West Kashmir

§ XVI Corps – Naoshera (Jammu region)

§ III Corps - Jammu

§ XI Corps – Punjab

§ X Corps – South Punjab – North Rajasthan

§ I, II, XII Strike Corps – concentrated in Punjab and Rajasthan

§ XXI Strike Corps – [Army HQ Reserve]

o Some rearrangement of HQs is needed, though the new HQs are termed ad hoc, they have been long prepared and rehearsed for their role.

o A new Provisional HQ 6^th Army is created at Leh. Under it is a new Provisional HQ XIII Corps for the China border, XIV Corps, and an independent provisional HQ 93^rd Division for the front Matyan-Kaksar. It is 93^rd Division’s responsibility to ensure Pakistan does not outflank the Skardu thrust by attacking from Gultari. GOC XIV Corps is thus free to focus exclusively on Skardu.

o Battle Dispositions

§ XIV Corps

- 3^rd Division to attack from Thoise and Chorbat La

- 8^th Division to attack from Kargil

- 77^th [I] SF Brigade is the air assault element

- 6^th (-) Division is the Corps reserve

§ 16^th Sector - Between Matayan and Kaksar

- XIV Corps Independent Brigade

- Brigade 8^th Division

- 7 Kargil Scouts Battalion between Matayan and Kaksar

- 61^st RR Division positioned to protect the road Matayan – Kaksar and to provide depth against any Pakistani infiltration that might threaten the vailability of the Skardu offensive.

• India’s clear intent is to begin the war with a maximum strength offensive between Thoise and Kargil. 77^th Brigade is to seize Skardu by an airborne assault; 3^rd and 8^th Divisions are to attack frontally to pin down Pakistani defenders, 6^th Division is to jump over the defenses once they are fixed, using helicopters, and progress in steps to link up with 77^th Brigade in six days.
• It is assumed to offensive will draw all available Pakistani brigades in North Kashmir to Skardu, reducing Pakistan’s offensive potential in another sector to zero.
• The Indian Air Force has promised it will block any Pakistani reinforcements from Gilgit or Minimarg, protecting Indian XIV Corps’ left flank as it advances to Skardu. India will send only about two companies worth of SF to screen the flank; they will call in air power as needed to provide flank security. Another two companies will perform sabotage against Pakistan’s lines of communication, and stage strikes against C3 targets [Pakistan Command, Control, and Communications] This is the first time in independent India’s history that flank security for a major offensive is to be provided solely by air power.

Deployments – Pakistan

Peace Dispositions

• Pakistan’s Force Command North Kashmir, in peacetime, consists of:

• 323^rd Brigade at Dansam for the Siachin – though India and Pakistan have long since ceased fire and troops at Dansam and Thoise live mainly under peace conditions [such as are possible in the terrain], the issue has not been resolved and both can react quickly to any escalation.
• 62^nd Brigade at Skardu
• 80^th Brigade at Astor
• 170^th Brigade at Gilgit as reserve
• Territorial defense militia, into which Pakistan’s border paramilitary battalions are integrated; estimated about 7,000 full-time soldiers plus perhaps 20,000 militia.

India expects Pakistan X Corps will send about 3 reinforcing brigades to FCNA when it becomes aware of the Indian buildup, and it anticipates

§ Brigade at Dansam

§ Brigade at Marol

§ Brigade at Gultari [in 2003 this had been covered by a division which was later withdrawn]

§ Brigade in reserve at Skardu

§ Two brigades at Astor and Minimarg

§ Brigade in reserve at Gilgit

India knows Pakistan is limited in how many troops it can deploy in this region because its communications with its plains bases are lengthy and tenuous; moreover, putting too many troops into the fighting at Skardu means risking having larger numbers trapped with no line of retreat should India cut the lines of communication between Gilgit and Skardu.

As far as Operation Trident East is concerned, Indian XIV Corps needs to deal with brigades at Skardu, Marol, and Dansam; it expects at worst it will be opposed by 5 brigades, and expects because of air interdiction Pakistan will be unable to reinforce the area. Against that India will deploy 11 brigades, with more available as needed. More than the numerical superiority, India has superiority in mobility so it can engage and defeat Pakistani brigades one by one.

• Snapshot

Other Pakistani corps are deployed as follows [each has TD forces]

§ X Corps - Rawalpindi [mainly to protect front between the Chenab and Poonch Rivers

§ I Corps - Sialkot

§ XXX Corps - Pasrur

§ IV Corps - Lahore

§ XXXI Corps - Bhawalpur

§ II Corps - Ft. Abbas

§ XI Corps - Sukkar

§ V Corps - Hyderabad

§ XII Corps - Army HQ Reserve, but India will force it to deploy between Sukkar and Hyderabad

§ Force Command Makran Area – assortment of defense troops

War Dispositions

• For all the talk about zero warning offensives, this is impossible to do. You can, as the Egyptians did in 1971-73, keep your army mobilized and conduct endless exercises, thus disguising the real offensive as just another routine exercise. This ploy worked once, it is unlikely in our times to work again. A major offensive requires time to prepare, and India had been preparing since January 1 of the year. Pakistan had responded accordingly, so that as of June 1, both sides were fully mobilized: troops were deployed, reserves had been called up, ammunition stocks were in place, maps had been updated, adversary air defense electronic systems probed, and so on through a list of hundreds of things needing to be done before war is declared.
• India is baffled, but also pleased, that the Pakistanis seem to be misreading Indian intentions. For Pakistan does not reinforce FCNA beyond embodying its territorial defenses of 9 regiments, a total of about 20,000 men, whose heaviest equipment is the 81mm mortar. A debate takes place among Indian intelligence analysts: is Pakistan really unaware of the impeding war or is it playing some deeper game of its own? The Army is not particularly interested in the answer. Its plans are predicated on Pakistan putting up the best possible defense; if Pakistan reinforces FCNA it acts as India expects, if it does not reinforce, all the better for India.

• Pakistani dispositions in FCNA are:

§ Regular army as deployed in peacetime

§ TD regiments based on Gultari [1]; Marol [2]; the Chorbat La [1]; depth reserve [1]

Strategic Considerations Note

India’s assessment is that Pakistan’s overall offensive potential in the plains is limited. Pakistan has 36 mechanized and 30 armored brigades, a total of 66. By contrast, India has 80 brigades. The superiority is not so much in numbers, but in quality of equipment: less than one-third of Pakistani tanks are modern, versus two-thirds of Indian; Indian brigades have IFVs, only some Pakistani brigades do; India has modern SP artillery for all formations, Pakistan has it only for some. India has a 8-1 advantage in attack helicopters, which are in reality the next incarnation of tanks. None of this implies that Pakistan cannot catch India by tactical surprise and launch an offensive at some point in the plains, or at best at two points. It does mean that because India can mount four powerful corps sized offensives to Pakistan 1-2, and can sustain them better, the threat to India can be contained.

In Kashmir, Pakistan seems to have given up offensive plans, because it is unable to keep pace with India’s buildup. It has only about 8-9 brigades for mountain operations; considering India has nine divisions while still keeping guard against China, India sees no offensive threat. Defensively, both in the plains and in the mountains, India believes Pakistan’s TD regiments will prove mere speed bumps to the Indian attack, and that they will become disorganized and ineffective when India uses its airmobile strategy to jump over frontier defenses.

Overall, India believes it has the needed superiority to defeat Pakistan.

Technical Note: Helicopter Operations

§ The higher the mountain terrain, the less the helicopter’s lift. This can be compensated for by using more powerful engines than may be required in the plains; but it works only to a point. Even in 2010, an Indian UH-1 [based on the US UH-60] is not going to lift its normal plains payload of 4 tons to altitudes higher than 2000 meters, or half that to 4000 meters. To operate at 6000 meters even if the payload is now reduced to 1 ton requires is something that cannot be consistently done.

§ Mountain helicopter operations are greatly affected by winds at various points of the day, leading to conditions that are dangerous, sometimes the winds make flying impossible. Rotor blade icing is a serious problem even with de-icing systems: if excessive ice builds up, the helicopter is in trouble. There are other difficulties not encountered in the plains.

§ In the plains, a helicopter can hover a few meters above the ground and thus be line-of-sight invisible to the enemy at – say – 1-2 km across flat plain. In the mountains, if the helicopter is in a valley, it can be spotted from miles around by observers on the mountains above the valley; if it is operating on top of a ridge, it can also be easily from long distances. The vulnerability of the helicopter during assault operations is much greater in the mountains.

§ In the plains a helicopter landing pad can be arranged at short notice almost anywhere, and usually the helicopter can put down most anywhere without serious foreign object damage to its engines. In the mountains the helicopter has to have an adequate landing pad. In the advance, landing pads close to the leading edge of the infantry will be unavailable and time is required to construct pads. Paradoxically, then, though the helicopter can give advancing infantry a big jump when the operation starts, to sustain an operation, particularly if the advance is stalled is much harder than in the plains.

§ Under ideal conditions, a helicopter can fly 10-20+ logistic support sorties a day, as many Indian helicopters did when rivers needed to be crossed in the 1971 East Bengal campaign. In battle, however, the number of sorties per day plummets. Requiring more than 3 a day per helicopter is asking for trouble. Enormous amounts of time are taken up getting reconnaissance information, briefing, planning and preparing for a mission, and simply sitting around while the usual communications and control problems are resolved. If the 10 helicopters that are needed to lift a rifle company in the assault lightheartedly take off without being aware of the exact situation in and around the assault zone, you could, for example, lose most of them to an ambush. In the mountains, expecting even a sustained 3 sorties a day is unrealistic.

§ No matter how many helicopters you have, the commander is always short of helicopters when in battle. Theoretically, of course, he is short of everything, but because helicopter operations are vulnerable to so many disruptions, and because the helicopter is a high-value asset, any departure from perfect conditions/operations is going to seriously affect the commander.

§ Rule Number 1: the commander and his battle staff always get a helicopter before anyone else, and it has to be that way. In combat [as opposed to sustainment operations such as moving cargo and personnel], casualty evacuation gets a helicopter last. Regardless of what one sees in the movies, many, many men die who could easily have been saved had a helicopter been quickly available.

§ Pilots are human beings and their machines are highly vulnerable at the delivery and extraction end of their mission profile. Regardless of what the manual says, if unexpected difficulty is encountered on the ground due to enemy action, the helicopters are not going to go in to complete the mission. If, for example, the first company in a battalion assault gets into trouble, the helicopters with the remaining companies are not about to go in, no matter how badly the company now on the ground needs help. Quite aside from the lives of the four crew [two pilots and two crew chiefs] there are lives of the 10-15 infantry aboard to be considered. When a loaded helicopter gets a missile hit in its engines or rotors get blown off, the end result is not pretty. That is why you never see close-up pictures of a downed loaded helicopter.

§ There is an unwritten law in combat helicopter operations. You cannot order a crew to fly a mission to pick up casualties from a specific location in a contested battle zone. The helicopter is a sitting duck as it hovers – sometimes for minutes – to get the casualties out. You call for volunteers, and depending on the intensity of the battle, you may not get any. Combat medevac pilots are the most respected of all helicopter pilots. They not only have to be without nerves, they also need to be habitually lucky, many times a day, every day. There is good reason they are considered the angels of the battlefield.

The Final Round Starts

o At exactly 0600 on June 1^st, 2010, 102^nd (I) Brigade’s medium regiment in support of troops deployed in the Siachin, opens a systematic and measured bombardment of Pakistani positions on the heights above the glacier. Pakistan Artillery responds with alacrity. Casualties – not serious – are reported from both sides as the exchange continues into the night. UAVs and helicopters buzz around in great excitement, but fighter and reconnaissance aircraft are careful not to violate any of the peacetime rules regarding their deployment in this crisis area. Pakistan has a pair of F-7Qs and an AEW controller airborne over Skardu; India has a pair of interceptors up over Leh, controlled by an AWACS flying over the Kashmir Valley, and by nightfall has put up a Combat Air Patrol over the Valley as well. Indian air intelligence intercepts and decodes a signal from the PAF’s AEW dressing down the F-7Qs on duty because they are so close to the 25-km buffer area on Pakistan’s side that the slightest error or distraction can find them in the buffer.

o Anxious moments are experienced by army intelligence when it learns that Pakistan has identified 3^rd Division on its left flank: till now India has quite successfully convinced Pakistan that 3^rd Division has not moved from the East Ladakh front. But Pakistan seems to do nothing about this information, and other messages which make apparent the Pakistanis are exceedingly worried the incident not escalate through any misaction of theirs, reassure the Indians that they still have the element of surprise. Pakistan does not seem to have worked out that India is dissimulating and that in reality a corps size offensive is waiting to jump off.

• The DMOs of both countries and the sector commanders are constantly on the hotlines. Each accuses the other of starting the Siachin firing, each assures the other it has no intention of escalating, troop movements are only precautionary, and doubtless all will be sorted out at the political level in short order.

Both DMOs know they are lying; each wonders if the other knows he is lying.